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Abstract 
 Starting from the premise that international human rights law is not a neutral fact, this 
dissertation is a critical exploration of the promises, transmissions and impacts of 
intersectionality as an approach to gender protections in international human rights law. I begin 
with a definition of intersectionality at the individual claimant and jurisprudential levels, as an 
approach to anti-discrimination and equality law that attempts to move beyond static 
conceptions and fixed identities of discriminated subjects, and, based on Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
powerful metaphor of a traffic intersection, delineates the flow of discrimination as multi-
directional, and injury as seldom attributable to a single source. But in its life beyond these early 
works, intersectionality’s epistemological and ontological claims have since come to express the 
possibility of a nearly infinite entanglement of human experience as impacted by systems of 
governance and regulation. In exploring this, I articulate an additional conditioning intersection. 
That is, in addition to the intersection of multiple harms, forms of discrimination or identities—
which are, variously, the meanings ascribed to intersectionality as an approach to international 
human rights law—the intersection this dissertation fundamentally straddles is that between 
social critique and instrumental engagement. This dissertation is guided by an engaged 
ambivalence about the core project of harnessing feminist social critique, such as that invited by 
intersectionality’s migratory path, to the perilous project of feminist governance. I mobilize a 
critical international law framework, to review relevant literature, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) practices and decisions, 
related United Nations memos, documents and Special Rapporteur materials, along with 
original interviews with CEDAW Committee members to assess the legal status, governance 
implications and feminist goals realized and missed in the intersectional turn in international 
human rights. It concludes that intersectionality both advances critical legal practice, and 
remains entangled in the imperial vestiges of international law’s genealogy.  
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Introduction 
“Can feminism foster a critique of its own successes”?2 
 
In a 2002 essay,3 Anne Orford issued a challenge to feminist international legal theorists 
and practitioners. Within an overall critique of the imperial shadow cast over the deployment of 
women’s rights’ rhetoric and its effect in a neoliberal economic context, Orford asks: “What 
might a feminist reading that attempts to avoid reproducing the unarticulated assumptions of 
imperialism look like?”4 
In this dissertation I ask, what if the introduction of intersectionality as a framework for 
approaching women’s international human rights is a partial answer to this question? In order to 
both pose and answer this question, I will advance a critical exploration of the promises, 
transmissions and impacts of intersectionality as an approach to gender protections in 
international human rights law. Mobilizing a critical international law framework, I review 
relevant literature, practices and decisions of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), related United Nations (UN) memos, documents and 
Special Rapporteur materials, along with original interviews with CEDAW Committee members 
                                                 
 
2 Janet Halley et al, eds, Governance Feminism: An Introduction, Legal Studies/Feminist Theory (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2018). 
3 Anne Orford, “Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law” (2002) 71 Nord J Int Law 275. 
4 Ibid. 
2 
to assess the legal status, governance implications and feminist goals realized and missed in the 
intersectional turn in international human rights law.   
Promising an account of the full complexity of discriminated persons, intersectionality at 
its most involute allows us to elaborate the specifically structural histories of exclusion from the 
distributional benefits of equality that an anti-imperial approach would require. Traceable 
through many academic fields, standpoints of critique and approaches to method, 
intersectionality has travelled the globe, articulating this promise through its potent metaphor of 
the confluence of pathways to harm through multiple identities. As with other feminist ideals 
active in public life, intersectionality has leapt from the page, transmitting and thereby being 
transformed through its movement “from the international to the local and back again, from 
centre to periphery and back again, from the ivory tower to the street and back again”.5 Although 
there is a strong body of work that catalogues intersectionality’s failures in domestic law,6 
relatively little has been done to account for its robust adoption in international law. Notable 
exceptions to this are divided between critiques of the UN’s allegedly incomplete understanding 
of the concept,7 upset at the primacy of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work in informing it,8 and 
practitioners’ guides to its deployment.9  
                                                 
 
5 Janet E Halley, Governance feminism: an introduction (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2018) at 23. 
6 Emily Grabham, Intersectionality and beyond: law, power and the politics of location, Social justice (Abingdon, 
England) (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009). 
7 Johanna E Bond, “International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s 
International Human Rights Violations” (2003) 52 Emory LJ 71. 
8 N Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics” (2006) 13:3 Eur J Womens Stud 193; Nira Yuval-Davis, 
The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations (London: Sage, 2011). 
9 Meghan Campbell, “CEDAW and Women’s Intersecting Identities: A Pioneering New Approach” (2015) 11:2 Rev 
Dierito GV 479; Fredman, Sandra, Intersectional discrimination in EU gender equality and non-discrimination law 
(European network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination: European Commission, 2016). 
3 
Of particular interest to me in this dissertation is intersectionality’s now nearly ubiquitous 
appearance as a key aspect of women’s international human rights law. Its deployment needs to 
be better understood so as to pose and explore the question of whether its adoption helps 
international law to shed its imperial mantel, effectively moving intersectionality from critical 
social theory to critical legal technique. Therefore, while there is a vast literature through which 
the concept can be traced and usefully sharpened, it is the transmissions and impacts—
productions and receptions—particular to international human rights law that will shape the 
contours of this work. Specifically, I trace the promises, transmissions and impacts of 
intersectionality at and through CEDAW and its monitoring committee (the Committee), and 
consider the ways in which intersectionality has been elaborated as an approach to international 
human rights’ protections for multiply10 discriminated women.  
For this context, I begin with a definition of intersectionality at the individual claimant 
and jurisprudential levels, as an approach to anti-discrimination and equality law that attempts to 
move beyond static conceptions11 and fixed identities of discriminated subjects, and which, 
based on the metaphor of a traffic intersection, delineates the flow of discrimination as multi-
directional, and injury as seldom attributable to a single source.12 As I explore in Chapter 1 and 
continue to trace throughout the dissertation, the strain of intersectionality that arose in 
Crenshaw’s work was an attempt to account for the duality of race and gender as they shaped 
experiences of discrimination and were rendered invisible by the systems that both inflicted 
                                                 
 
10 I use multiply in this context as an adverb, meaning in multiple ways, or in several ways. 
11 Emily Grabham et al, “Introduction” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersect Law Power Polit Locat, Social Justice 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 1. 
12 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chi Leg F 139 at 149. 
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harms and proposed remedies.13 But in its life beyond these early works, its epistemic and 
ontological claims have since come to express the possibility of a nearly infinite entanglement of 
human experience as impacted by systems of governance and regulation. Does this extend the 
emancipatory possibilities of law as it accounts for these variables, or does the concept become 
incoherent? Does intersectionality as human rights law provide a way out of the impasses in 
rights protections that pit vulnerable groups against one another, that view human rights in solely 
binary fashion in either/or propositions, or that seek always to balance rights between winners 
and losers, or painfully, between aspects of a single individual seeking protection?    
In attempting to answer these questions, this dissertation focuses on the promises, 
transmissions and impacts of intersectionality. In doing so, I articulate an additional conditioning 
intersection. That is, in addition to the intersection of multiple harms, forms of discrimination or 
identities—which are, variously, the meanings ascribed to intersectionality as an approach to 
international human rights law—the intersection this dissertation fundamentally straddles is that 
between social critique and instrumental engagement. This work is guided by an engaged 
ambivalence about the core project of harnessing feminist social critique, such as that invited by 
intersectionality’s migratory path, to the perilous project of feminist governance. Put another 
way, throughout the chapters that follow, there is a “story” of intersectionality that traces the 
concept and its work, contextualizing where and how it appears on its route to acceptance as 
international legal technique. In doing so, and in accounting for both losses and advances made 
                                                 
 
13 Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of 
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics” (1989) U Chi Leg F 139; Kimberle Crenshaw, 
“Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color” (1991) Stanford 
Law Rev 1241. 
5 
possible by its adoption, there is a more general question of what wider power struggles might be 
at play that allow for an idea’s acceptance or pave the way for its advancement; what does the 
concept facilitate and what does it permit, both at the level of its expressed purpose and with a 
wider view. This is what is meant by asking what “work” a concept is doing in the worlds it 
travels through. 
I begin this account of transmissions and impacts by asking what it is we are talking 
about when we refer to intersectionality, and for this I turn to the literature on intersectionality 
that simultaneously exceeds and informs law. Nevertheless, the act of tracing intersectionality 
through the literature is not an exhaustive intellectual history. The approach I have taken to the 
topic of intersectionality as a legal concept and practice recognizes that intersectionality has a 
life in and beyond law. It thus manifests as epistemology, ontology, methodology, as well as 
legal technique.  
As an acknowledged “travelling idea”,14 intersectionality does not always appear under 
its own name. Its antecedents, co-travellers, as well as its staunchest critics, need to be 
considered to plumb its deeper meaning and contribution. I will note intersectionality’s 
transformation across these categories and iterations as I explore them in the following chapters. 
This is necessary to assess its putative contribution to social critique before following its 
movement back and forth in law.  
In all its travels noted above, intersectionality appears as a metaphor to express domestic 
human rights critiques as well as a concept in sociological, activist and legal analysis, and I 
                                                 
 
14 Halley, supra note 5. 
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explore this grounding in the literature in Chapter 1. Here, I also explore the implications of 
intersectionality as a manifestation of feminist theory, and as part of the long and aporetic 
relationship between feminism and governance, and more specifically, between feminism and 
law.   
In Chapter 2, I distinguish the role of CEDAW as text and as Committee, exploring the 
textual life of the treaty as both instrument of law and discursive text, caught up in a history of 
empire and simultaneous resistance to particular manifestations of patriarchy, often couched as 
expressions of “culture”. In this context and throughout the dissertation, I challenge the oft-
proffered reasoning that pits women’s rights as a self-evident entity in a reified clash with a fixed 
idea of “tradition” and “culture”, finding that CEDAW as text, and later in the dissertation as 
Committee, retains some imperial vestiges foreshadowed in the literature review. 
Intersectionality has an active life as discourse in various UN documents, which I explore 
in Chapter 3. Here—as in all chapters—I critically examine the subtle ways in which the various 
notions of intersectionality surface and in which empire remains influential. It is this 
subliminally imperial discourse of international human rights law that I explore, and which I find 
newly embedded in sovereignty and security agendas. I examine what, if any modifications 
intersectionality has made to this mix. These agendas are equally relevant as I dig deeper into the 
literature on the clash between religious/cultural and gender-based rights that I first present in 
Chapter 1. This work sets the stage for a closer examination of the complicated role played by 
international human rights law and CEDAW as governance feminism, in Janet Halley’s sense, 
7 
and therefore as both vector of liberatory ideals and consolidator of forms of power.15  In Anne 
Orford’s formulation, these twin manifestations are most fruitfully seen through a method that 
traces their appearance as expressions and advancements of authority. Following Orford’s 
example, I find a fragile thread that links a desire for mastery over the major geo-political events 
of genocide in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda with the UN’s receptivity to an 
intersectional approach to the conceptualization of discrimination. This thread grows thicker with 
each step I follow along its vestigial path. I bring the reader on this journey throughout Chapter 
3, until the links are made expressly through the documents I examine and that later, in Chapter 
4, I ask my original sources to reflect on.    
Intersectionality, in its more liberatory appearances, is an heuristic device for theoretical 
examination of the dynamics of power. I explore this in Chapter I as a theoretical proposition and 
further in Chapter 4 in light of my original interviews. In these chapters I discern the 
institutional, instrumental and normative grounding of intersectionality’s adoption in the 
conflicted and contested terrain of CEDAW, and then examine and analyze these appearances 
through the lens of my conversations with CEDAW Committee members. A key part of my work 
mobilizes original research to assist in tracing the promises, transmissions and impacts of 
intersectionality. This takes the form of semi-structured interviews that I conducted in person 
during CEDAW’s Fall 2016 session in Geneva, and via Skype interviews with additional 
informants no longer part of, or situated outside CEDAW, in the year following. I make meaning 
of this material as an element of “law’s consciousness of itself”16 and to do so I turn my attention 
                                                 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 ESIL Lecture Series, Anne Orford - Histories of International Law and Empire (University of Paris 1 Sorbonne, 
2013). 
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fully to Orford and mobilize her body of work in critical international law.  Orford holds that 
“law is inherently genealogical, depending as it does upon the movement of concepts, languages 
and norms across space and even time”.17 For Orford, making meaning in law hinges on the 
Foucauldian phrase “consciousness of itself”,18 because it signals the methodological approach of 
starting from the practices of law as they are given, or operate, but at the same time as they 
reflect on themselves and are rationalized. In Chapter 4, I employ this methodology in the 
analysis of my original interviews with CEDAW members as they reconstruct and reflect on the 
development and current practice of intersectionality in their deliberations. This places their 
individual and collective understanding of intersectionality in direct conversation with the twin 
aspects of authoritative and liberatory impulses in governance feminism, adding their reflections 
(individual law-makers’ consciousness of themselves) to a literal account of law’s consciousness 
of itself.   
Following Orford’s method further, in Chapter 5 I gather the preexisting but dispersed 
practices of intersectionality into a coherent examination, attentive to its adoption in the 
consideration and adjudication of women’s international human rights at CEDAW. Here I assess 
the written decisions and pronouncements of the CEDAW Committee in its role as custodian of 
the treaty charged with protecting women’s rights considering what I have examined before: the 
theoretical grounding and political promise of intersectionality; the geopolitical context of its 
adoption; the textual and discursive manifestations of it in international law; and the self-
                                                 
 
17 ESIL Lecture Series, Anne Orford - Histories of International Law and Empire (University of Paris 1 Sorbonne, 
2013). 
18 Anne Orford, “On International Legal Method” (2013) I:I Lond Rev Int Law 166; Michel Foucault, The birth of 
biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, 1st Picador pbk ed.. ed (New York: Picador, 2010) at 3. 
9 
conscious adoption of it as an approach in decision making as articulated by the Committee 
members. This final chapter comes full circle to Orford’s challenge, completing the task of 
scrutinizing the decisions of CEDAW as a window into assessing intersectionality’s role as a 
legal tool in international jurisprudence, concluding that it simultaneously bolsters imperial 
authority and advances post-colonial critique. 
A theme throughout this dissertation is the struggle to discern a distinct elaboration of 
intersectionality as a means to sharpen the focus on a mutually constitutive form of 
discrimination which is at once a product of multiple vulnerabilities and social oppressions, but 
not simply additive. Resisting the appearance of intersectionality as simply part of a “tag-cloud” 
of key recurring terms that inform contemporary theorizing,19 I take its advent seriously. I 
advance a view of intersectionality as not an indiscriminate assemblage of concepts, but as 
revealing a range of different approaches to categorizing complex, violent and systemic 
discriminations, and attempts to trace the burdens of dynamic disempowerment these create. As 
such, its promise to reveal and illuminate must be taken seriously as a possible precondition to 
individual as well as collective resistance, amelioration and agency.  
Although there is little room for intellectual or political purity in the world of applied 
feminism, there is a great need for reflection and accountability. Resisting naivety or easy 
answers in responding to Orford’s gauntlet which began this introduction—indeed in honouring 
her method of assessing law’s retrospective self-justification for its claim to authority—I trace 
                                                 
 
19 I paraphrase in a different context Orford, Hoffmann and Clark in, Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann & Martin 
Clark, The Oxford handbook of the theory of international law, first edition. ed, Oxford handbooks (Oxford, United 
Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016). 
10 
the critical insights brought to law from intersectionality, both describing what I find, and 
elaborating what can be. It is my effort to make room for a conversation about “critically 
engaged governance”,20 and governance-engaged critique that drives this work overall. “Be 
prepared for paradoxes”, 21 offers Janet Halley in a warning about the nature of feminism as a 
governance project that could equally apply to what follows here. My work seeks to be an open-
eyed approach to weighing the complicated and sometimes fractured twin projects of social 
critique and governance technique. To do so, as I trace the ideas, governance pathways and 
people at the UN responsible for holding states accountable for preventing and ameliorating 
intersectional violence, inviting them as I go, to engage in a little reflection of their own.   
A note about method 
As I hope I will establish, intersectionality is a word that neither clarifies which academic 
terrain you are on nor what exact epistemological, ontological or political frames you are 
referencing.  In part, this project has a purpose to precisely trace the meanings and disciplinary 
manifestations of the term and the work intersectionality does as an aspect of the back and forth 
nature of its relationship to law. Although there is an argument to be made that all contemporary 
advanced academic work is in some senses interdisciplinary,22 some of the disciplinary norms of 
the work I engage are more fluid than others. The introduction of Queer Theory into the flow of 
understandings of intersectionality, for instance, precisely aims to “reflect both an unhomed 
interdisciplinarity as well as mediated tensions and deliberate blurring between area studies 
                                                 
 
20 Halley, supra note 5 at 266. 
21 Ibid at 261. 
22 Kristin Luker, Salsa Dancing into the Social Sciences: Research in an Age of Info-Glut, EBSCOhost (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
11 
knowledge formations and ethnic, diaspora, and transnational studies.”23 So while this is a 
dissertation in law, and as I will sketch briefly below and elaborate more fully in the chapters 
that follow, I engage a methodology proper to my discipline, much of what is asked of law by 
entertaining intersectionality requires consideration of contestations that come from beyond 
law’s traditional borders.  
I hope to bring these interdisciplinary insights into dialogue with what law has made of 
intersectionality to try to assess and if necessary, reinvigorate those aspects that it is law’s natural 
tendency to flatten and make into easily justiciable claims. Along the way, it remains necessary 
to articulate the structures, processes and legal standing of the mechanisms and material that I am 
citing from within law. At times, the reader will need to forgive a remedial lesson in the 
structures, sources and status of international human rights law as it frames this discussion in 
order that the transition from insight to practice and possibility is made clear. If the 
interdisciplinary nature of the concept of intersectionality provides little coherence, the legal uses 
of it provide little more. Another ambition of this dissertation is to take the varied legal 
manifestations of intersectionality I probe and create a working set of definitions that help clarify 
and discern intersectionality’s unique contribution to the field of international human rights law. 
By putting these worlds into direct dialogue, I am able to identify the gaps in, for instance, the 
self-proclaimed intersectional approach of the CEDAW Committee’s interpretation of women’s 
human rights as articulated in their General Comments, as reflected upon by many of them as 
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individuals in conversation with me, and as practiced in their Concluding Observations of 
reporting states, and their individual communications with claimants.    
At the start of this introduction, I quoted Anne Orford. Her work as a critical international 
law theorist squarely places the claims of international law, including international human rights 
law, within the trajectory and project of international governance and authority. Orford’s work 
has spawned resistance from traditional disciplinary historical accounts of law,24 and 
simultaneously initiated methodological innovation in tracing the origins and meanings of 
international law.25 Orford addresses her methodical choices head on in a volume of the London 
Review of International Law26 devoted to her account of international authority’s consciousness 
of itself in International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.27  Orford tells us that her 
research method—the rationalization and approach to “gathering” of materials—was influenced 
by, and is in the main not dissimilar from, “a sociological approach to the study of international 
organisations, and that places ‘renewed emphasis on the study of practices, including the study of 
discourses as practices’ rather than the study of ‘disembodied structures, even abstractions’”.28 
Much of Orford’s departure from traditional historical accounts is based in her assertion 
of an expressly legal way of tracing discourse, as I will briefly review in Chapters 1 and 3. 
Specifically, she asks “[w]hat kind of method is appropriate to a discipline in which judges, 
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advocates, scholars and students all look to past texts precisely to discover the nature of present 
obligations?”.29 In answer, she advocates for an approach to international legal theory that she 
situates as based on “the core of legal method”, wherein:  
[…]as lawyers, particularly those of us with common law backgrounds, we are trained in 
the art of making meaning move across time—by learning, for example, how to make a 
plausible argument about why a particular case should be treated as a binding precedent, 
or why it should be distinguished as having no bearing on the present.30  
 
Her argument here is against strictly contextualist interpretations of texts, actions and 
ideas—a method which holds that examining ideas and actions exclusively through the lens and 
meanings of their time is the “proper” approach to avoid misconstruing actors’ motivations and 
the proper chronology of history. This approach, Orford argues, diverges from legal method and 
is not properly employed in the effort to trace the genealogy of legal concepts. As Orford has 
established, law “is inherently genealogical”.31 We have seen above how for Orford, making 
meaning in law hinges on the Foucauldian phrase “consciousness of itself”.32 Orford uses 
Foucault’s method of embedding critique in the act of tracing origins, to show how “certain 
things were able to be formed and the status of what should obviously be questioned”.33  
Foucault used the phrase, “consciousness of itself” to characterize the rise and retroactive 
self-justification of the state system as a whole—as the entirety of the practices of a governing 
police state. Orford uses this same frame to examine a subset of statecraft, namely, international 
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legal authority carried out through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P). In my work, 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) can be seen as an instance of this larger project of 
international authority and governance, if perhaps the most legitimating aspect of it (alongside 
humanitarian intervention), grounding as it does the ideals of  “benevolent humanitarianism” that 
come in the package of international law’s valorization of capitalist cosmopolitanism, and of  
“free-trade, liberalized economies, informal empire”.34 Throughout this dissertation, my 
approach to tracing the movement “across space and … time”35 of intersectionality, follows 
Orford’s distinction of an international legal method that examines the history of its own 
concepts and ideas, based on the authority of juridical interpretation; namely, how “the past may 
be a source of present obligations”.36 I take  authority’s consciousness of itself as an approach to 
my exploration of the origins and impacts of intersectionality, as I already briefly noted. This is 
critical to underscore at the outset, because it assists the reader in comprehending the 
methodology of gathering the dispersed practices I trace.  
Orford’s approach of revealing the meaning of ideas both within and across time requires 
sociological techniques to carry it out, as does my work here. In Orford’s R2P work, the 
sociological techniques were necessarily restricted to the examination of documents and 
discourse, which I also employ. While Orford examined the individuals, and their influences, 
who gave shape and form to the practices she was interested in, the main proponents and 
advocates of the doctrine she was interested in were dead. In the case of intersectionality’s 
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genealogy, I can complement the written record I explore with the reflections of living 
proponents. The interviews I conducted with CEDAW Committee members fit into this 
methodology of tracing international law’s consciousness of itself, as well as its claim to 
authority through its relationship with intersectionality.  
Intersectionality is an active area of theory, methodology and feminist engagement with 
statecraft and governance; examining its promise and impact reveals the genuine urge to adapt 
law to account for the distributional inequalities of feminism’s successes heretofore, as well as 
the need to hold these claims to a high standard of scrutiny and self-critique. In my discussion 
with CEDAW Committee members, they related that such a project would be a welcome 
opportunity for reflection. In the spirit of critical engagement, I offer this work to the 
conversations that have taken place and are yet to happen between practitioners, activists, 
international law practitioners and academics about the promises, transmissions and impacts of 
intersectionality in women’s international human rights. 
 
16 
1 Promises: Intersectionality, Law and Women’s Rights—A 
Literature Review of History in the Present 
 [R]ecovering the specifically feminist ideas that animate various governance feminism projects 
strikes us as an urgent undertaking —but one that, we think, should be approached with scholarly 
care and political vision.37     
 
The account of ‘feminist approaches’ that I tell in this chapter is not one of 
origins, generations, or progress, but of hope and despair, paradox and 
conundrum, repetition and conflict, and the importance of history in the present.38 
 
Intersectionality’s institutional incorporation … requires attending to both continuities and 
breaches between the ways that intersectionality has been understood and practiced at different 
stages of its development in different national and institutional contexts.39  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In this initial chapter, I seek to provide the contours of the literature relevant to my telling 
of the promises, transmissions and impacts of intersectionality in relation to women’s 
international human rights. While each aspect of that triumvirate is part of a continuous 
movement of ideas, places and institutions, and thus present throughout this dissertation, it is the 
promise of intersectionality that I trace specifically in this chapter because it is in the academic 
literature that the aspiration for what the theoretical project can illuminate is its keenest. The 
literature on intersectionality has ambitions far beyond an extension of the grounds of 
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discrimination protections, and its ambitions will be part of my consideration of its role as an 
extension of the law’s protection.  
In this chapter I will explore intersectionality’s contested origins, meanings and 
applications; its appearance as epistemology, ontology and activist rallying cry, as well as the 
putative categories of identity it claims to draw into its metaphoric grasp. It is my contribution to 
curating, clarifying and critically appraising the variety of claims promised by intersectionality 
as a means to articulate and ameliorate women’s oppression. In order to later assess the 
multiplicity of claims and complexity of harms addressed by an intersectional approach to 
gender at CEDAW, in this chapter I examine its constituent feminist and anti-racist strands, as 
well as the challenges and enrichments offered through critical Queer Theory and scholarship on 
the right to freedom of religion and belief (FORB). The examination of this literature is in direct 
response to the expanded terrain in which intersectionality, as an elaboration of gender 
protections, is asked to do its work internationally.  
1.2 Intersectionality’s intellectual origins: history in the present 
The provenance of intersectionality is a matter of debate and contention. As intellectual 
history,40 the question of origins engages strongly held approaches—claimed,41 contested,42 and 
refuted.43 Simply raising the question of where intersectionality travels from and to opens 
broader questions as to the existence, or not, of dividing lines between past and present iterations 
of the main tenets of the concept. Is intersectionality primarily considered to be technique and 
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methodology, or does its principle contribution only remain radical in its formation as 
epistemology and ontology.44 Much of the literature contests the term itself, linking it to projects 
of “ownership” and prioritizing primacy of a given proponent’s lived experience.45 For instance, 
outside of the field of law, it is held that “[i]ntersectionality’s history cannot be neatly organized 
in time periods or geographic locations”, and that doing so is “far from neutral”, and leads to 
“oversimplified explanations” of its origins and meanings and grants “authoritative” status to 
some accounts “at the expense of others”.46  For some, simply asking the question reveals “that 
intersectional originalism is its own practice of re-reading and re-interpretation that has its own 
complex temporal and racial politics, and which is animated by a desire to rescue 
intersectionality from critique in a moment in which identity politics are increasingly suspect”.47 
There is little doubt that while there is “tremendous heterogeneity”48 in how the term is defined 
and applied, its roots lie in the struggles of black women and women of colour,49 and in the 
intellectual projects that took up those struggles and forged a coherent critique and praxis50 of 
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them, resulting in a “general consensus”51 about how the concept is understood. Collins and 
Bilge capture this in the broadest terms possible in the definition that follows: 
Intersectionality is a way of understanding and analyzing the complexity 
in the world, in people, and in human experiences. The events and 
conditions of social and political life and the self can seldom be 
understood as shaped by one factor. They are generally shaped by many 
factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways. When it comes to social 
inequity, people’s lives and the organization of power in a given society 
are better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social 
division, be it race or gender or class, but by many axes that work together 
and influence each other. Intersectionality as an analytic tool gives people 
better access to the complexity of the world and of themselves.52  
 
Interestingly, this definition does not make special reference to the role of 
intersectionality within feminism, or the role of feminism within the popularization of 
intersectionality, nor, for our purposes, its role in law. This is likely due to co-author Bilge’s 
concern that “disciplinary academic feminism specifically attuned to neoliberal knowledge 
economy contributes to the depoliticization of intersectionality”, keeping it palatable for market-
oriented university settings by “confining it to an act of metatheoretical contemplation” and by 
“whitening” it through stripping its contextual belonging in black feminist politics.53 Along with 
Bilge, this project is guided by an ethic of  “encouraging methods of debate that reconnect 
intersectionality with its initial vision of generating counter-hegemonic and transformative 
                                                 
 
51 Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of 
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics” (1989) U Chi Leg F 139.  
52 Collins & Bilge, supra note 42 at 2. 
53 Bilge, supra note 49 at 405–406. 
20 
knowledge production, activism, pedagogy, and non-oppressive coalitions”,54 expressly and 
methodologically resisting “confining intersectionality to an academic exercise”.55  
Bilge’s work serves as an important starting place for the contributions of 
intersectionality to international law because it reminds us of the social and political context that 
gives it meaning and purpose. A critical difference between this project and hers is that Bilge is 
principally concerned with using intersectionality as an accountability mechanism within 
activism, for creating what she calls “non-oppressive coalitional politics”.56 I draw attention to 
this because in tracing the link to law, it is possible to lose intersectionality’s bond with activism. 
Law tells its own stories of beginnings and can quickly dissolve intersectionality into a narrative 
used only to “analyse law… to unpack…the inadequate recognition of the complexly situated 
subject by various law-making or law-enforcing bodies or policy initiatives”.57  
It could be argued that law’s claim to intersectionality is just one more version of 
originalism. There is, however, a clear geneology of intersectionality in law, arising from critical 
race theory, and the specific coining of the term in the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw,58 although 
even this attempt to fix a moment of origins in law is complicated by the nearly simultaneous 
appearance of the word in the work of Canadian legal scholar Marlee Kline, who drew special 
attention to the intersection of indigeneity in criminal law in Canada.59 I argue that the account of 
law as the original site of intersectionality is best understood as positioning law as one strand of 
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praxis in keeping with intersectionality’s appearance as a multi-pronged route to “counter-
hegemony”.60 Nevertheless, the simple act of naming raises “challenges associated with 
straightening intersectionality’s history”.61  
As Collins and Bilge are quick to point out, “[c]ontemporary renditions of 
intersectionality’s past increasingly bypass altogether the heterogeneous forms that 
intersectionality took during the period of social movement politics”, which they locate 
temporally as being in the 1990s.62 This “straightening”, they argue, limits itself to crediting 
Crenshaw as the foremother, and the academy as the birthplace. Ultimately, they argue, the 
patterns of “incorporation” into the academy served to suppress the “transformative and 
potentially disruptive dimensions”63 of the projects steeped in an intersectional critique. 
Although these are certainly not lost for good, they need reinvigoration in any assessment of the 
concept’s utility to transformative action, whether legal or otherwise. For this reason, the link to 
activism and the goals of social change beyond the bounds of law, even if pursued through law, 
are important to attend to.  
Far from confining the discussion to metatheoretical contemplation, intersectionality as a 
legal concept must be understood through its complex role as link to broader demands of 
structural social change, realized through law’s contradictory role as both consolidator of 
precedent, and harbinger of new approaches to protection. This articulation of law’s dual role as 
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fixed to its past and reinterpreted for its current context is a methodology Orford positions as 
immanent to law, elaborated through the approach set out in the Introduction.64  Similarly, it is 
important to understand that Crenshaw’s association with the “coining” of the term and the 
spread of the analytic approach of intersectionality is tied to her grounding in “law as both a site 
of repression and as a site of social justice”.65 That is, in Crenshaw’s work, there is an important 
link between the “promise” of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry, and its role as a form 
of praxis.  
We return to these ideas throughout, and in some detail in Chapters 3 and 5. 
1.3 At the intersection with Crenshaw 
While it is an altogether different project from this one to determine an intellectual 
history of the concepts gathered under intersectionality, notwithstanding the word’s appearance 
in Marilee Kline’s work noted above, there seems little controversy that the term intersectionality 
appears early and frequently, and its most often sourced back to the work of Kimberlé 
Crenshaw.66 Her work forms the core named influence in the uptake of the concept in 
international human rights law, as explored further in subsequent chapters.67 Indeed, the 
literature on intersectionality that most influenced law originated in Crenshaw’s feminist critical 
race writing of the 1980s. It has now become influential in a vast number of fields: Emily 
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Grabham et al’s brief survey reveals more than six disciplines, including socio-legal studies, to 
which it has since been applied.68 As such, its potential reaches beyond the individual legal 
subject of liberalism into the realms of law’s political, symbolic and structural influences with an 
appealing epistemological critique that aims to “foreground the erasure”69of—or put more 
positively, centre the consideration of—multiply discriminated women, in contrast to traditional 
fixed legal categories and practices.  
The work of Kimberlé Crenshaw is pivotal in both the domestic (American) and 
transnational deployments of intersectionality. Referenced at the outset of this dissertation, 
Crenshaw’s pivotal metaphor, more fully reflected here, asks us to  
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going 
in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an 
intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. 
If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars 
traveling from any number of directions, and sometimes from all 
of them.70 
 
Her early analysis of employment law and anti-discrimination cases in the 
American appellate and constitutional systems was part of a founding insight 
growing out of Critical Race Theory,71 and her work was instrumental in 
analyzing the ways in which US antidiscrimination law took a ‘but for’ approach 
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to the basis of discrimination claims: that is, ‘but for’ being either black, or ‘but 
for’ being a woman, the claimant would have received different —equal to the 
norm—treatment. Thus, stripped of their complex social identity and only in 
negative relief against the putative norm of white males could claimants have 
their situations of harm addressed. Crenshaw’s work set into stark relief the way 
in which,  
race and sex … became significant only when they operate to 
explicitly disadvantage the victims; because the privileging of 
whiteness or maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at 
all.72 
 
This insight into the overarching epistemic framework of (anti-discrimination) law, 
privileging white male experience and encoding negative subjectivity, was further enriched by 
Crenshaw’s observation that gender as a basis of claim, was exclusively modeled on white 
women’s experiences. The encoding of gendered and racialized identities as ‘other’ and as 
‘victims’ becomes the focus in many adaptations of intersectionality outside law, especially in 
sociology.73 
In early academic pieces, intersectionality has an orientation to policy and law reform. 
Crenshaw’s work was, in large part, a foundational project of critical race feminism to open a 
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dialogue between the once separate worlds of anti-racist and feminist activists, in which she 
identified how “dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about 
subordination and disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis.”74 This, she claims, 
yields a “distorted analysis of racism and sexism” and “contributes to the marginalization of 
Black women in feminist theory and anti-racist politics,” and that because of this predicated 
“discrete set of experiences,” the intersections of race and gender are not duly accounted for not 
only in the status quo, but also in the reforming challenges and possible remedies. Centrally, 
theory and policy are “predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately 
reflect the interaction of race and gender.” 75 The aim of this formulation of intersectionality is to 
link the law to the lived experience of complex individuals with claims, and to highlight its status 
as an expository tool to check law’s tendency to instrumentalize social identity and categorize 
remedy in discrete baskets of entitlements that can’t be added together or compounded.  
These aims remain relevant to the ongoing development of equality rights and anti-
discrimination work. In the context of the widespread belief in a clash of claims for protection 
under human rights instruments and in liberal discourse about state duties to “accommodate” 
intersecting claims for protection or not,76 intersectionality reminds us that it is not simply a 
matter of stacking up the claims of discretely oppressed persons, nor of balancing the single 
claims of a group on the basis of one set of protected grounds versus another; intersectionality 
metaphorically recasts discriminations not as additive, but as mutually constitutive.  
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Crenshaw locates her initial discussion within the debates surrounding violence against 
women (VAW) as a universal experience of oppression, and contests that, “the location of 
women of colour at the intersection of race and gender makes our actual experience of domestic 
violence, rape and remedial reform qualitatively different from that of white women”.77 In this 
example, Black women are not only sometimes like white women in gender, and like Black men 
in race, but also often unlike either in an intersectional experience that constitutes its own form 
of discrimination, at times at the hands of the two groups they are most supposed to be like. 
1.3.1 What intersections make up intersectionality? 
While intersectionality has been widely acknowledged to be an influential concept,78 it 
has also been accused of falling short of a fully elaborated theory, and of failing to articulate its 
scope and reach—“are all subjectivities/identities intersectional or only those multiply 
marginalized subjects”?79 Is it important, for instance, to counter the pathologizing impulses of 
cataloguing social identity only in terms of its vulnerabilities to social marginalization, or do 
those who operate in the political and legal realm from positions of dominance not also carry 
intersectional identities?80 As Crenshaw remarked in response to dominant journalistic analyses 
of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, “[w]hy is the intersection of 
maleness and whiteness driving our analysis and not the intersection of being a woman and a 
person of color?”81  
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Intersectionality is embedded in a murkiness that is inherently ambiguous as to its status 
as methodology, the number and meaning of situational identities it represents and their relation 
to its putative epistemic claim. There is little doubt, for instance, that while the initial insight of 
intersectionality was premised on the unique form of discrimination experienced in relation to 
being black and a woman, there has been a proliferation of identity threads feeding into an 
intersectional analysis since those early days. In an interview marking the 20th anniversary of her 
first use of the term, Crenshaw had the following to say about the epistemic applicability of the 
term: 
Q: You originally coined the term intersectionality to describe bias 
and violence against black women, but it’s become more widely 
used—for LGBTQ issues, among others. Is that a 
misunderstanding of intersectionality? 
Crenshaw: Intersectionality is a lens through which you can see 
where power comes and collides, where it interlocks and intersects. 
It’s not simply that there’s a race problem here, a gender problem 
here, and a class or LBGTQ problem there. Many times that 
framework erases what happens to people who are subject to all of 
these things.82 
 
This generalizability of the term begs the related practical question of how one 
determines the “coherence between intersectionality and lived experiences of multiple 
identities?”83 Davina Cooper has pointed out that there is no clear answer to the question of 
whether “the axes [of identity and discrimination] have an existence apart from the ways in 
which they combine”.84 This is a matter Yuval-Davis has taken up,85 and which we will develop 
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more in relation to the concept’s uptake at the UN, where we see the tendency for the mutual 
constituency of the harmed identities accounted for in intersectionality come apart again, into 
discreet ontologically guarded identity threads. That the original formulation, which highlighted 
the intersectional discrimination of race and gender, has expanded to acknowledge a range of 
discriminatory experiences, as Crenshaw acknowledges above, deepens the tapestries of 
epistemologies and ontologies that make up an intersectional approach; it has also been noted, as 
we have seen in Collins and Bilge, that the original insight into the operations of gendered 
racism that it came about to highlight remain crucial and even more complex.  
1.4 Essentially anti-essentialist? 
Based on the foregoing, we can see that intersectionality poses a conundrum for theory 
and law: it is at once an effort at anti-categorical, anti-essentializing thinking that is sometimes 
theory, sometimes social science methodology and sometimes legal technique, and which 
nevertheless categorizes and spotlights—if not fixes—social identities for the purposes of 
exposing inequality and disadvantage. This is a thread picked up later in this dissertation through 
exploration of the work of Nira Yuval-Davis,86 who argues that in its interaction with 
international governance, intersectionality extends the very categorizations and reifications of 
identity the concept was meant to alleviate. This may simply be an effect of the conundrum at the 
heart of the attempt to enter governing spaces with critical concepts: intersectionality promises a 
powerful critique of the hegemonic grasp of law on social access that regardless, engages and 
works through law.  
                                                 
 
86 Ibid; Nira Yuval-Davis, The politics of belonging: intersectional contestations (London: Sage, 2011); Nira Yuval-
Davis & Marcel Stoetzler, “Imagined Boundaries and Borders A Gendered Gaze” (2002) 9:3 Eur J Womens Stud 
329. 
29 
The express use of intersectionality in the international human rights field since 2000 
weaves concepts from both inside and outside explicitly legal formulations, including most 
directly, those of Crenshaw.87 As Hill Collins and Bilge acknowledge, Kimberle Crenshaw’s 
work “made a major contribution to intersectionality’s dispersal in global venues”.88 I explore 
this “dispersal” in detail throughout the chapters to come, beginning in Chapter 2. For now, I 
return to the grounding and uptake of intersectionality’s elaboration in the academic literature 
that makes it attractive to the project of international human rights’ protections based on gender. 
Circling back to the debate about origins that began this chapter, many critical scholars not 
typically gathered under the banner of intersectionality have nonetheless analyzed the 
“intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class within the context of global colonial 
capitalism.”89 Their contributions to an enhancement of intersectionality for IHRL are explored 
further below.  
1.5 Women’s international human rights, critical race feminism, 
global critical race feminism, and intersectionality 
In the context of a career of critical examinations of the operations of law through detailed 
ethnographic method, it is significant that critical legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has 
stated that “[t]he global human rights system is now deeply transnational, no longer rooted 
exclusively in the west”.90 Nevertheless, she places this declarative sentence in the context of the 
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equally crucial conundrum at the heart of engaging intersectionality as an instrument of 
international human rights law: “how to relate the progressive ideal to imperial processes that 
skew what is considered to be legitimate progress and shape the impact of ideas and institutions 
that move across borders[?]”91 This is another way of stating the problem set out in the 
introduction: how to work clearly and ethically with a travelling and therefore transmutable idea 
in the context of global power imbalances? It is in this context, with this overall framing that I 
draw attention to deliberations about the universality of international human rights standards, and 
the extent to which they are colonial,92 neo-colonial,93 part of structural adjustment strategies of 
the Global North,94 or culturally determined.95 For our purposes, the point of interest is that they 
frequently occur in the context of debates over women’s human rights and related gender 
protections.96 This is expressed succinctly by Florence Butegwa, when she asks “[w]hy is it only 
when women want to bring about change for their own benefit do culture and custom become 
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sacred and unchangeable?” 97 Often, states, seeking to consolidate their sovereignty in regional 
or global systems, will use “culture” as a defense to encroachment by gender-related rights,98 
posing a clash between the rights guaranteed by international human rights law under the 
complex rubric of culture or FORB, and the protections offered to women qua women. 
According to Michael Freeman, “[w]omen suffer much more than men from justifications of the 
violations of almost all their human rights by appeals to culture”.99 Existing side by side to this 
are hegemonic notions of women’s rights emanating from the Global North, in which non-
western women are often represented as if they exist in a “permanently anterior time, with 
gender subordination uniquely integral to their culture”.100 This critical perspective on rights, 
gestures past intersectionality’s primary interest in the conceptualization of widening the 
aperture of legal protections against harms.  It concerns itself instead with a critique of the 
problematic formulations of global rights frameworks in their whole, as extensions of colonial 
and racist narratives that fundamentally silence the agency and vitality of ‘the third world 
woman’, reducing her to a trope used to the advancement of western women’s rights. Leti 
Volpp’s work articulates and advances this critical perspective on the global transmissions of 
feminism. Her scholarship advances the “multi-axis” approach to women’s rights, central to the 
concerns of intersectional scholarship. While Volpp primarily is an observer of constructions of 
race and gender within the U.S. context, her work has surfaced as part of an American-based 
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scholarship on, “Global Critical Race Feminism” (GCRF),101 which takes the insights of 
American Critical Race Feminism into observations of women’s rights globally. Volpp initially 
developed her work to combat what she terms domestic conservative (feminist) backlash 
scholarship and critiques its construction of culture as the problem of feminism. In that work she 
focuses on the liberal and racist discursive move the dominant institutional U.S. feminist 
deployment of culture and race entails, and its role in obscuring the real institutional and other 
operations of women’s inequality.  
Volpp complicates the dominant American feminist representation of patriarchy as a third 
world women’s problem, and locates its evocation within earlier, colonial models of progress 
which cast a reified binary of modern versus pre-modern. She approaches culture differently 
from its traditional implication in the oppression of women and, rather than an over-determined 
one-size-fits-all obstacle to their agency, Volpp asks what it would mean to our 
conceptualization of feminism and women’s rights if we highlighted culture’s role in support of 
women’s ingenuity and as a resource in their active engagement with their own struggles, a point 
explored in the work of Leslye Obiora over the course of decades.102 
In defense of women’s rights qua women, culture, Volpp contends, is often constructed 
as the straw man, belonging only to those outside the metropolitan/cosmopolitan centres whereas 
“[t]hose with power appear to have no culture; […]Western subjects are defined by their abilities 
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to make choices, in contrast to third world subjects, who are defined by their group-based 
determinism”.103 As such, her work provides crucial conceptual clarity to counter the work of 
single axis feminism, in terms of both its western liberal democratic manifestations (grounded 
primarily in the U.S. context), and in terms of its positioning of non-western subjects globally. 
As an early participant in these debates, Orford noted this driving force of feminist international 
law as the mission of “white women saving brown women from brown men”.104 While Orford is 
best known for her innovations in the history of international law and critical approaches to 
international law,105 her early work centred on a critical feminist approach to international law 
and international human rights law more specifically, observing “the extent to which feminist 
internationalism is haunted by the shades of those 19th-century European feminists … 
facilitating empire […]”.106  
Orford’s early work in fact can be seen to have laid the groundwork for the methodology 
she is now known for; it was through her early critique of mainstream feminist engagements with 
international law that she began to “propose alternative methodologies for undertaking the risky 
project of reading international law.”107 Risk in this context means a risk of colluding with 
structures of power and empire that one is invoking human rights frameworks expressly to resist. 
Orford shows concern to scrutinize “the ways in which feminist legal theory is invited to 
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participate in the project of constituting women and the international community”, 108 remaking 
the world in its own (European) image.  
These insights belong generally to the scholarship broadly defined as Critical Race 
Feminism. Adrien Katherine Wing109 finds its origins in three distinct schools, Critical Legal 
Studies, Critical Race Theory and feminist jurisprudence.110 To this synthesis, Wing adds the 
conditioning word “global” in a branch of scholarship that seeks to apply its insights to the 
global context: The word “global” implies the embrace of strands from international and 
comparative law, global feminism, as well as postcolonial theory.111 The work represents a 
broadened application of American Critical Race Feminism; however, GCRF does not engage 
the express developments jurisprudentially under the new UN interpretations of race and gender 
within the treaty framework. Like Orford’s early work, it seeks to displace white, northern 
feminism as the “protagonist” of the international human rights story: 
Paying attention only to the protagonists in this drama blinds us to 
the way in which the Third World is staged as a backdrop, with a 
cast of nameless extras imagined as playing a part they have not 
written. A feminist analysis of international law that focuses on 
gender alone, without analysing the exploitation of women in the 
economic ‘South’, would operate to reinforce the depoliticized 
notion of ‘difference’ that founds the privileged position of the 
imperial feminist.112 
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Global Critical Race Feminism Studies is not the only quarter from which critiques of the 
uses put to culture in women’s international human rights emanate. Traditional feminist IHRL 
scholars, such as Rikki Holmaat and Jonneke Naber,113 have queried the treaty committee’s 
choice to focus on violations as a result of culture and custom, and, in light of the role culture 
plays in an impasse of contested rights, they have suggested new avenues to broaden acceptance 
of women’s rights by focusing on framing infringements differently.114 As I come to examine the 
framing of women’s rights’ violations in the discourse of the treaty committee’s utterances in the 
final chapter, I will show that the ghost of this dilemma is far from exorcised, although its 
existence is certainly addressed, in part, through the elaboration of an expressly intersectional 
approach.  
The underlying issues of the intersections that are the focus of intersectionality have long 
been the purview of scholars of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL),115 
insisting on writing accounts of international law and its effects based in third world experiences 
of them—itself a powerful epistemological and ontological challenge to human rights law116—
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displacing “positivist certainties about the autonomy and inherent justice of international law”.117 
Instead, they insist on accounting “for the importance of integrating consideration for the 
suffering of Third World peoples, the ongoing perpetuation of economic injustice by 
international institutions, and acts of resistance by states and social movements in the South, into 
an account of international law’s history as well as its possible futures”.118 Some have 
specifically noted the turn to trade-related human rights internationalism, a selective 
instrumentalization of human rights’ obligations and values, exposing the fundamental material 
interest of western/northern states in human rights that takes precedence over its purported 
universalism.119 Put another way, TWAIL has revealed that from a different perspective, 
“international law is seen as implicated in the preservation and maintenance of a deeply unjust 
global order”.120 More plainly put, law is the “chosen instrument of northern domination”,121 
with “(Third World) poverty as, potentially, part of the very genetic programming of 
international law”.122  
This latter, more deterministic view of the role of international law, is challenged by 
Orford’s subtle but profound embellishment of its core insight: that both taking international law 
at its word while simultaneously scrutinizing it for its long game of consolidating its own 
authority, yields a deeper and more complete view of its operations. From this perspective, IHRL 
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can be seen as an instance of the larger project of international authority and governance traced 
by Orford. A close cousin to humanitarian intervention, IHRL grounds the ideals of “benevolent 
humanitarianism” that come in the package of international law’s valorization of capitalist 
cosmopolitanism, and of  “free-trade, liberalized economies, informal empire”.123Within this 
larger view of the imperial work done through international human rights, the debates over 
“culture” play a pivotal discursive role in legitimizing, obfuscating and upholding a worldview 
that shores up its perpetuation.  
Descending from the lofty heights of theorizing systems of power, and returning to the 
activist impetus for engaging human rights in the first place, feminist scholars from the TWAIL 
movement, such as Celestine Nyamu, demand a step away from “vague notions of culture” 
deployed in international human rights law, and instead call for a nuanced approach to how 
“formal legal institutions, culture, and customary practices interact”.124 Ratna Kapur counters 
international law’s claims of being the champion of women’s equality rights by showing that in 
Nepal, “UN interventions in conflict situations and noises around gender mainstreaming did not 
help disrupt deeply entrenched normative assumptions about gender…”.125  
Outside the TWAIL discourse, others, such as regional systems scholar Fareda Banda,126 
and minority rights scholars, such as Patrick Thornberry127 and Alexandra Xanthaki,128 have also 
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attended to the intersections of multiple grounds of discrimination. Observers of religious rights 
in human rights, Nazila Ghanea-Hercock129 and Ayelet Shachar,130 also concern themselves with 
the intersections of gender, minority status, and freedom of religion and belief, so often conflated 
with culture; all these scholars attend to intersections in rights discourse and protections without 
the banner of intersectionality necessarily branding their work. As we will explore below, 
religious or believing women are arguably the most impacted by perceived impasses between 
culture or FORB and human rights, impasses that an intersectional approach true to its insights 
will have to reckon with. Queer critical culture theorists, like Jasbir K. Puar, argue from a 
different but related perspective “for new directions in cultural studies that critically reassess the 
use of intersectional models”.131 
Informed by the insights of the work of Volpp, Orford, Nyamu and the other scholars 
engaged above, women’s rights as a subcategory of human rights is exposed as being posited 
frequently in teleological tension with the West. In this formulation, only westernization will 
drag women’s equality behind in its wake.132 Thus, resistance to this further attempt at perceived 
colonization pits feminists from the Global South in opposition to culture and as apologists for 
the last colonizing outreach of the Enlightenment.133 This framing of women’s rights entails the 
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reification of each term—gender and culture—and assigns the two protections to the 
philosophical polarities of universal and particular, western and non-western, respectively. The 
insights from this work allow us to see that the human rights discourse—and its development of 
protections—despite the adoption of intersectionality, will continue to struggle with a 
conceptualization of gender as essential, and unaffected, except in negative ways, by cultural and 
other differences. Halley et al point out that adequate reflection on the intersections that 
complicate notions of gender protections implicated in global and intra- feminist power 
structures is crucial, to keep “feminist fingerprints” on governance projects.134 Otherwise, 
“women benefit differentially”, and “some are [thereby] harmed”.135 They point out that 
“transforming a feminist idea into law”,136  
can consolidate a particularistic identity-based project, sometimes 
at the expense of alternative affiliations. It can respond to more 
general discursive or strategic demands making victimization and 
identity the prerequisites for legal intelligibility and leave behind 
questions about the costs of these formations.137 
 
As Puar’s call for reassessment above articulates, intersectionality is ripe for resistance to 
“prematurely settling”138 its understanding of these affiliations, particularly with respect to 
LGBT rights. In the context of the Secretary-General of the United Nations’ endorsement of 
LGBT rights,139 the frequent articulation of the resistance to these rights as couched in the 
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language of culture and religious rights, and CEDAW’s updated definition of intersectionality140 
as expressly extending gender protections to be “inextricably linked with …  sexual orientation 
and gender identity”141 (which we explore in detail in Chapters III and IV), means that the 
literature on critical LGBT international human rights deserves some attention here. This is not a 
primary focus of my work, but I enter these debates, as they are relevant to framing 
intersectionality’s story at CEDAW. A brief summary of their status as rights follows below, in 
order to situate the critical examination of intersectionality demanded by transnational queer 
theory. 
1.5.1 Critical intersectionality and LGBT rights 
The articulation and protection of LGBT rights in international human rights law relies on 
express intersectional approaches to existing rights—most recently, as part of an expanded 
definition of gender protections at CEDAW and elsewhere—since LGBT rights are, unlike race 
(ICERD),142 disability (CRPD),143 women’s (CEDAW)144 and children’s rights (CRC),145 not 
secured through protections named in a discreet treaty.146 In the strictly legal sense they are, in 
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fact, more like the rights to FORB, against which they are most often pitted, than other identity 
rights, in that they are not subject to separate treaty protection but dependent on the contested 
definition(s) of existing and aspirational protections.147 I will explore this in some more detail in 
the chapters that follow. At this stage, the questions raised in the literature I have reviewed invite 
exploration as to how it is that as a group of protections, LGBT rights have become a lightning 
rod for wider debates about the globalization of culture and identities. The commentary in this 
area has begun to move from a plain assertion or denial of LGBT rights as a legitimate concern 
of IHRL to a more nuanced account of the politicization of these rights, and specifically of the 
essentially political, rather than cultural work they do through the battles mounted for and 
against them. Puar’s wide-ranging work in particular, has opened a complex reflection on the 
operations of these protections and invites scrutiny of intersectionality’s potential role in 
accounting for both the identity affiliations and protections claimed and contested, as well as the 
structural and conditioning elements to the work these rights do in the global context we have 
been referencing.  
Puar asks: 
What are the historical linkages between various periods of national crisis and the 
pathologizing of sexuality, the inflation of sexual perversions? What are the 
heteronormative assumptions still binding the fields and disciplines of security and 
surveillance analyses, peace and conflict studies, terrorism research, public policy, 
transnational finance net- works, human rights and human security blueprints, and 
international peacekeeping organizations such as the United Nations?148 
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Her work is concerned ultimately with “a very specific production of terrorist bodies 
against properly queer subjects,”149 and offers a self-professed “new paradigm for the 
theorization of race and sexuality”.150 As such, it falls outside the scope of the project at hand. To 
get there, however, her work is self-consciously and deliberately disruptive, demanding a 
“deeper exploration of these connections among sexuality, race, gender, nation, class, and 
ethnicity in relation to the tactics, strategies, and logistics of war machines.”151 It therefore has 
insights that respond to Crenshaw’s invitation, quoted above, to move beyond the original binary 
of race and gender to make intersectionality relevant “to people who are subject to all of these 
things”.152 Significantly, it places the discussion of LGBT rights in the context of global power 
relations. For this reason, “[i]t is an invitation to take stock of the inclusions and exclusions—the 
upsides and the downsides—across their full range”,153 of what and how intersectionality’s 
promises transmit in these complex environments. Puar’s work warns of  
the powerful emergence of the disciplinary queer (liberal, 
homonormative, diasporic) subject into the bountiful market and 
the interstices of state benevolence—that is, into the statistical fold 
that produces appropriate digits and facts toward the population’s 
optimization of life and the ascendancy of whiteness: full-fledged 
regulatory queer subjects and the regularization of deviancy.154 
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The brilliance of this disruptive work shines clearly on the intersections of governance and 
LGBT rights as they boomerang across global governance mechanisms and movements. These 
issues are taken up in a more linear fashion and in direct relationship to the mechanisms we are 
aiming to focus on, by others writing on global LGBT matters.  
Of particular note in the literature is Meredith L. Weiss and Michael J. Bosia’s anthology, 
Global Homophobia: States Movements and the Politics of Oppression.155 The work complicates 
the polarized debate about the extent of the intersections of human rights protections, and their 
place in globalization, with a sophisticated and critical take on the terrain that owes much to 
Puar’s formulation. Specifically, the volume, 
considers political homophobia as purposeful, especially as 
practiced by state actors; as embedded in the scapegoating of an 
‘other’ that drives processes of state building and retrenchment; as 
the product of transnational influence peddling and alliances; and 
as integrated into questions of collective identity and the 
complicated legacies of colonialism.156 
 
According to this critique of the mobilization of international human rights, it is often the 
politicization of domestic battles that drives the international agenda on this topic, provoking 
Bosia’s “radically obvious question,” namely, “tossing aside elusive dichotomies … [w]hy do 
state actors embrace homophobic policies and rhetoric”?157 His answer weaves a nuanced view 
that eschews the oft-proffered reasoning of culture and tradition as the bulwark against the 
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extension of rights. This language of culture and tradition which, as I explore further in the 
chapter following, is also the language of CEDAW, and serves to mask the interplay between 
internal state weakness, external pressure and globalization in the choices states make to employ 
homophobia as a state practice: 
It is neither profitable nor demonstrable to claim that state actors 
are constrained or compelled to adopt some form of state 
homophobia as ‘the same end’ because of personal belief, the 
traditions of the past, or the emergence of LGBT demands. Instead, 
the power and “will” of the state is such that these policies and 
rhetorics can create, refashion, and impose tradition or identity 
rather than merely reflect them.158 
 
A more nuanced approach asks, what is “the work done by homophobia in periods of 
instability or uncertainty”,159 and the answer proffered by Bosia fits with the approaches I traced 
in critical international human rights law scholarship, which place current conflicts and the 
development of rights within the shadow of empire and the extension of current global authority. 
What Bosia terms “State homophobia” arises in times of violent conflict, resulting in his 
analysis, from profound changes in the international system, where “processes of sovereignty 
and belonging are in question and an emergent national security apparatus seeks to reestablish 
authority”.160 Making clear the intersection between the operations of violence against women as 
gender-based violence, and state homophobia, Bosia’s work explores how “state actors, their 
proxies, and their allies use homophobic repression as a tool for the reconstitution of belonging, 
not only as ethnic cleansing through expulsion and sexual assault, but in the ways brutal 
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sexualized and gendered violence affirms authority within.”161 Bosia additionally traces how 
ongoing pressures—such as those posed through structural adjustment policies and cyclical 
crises embedded within globalization, or emanating from allies or competitors—present state 
homophobia as a convenient tool for the “affirmation of rule,” through the deployment of 
“prosecution and condemnation as improvisational strategies introducing very public discussions 
of sexual differentiation”.162  
Once thus mobilized, Bosia points to the work done by “neo-colonial networks that 
reinforce the imposition of sexual repression and the full articulation of an LGBT scapegoat 
within a Western sexual binary”.163 International Human Rights Law does complex work in this 
context: LGBT rights could be seen as an approximate, live version of the controversial entry 
into the human rights family that women’s rights once represented,164 and, likewise for these 
activists in both the Global South,165 Muslim majority countries,166 and in the human rights 
NGOs based in the North167 or West,168 human rights discourse, to repeat Sally Merry’s 
assessment, represents “the major global approach to social justice”.169 In the same move, as a 
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frame of reference, IHRL can excite State repression based on fears that it counters 
“heteronormativity”, with “homonormativity”,170 that is, extends the binary and fixed western 
view of sexuality that requires a particular performance of identity that complies with known 
definitions and protections, “as if sexual minorities everywhere claim the same rights that define 
LGBT organizing in only an handful of countries”.171 These identities are then refracted through 
a house of identity mirrors that distort, amplify and reflect the layers of imposition from the 
colonial to the neoliberal.  
Religious approbation of “native” sexualities now inform post-colonial states,172 who 
mobilize colonial tropes as nation building essentialism in order to resist internal and external 
political and economic threats.173 At the same time, powerful states in which rights have 
allegedly been achieved, deploy what Christine Keating in the same volume calls, 
“homoprotectionism,” which likewise, serves to “foster alliances that serve to bolster state 
power”.174 State homophobia and state homoprotectionism can be deployed simultaneously to 
this end; and both, Keating argues, are serving to legitimize “political authority both on a 
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national and on a transnational scale”.175 To Keating it is clear that both state homophobia and 
homoprotectionism are “deeply linked to and embedded in inequitable global relations of 
power,” and the related systems of “colonialism, neocolonialism, and capitalist globalization”.176 
Simultaneously, current deliberate western (mostly American) religious fundamentalists export a 
virulent homophobia that serves their (governance) projects at home.177  Puar articulates this in 
relation to the spectre of the terrorist, and the manipulation of queerness, terror and the need for 
national security: “…sites of queer struggle in Europe—Britain, the Netherlands—have 
articulated Muslim populations as an especial threat to LGBTIQ persons, organizations, 
communities, and spaces of congregation.178 Her work goes on to trace the  
emergence of a global political economy of queer sexualities 
that—framed through the notion of the ‘‘ascendancy of 
whiteness’’—repeatedly coheres whiteness as a queer norm and 
straightness as a racial norm.179  
 
The role of an intersectional approach to international human rights can only work if its 
bounds extend to be able to account for the work it does in this highly charged, militarized and 
yet phantasmagoric context. Following suit, the clarity of analysis in Weiss and Bosia’s work 
and throughout their edited collection, demonstrates that homophobia, despite its frequent 
articulation in terms of religion and culture, is “not as some deep-rooted, perhaps religiously 
inflected sentiment, nor as everywhere a response to overt provocation, but [is] a conscious 
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political strategy often unrelated to substantial local demands for political rights.”180 Both 
intellectually and strategically, the push/pull between the binary of rights and religion sidesteps 
and distracts from this fundamental purpose of the contest. Neither uniform applications of IHRL 
to LGBT people, nor invocations of both false and misunderstood religious rights get us closer to 
an intersectional understanding of their interrelation and implication in the various global power 
struggles and security agendas that invoke them.  
As we will see in the chapters that follow, the intersectional protections named in the 
CEDAW Committee’s newest interpretations of its treaty articles include sexual orientation, 
gender identity and religious belief as intersecting grounds of states’ obligations to gender 
protection. These same intersections are likewise named in the first comprehensive commentary 
on the international protections based on FORB.181 In the view of its authors, “there is serious 
risk that women belonging to discriminated religious communities fail to benefit from any anti-
discriminatory measures”,182 and, singling out the intersection of this with sexual orientation, 
they point out that the human rights protections include a right to an LGBT person’s “freedom of 
thought, conscious, and religion”.183  
In this context, it is crucial not to overstate the dichotomy between the rights, to 
understand the precise nature of the rights themselves, and to understand the intersectional 
applications of them that seek to protect the most vulnerable, who are not served by 
grandstanding and the spectacle of inaccurate polarities. In their Commentary, Bielefeldt, Ghanea 
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and Weiner invoke intersectionality as a frame of reference for understanding this complex area 
of rights, and, to some extent, for seeking a truce between their claims and counter claims, 
without wishing to deny the “reality of conflicting human rights concerns”.184 Looking at similar 
matters as they play out in cases where women seek protection at the intersection with culture 
and religion, Pok Yin S. Chow has observed that even within the bodies that administer the 
intersectional treaty protections named above, “the binary logic adopted by the treaty bodies is 
that it denies that women who engage in or consent to certain cultural practices are legitimate 
participants in culture or religious life”.185 As a result, he has concluded that “intersectionality” 
does not consistently assist decision makers to understand the “ambivalence” women may hold 
toward aspects of their cultures and religions in the context of exercising their rights based on 
both religion and gender.186  
Chow’s work is an important advancement of the discussion of intersectionality in human 
rights contexts. At the same time, his study of intersectionality moves freely between CEDAW, 
across EU and UK human rights protections, and, within an overall concern with the limitations 
of an exclusively legal approach to culture and religion. It therefore does not concern itself with 
the nuances in intersectionality’s development and deployment at CEDAW that I trace in the 
chapters that follow.  
Nonetheless, the work that follows is indebted to all these scholars and their insights. The 
sheer variety of critical scholarship, which challenges law’s relationship to culture, feminism’s 
                                                 
 
184 Bielefeldt, Ghanea & Wiener, supra note 129 at 371. 
185 Pok Yin S Chow, Cultural Rights in International Law and Discourse Contemporary Challenges and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Leiden Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2018) at 217. 
186 Pok Yin S Chow, “Has Intersectionality Reached its Limits? Intersectionality in the UN Human Rights Treaty 
Body Practice and the Issue of Ambivalence” (2016) 16:3 Hum Rights Law Rev 453. 
50 
relationship to law, and law and feminism’s relationship to plurality, serves to enrich the goals of 
intersectionality’s variously articulated projects. In keeping with this, I engage the works 
variously of Merry,187 who brings insights from legal anthropology, and its deep understanding 
of the contested nature of culture and its interactions with law; Orford, who begins in an express 
struggle with feminist international law188 and develops a critical legal theory and methodology 
that shapes the insights discussed here;189 and Volpp, whose work decentres the white 
protagonist of feminism and the distorted view of multiculturalism that conflates patriarchy with 
third world culture.190 Much of this work, however, was published either before or 
contemporaneously with the important and express development of the CEDAW Committee’s 
own reorientation to take stock of such critiques and provide new guidance to its deliberations 
through the adoption of intersectionality, and for the most part, it does not concern itself with 
these developments. The scholarship I have explored in this chapter could therefore benefit from 
dialogue with this new terrain, just as the governance aims of this new terrain calls out for the 
insights of this critical scholarship.  
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Since intersectionality derives in large part from a theoretical and philosophical basis, 
and arises in international human rights legal discourse and authoritative texts at a particular 
juncture in relation to politics and world events, understanding that context, as demonstrated by 
the work of Puar as well as Bosia and Weiss is of vital importance to a more complete account of 
the role of intersectionality in international human rights law. This method of tracing 
intersectionality follows from the observation that “[f]or lawyers seeking to take responsibility 
for engaging with the practice of the discipline and for its present politics, it is useful to grasp the 
practice of theorizing as itself historically situated and existing in relation to particular concrete 
situations”.191 Following this lead, in the chapters that follow, I strive to subject intersectionality 
to the same scrutiny others have applied to various international legal concepts in the works here 
explored, that is, to “pay close attention to the interventions that particular theories make and the 
context in which they were first presented”.192 
1.6 What lies ahead 
Feminist engagements with international law are often characterized in cheerful tones193 
as a progression in which a direct line between The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,194  
CEDAW,195 The Beijing Platform196 and international criminal protections against sexual 
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violence in the context of genocide and war is charted.197 The arrival of LGBT rights can now be 
added to this canon. And while this dissertation tracks the rise of intersectionality as a partial 
answer to the call to join critical international law’s overt concern “with critically theorizing 
about international law with a view to its transformation”,198 it also acknowledges that feminist 
gains in international law are also sometimes “the product of despair about the apparent 
imperviousness of international law to feminist perspectives”.199  The trick is, rather than 
adopting the mantel of the outsider’s remoteness from the effects of formal governance power, 
on account of this perceived “exclusion”, their work guides a desire to acknowledge that “[t]o 
engage governance…is to make use of force”.200 This requires that we not be guided solely by 
the moment of despair, but develop a stance of what Halley et al have termed “engaged 
ambivalence”201 towards the governance project of feminism. In their view, “[t]his stance is quite 
the opposite of deeply at odds with rhetorical renunciation of all feminist will to power”.202 But it 
does require us “to think anew about engaging directly with power”.203  Critical insight can lead 
to “renunciation”, as the more deterministic moments of TWAILian insight explored above 
suggest.  
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Orford’s work builds on TWAIL’s insights, stating that TWAIL “argues that imperialism 
must still be thought of as part of international law,” but gestures to its limits when she persists 
to demand, “the question is how”?204  Orford indicates dissatisfaction with the spectre of a one-
size-fits-all response to the meaning and purpose of each new twist in international law, such as 
observing a phenomena as merely a “Trojan Horse” for political intervention.205 In partial 
response to this risk of imprecision, Orford’s own method entreats international legal scholars, 
“rather than [focussing on] the study of disembodied structures, even abstractions”,206 instead to 
concern themselves with “the relation between the symbolic and the material dimensions of 
authority and of law”,207 and these practices as the concept I have proffered throughout this 
chapter, as international authority’s consciousness of itself. In short, this means paying attention 
to what law claims about its own operations.  
Orford’s work reminds us that legal method trains us to “make a plausible argument 
about why a particular case should be treated as a binding precedent, or why it should be 
distinguished as having no bearing on the present”.208 This method of creating precedent and 
building law from it, is also the structure and process of the international human rights treaty 
bodies; in the case of the treaties, the committees charged with administering the obligations 
under the treaties build on their prior de facto decisions to create guidance for the future 
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interpretation of states’ obligations under the treaty document: this has been characterized as a 
“broad remedial approach to interpretation”.209 
The sheer proliferation of scholarship investigating intersectionality begs the question of 
the reason for its ubiquity. Along with Chow’s declarative query as to whether intersectionality 
has reached its limits noted above, others have gone on to ask if the idea of an intersection is the 
“right analogy”,210 if we have reached a time to move “beyond” it,211 or if it has come to rely too 
much on “identities” and “recognition”, to the detriment of challenging structural inequality and 
calling for redistribution,212 or if in Puar’s sense, it requires a critical reassessment of 
intersectional models, keeping watch for “global forces of securitization, counterterrorism, and 
nationalism”.213 It seems that the sweeping claims of intersectionality have prompted the 
accusation that it does not prove its grandiosity through its merits:214 as deployed outside of law, 
intersectionality has been accused of being a “project of limitless scope and limited promise”;215 
within law, it can likewise be accused of doing the work of liberalism’s optimistic reform,216 
narrowly and naively “explaining to the law its mistaken assumptions, [and believing this] will 
lead the law/state to a consciousness of its omissions and to rational change”.217  
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There is some evidence that the sophistication of intersectionality’s theoretical forms, or 
more pointedly its most radical potential, is at best ill understood, and, at worst, undermined by 
the legal domestic orders in which it has been deployed and subsequently evaluated by 
academics.218 Can the exploration of the international field augment this record with a more fluid 
and potent antidote to law’s need to order, discipline and restrict, ultimately advancing the 
project of feminism’s ambivalent engagement with law? Importantly, can it allow feminism to 
remain armed with some of the self-administered critiques of its own project of reform and 
radicalization, as explored here?  
There is a conceit at the centre of feminism’s engagement with the promise of 
intersectionality, namely that feminism is adequately self-reflective to responsibly manage the 
aporia between aspiration and real-world structures and legacies at the centre of all engagement 
with the potential of human rights law. In Halley et al’s terms, this is the central risk of 
governance feminism and its will to power. Intersectionality at times appears to lay claim to 
being able to attend to and detail the imperial foundations of modern international law that 
concern Orford and drive my exploration here. At times, it also gestures to “the multiple 
trajectories by which that imperialist history can be linked to the ongoing failures of international 
law to respond meaningfully to the demands for inclusion made by states and peoples of the 
developing world”.219 It appears as a hope and a promise of intersectionality that insight can be 
an inoculation against the repetition of the problems of international law, even as we engage its 
                                                 
 
218 Toni Williams, “Intersectionality Analysis in the Sentencing of Aboriginal Women in Canada: What Difference 
Does it Make?” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersect Law Power Polit Locat, Social justice (Abingdon, England) 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 79. 
219 Buchanan, supra note 118 at 446. 
56 
terms and foundations. It remains an open question that requires constant reflection as to how to 
radically transform social relations through engagement in the present restrictive terms of law, 
without either abandoning the possibility of change or falling prey to law as technique and 
sentinel to the status quo. 
Anne Orford warns of the foundational fault line in legal scholarship—that of a practice-
based approach, “premised on unarticulated theories”.220 My work attempts to unearth and 
articulate the theories that animate decision-making at the international level, particularly the 
uses intersectionality is put to at CEDAW. I am guided by an “endeavour to link theory to 
practice, and a search for ways to practice theory” that Orford finds “pervasive” among those 
who engage the law.221 This quest is conditioned by a skeptical optimism, and a hope not fully 
supported by the existing record, for a “more egalitarian, inclusive, peaceful, just and 
redistributive international order”.222 In other language, I approach intersectionality as a form of 
praxis that its deployment at CEDAW shows promise of evidencing. At its most ambitious, 
intersectionality can be seen to do the work of the aborted grand theory projects of earlier 
feminist scholarship, which tried to marry Marxism and feminism with the insights of anti-racist 
movements; in the view of Joanne Conaghan, it does not inherit this legacy gracefully.223 Kathi 
Weeks summarizes the loss of the grander terrain of feminism’s aims as a stripping of context, in 
which “we end up with an impoverished model of the subject, that overestimates its capacities 
for self-creation and self-transformation”,224 or conversely, see her as over-determined and 
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without agency.225 In this critique, intersectionality emerges as a thin stand-in for the full critical 
consideration of the structures of inequality and social transformation at the heart of feminist 
engagements with law. Conaghan summarizes this transformational impulse in feminism as the 
standard against which intersectionality must be measured: 
feminist legal engagement is a practical activity designed to 
engender, directly or indirectly, socially transformative processes 
and effects. In this, it may be understood as part of broader 
feminist commitment to praxis, that is, to the convergence of 
theory and practice, a productive coming together of thought and 
action, ideas and strategies, scholarship and politics. It is, I would 
contend, against this standard that the value of intersectionality, as 
a theoretical and strategic approach, should be measured.226 
 
It is possible that the continued appeal of intersectionality as a theoretical project 
represents “a dose of academic feminist guilt for having ‘abandoned’ the activist field”. 227 It 
may represent nostalgia for what Weeks calls the “project of totality” (as distinct in her work 
from a totalizing theory).228 Crenshaw herself resists this grand narrative of intersectionality’s 
life outside her work, provocatively narrowing the use of the concept to the original employment 
law context in which she first introduced it: 
Some people look to intersectionality as a grand theory of 
everything, but that’s not my intention. If someone is trying to 
think about how to explain to the courts why they should not 
dismiss a case made by black women, just because the employer 
did hire blacks who were men and women who were white, well, 
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that’s what the tool was designed to do. If it works, great. If it 
doesn’t work, it’s not like you have to use this concept.229 
 
Victoria Browne wonders why we gave up theorizing patriarchy for greener post-modern 
pastures.230 I end this chapter, therefore, in a similar manner to how I began it, by noting that 
taking intersectionality as a starting point, despite extensive exploration of its evocation, does not 
necessarily clarify the theoretical terrain one is on. As we will discover in the chapters ahead, nor 
does it necessarily provide guidance as to the correct intersectional approach to concrete 
situations. Toni Williams’ work on the deployment of intersectionality as an incomplete 
recognition of Indigenous women’s social realities reveals the problematic neutrality of an 
intersectional approach when it becomes a tool of law and policy.231 This is in line with what 
Crenshaw calls the “problem of complexity”, in that, “intersectionality can get used as a blanket 
term to mean, “‘[w]ell, it’s complicated.’ [And that s]ometimes, ‘It’s complicated’ is an excuse 
not to do anything”.232 In this sense, an intersectional analysis of subject positions “need not 
even be particularly critical or used to improve the lives of targeted groups”.233  
Jennifer C. Nash, like Puar, although in quite different ways, speaks of the necessity of a 
reform to intersectionality in order that it continue to “grapple with the messiness of 
subjectivity”,234  a messiness surely augmented by the works explored above. At the same time, 
just as its sun appears to be setting, Grabham warns against moving away from intersectionality 
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“without careful thought”.235 Kathy Davis has argued that it was the alleged weaknesses of the 
concept, “its ambiguity and open-endedness that were the secrets to its success and, more 
generally, make it a good feminist theory”.236 Nevertheless, after accounting for all its 
embellishments and detractions, can it help make good law? In pursuing this question in the 
chapters that follow, I seek to trace “the vital connection between practical innovation, 
theoretical elaboration, and social transformation, both in relation to the political 
instrumentalization of theory in practice and in the search for a critical practice of international 
law in its different articulations”.237 The connective tissue of this search in the case of 
intersectionality lies in CEDAW, which, as both text and committee, grounds the historical, 
normative, discursive, institutional and practical application of the concept, giving us a view of 
its conditions, limitations and operations as law. 
1.7 Conclusion 
In the chapters that follow, I engage Orford’s methodology to trace the development of 
women’s rights at the UN in the “shadow of empire”, its normative and textual advances and 
limitations, and the structure of the treaty body system, to comprehend the fertility of the milieu 
intersectionality is proposed within, and the work it is observed to be doing. The guidance on 
intersectionality that now characterizes the treaty system, explored in further chapters, arose out 
of a legacy of contestation at the heart of the meanings, situations and projects attributed to 
women and gender in all its intersections as I have explored above. The mechanisms I will 
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explore in the international human rights realm that have engaged these debates now provide 
jurisprudential heft to the deliberations and exchanges among and between various UN 
institutions, NGOs, and women activists from the Global South at public forums238 and through 
the academy.239 Collins and Bilge,240 Henne,241 Merry,242 Nazela Ghanea,243 Johanna Bond,244 
Nila Yuval-Davis245 and more recently, Pok Yin S. Chow246 are among the few scholars who 
variously reference or engage overtly with the “intersectional turn” in the international human 
rights context. Meghan Campbell and Sandra Fredman tackle this advance head-on in their 
crucial work on intersectionality’s interpretation and potential as a form of legal practice.247 The 
analysis I have just conducted on the scholarly contemplations of intersectionality will serve to 
help to scrutinize the how the promise of intersectionality traverses the road from critique to 
technique, and I will return to the challenges and advances in the conceptualization of 
intersectionality throughout what follows.  
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2 Transmissions: The Institutional, Textual and Normative 
Grounding of Women’s International Human Rights at 
CEDAW 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined, to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, and […] to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples, [….]248 
 
Promotion of human rights is a widely accepted goal[.] … Further, 
it is one of the few concepts that speaks to the need for 
transnational activism and concern with the lives of people 
globally. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 
1948, symbolizes this world vision and defines human rights 
broadly. While not much is said about women, Article 2 entitles all 
to “the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” Eleanor Roosevelt and the Latin 
American women who fought for the inclusion of sex in the 
Declaration and for its passage clearly intended that it would 
address the problem of women's subordination.249 
 
It would seem that the creation of specialized machinery and 
procedures is necessary in order to ensure that the human rights 
codified in international instruments are interpreted and applied in 
such a way that women are guaranteed their full enjoyment.250  
 
Building on the Universal Declaration, women’s movements 
appropriated the universally agreed language of human rights and 
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transformed the international human rights framework to address 
their concerns. The evolution of women’s history, especially since 
1970s, has revealed the commonalities and the global 
connectedness of women’s local resistance. The United Nations 
provided a platform for women to network and integrate the 
common elements of this history into the work of the Organization, 
which has resulted in the growth of a well-established gender 
equality and women’s rights regime. Most important in this regard 
is the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (1979) by the General 
Assembly.251 
Although the Universal Declaration in its own terms guarantees the 
enjoyment of human rights without gender distinction, the rights of 
women and the specific circumstances under which women suffer 
human rights abuses have in the past been framed as different from 
the classic vision of human rights abuse and therefore marginal 
within a human rights regime that aspired toward universal 
application. This universalism, however, was firmly grounded in 
the experiences of men.252 
 
2.1 Introduction 
To establish the ground and potential of intersectionality as an approach to women’s 
rights within international human rights law, it is necessary to trace the institutional, instrumental 
and normative grounding for its adoption in the human rights approaches of CEDAW,253 both as 
treaty and treaty body. The CEDAW is seen as the principal instrument for the delineation and 
protection of women’s human rights; it is often referred to as the “Women’s Charter”. But it was 
a relative latecomer to the first generation of human rights254 and although it has made some 
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significant breaks from the established order, its genesis is also shaped by preexisting norms and 
approaches, making it a conflicted and contested terrain for the establishment of an intersectional 
approach to human rights protections.255 In this section we will explore the legality, normativity 
and institutional drivers in the framing of CEDAW, highlighting its potential for the elaboration 
of intersectionality.  
2.2 Before CEDAW 
Women’s rights have been explicit in the UN family of human rights since its founding 
human rights document, the Charter of the United Nations (The Charter, 1945), affirming the 
“equal rights of men and women” and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, sex, 
language and religion”.256 This was followed closely by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR, 1948),257 which, although rife with indications of faux universality through 
references to “mankind” and “brotherhood”,258 names sex as a prohibited ground for 
“distinction” in the granting of its enumerated rights and freedoms. The important scholarship 
that distinguishes sex from gender was not yet in currency; a shift in attribution of characteristics 
from sex (biology, immutable) to gender (socially assigned, changeable) was only brought into 
the official framework of women’s human rights after the creation of CEDAW, in 1979 (adopted 
1981).259 
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Although CEDAW retains the language of “sex”, it is infused with the implicit 
conceptual transition to gender through its mandate of cultural change in the assignment of 
gender attributes.260 In General Comment (GC) 25, CEDAW moves explicitly to the use of 
“social construction” as the approach that guides its work and accounting of gender, pointedly 
referencing it as a “social stratifier”, on par with “race, class, ethnicity, sexuality and age”.261 
Certainly the explicit deployment of “gender” drives the examination of rights under the treaty, 
according to its members. 262 In GC 25, gender appears alongside, rather than enmeshed with 
other social stratifiers, such as we might expect to see in later expressly intersectional 
approaches. 
Lars Adam Rehof, the scholar of CEDAW’s documentary origins (referred to as the 
traveaux preperatoires), traces elements of international protections for women as far back as 
1904, when early iterations of anti-human trafficking instruments were being developed.263 That 
the preeminent traveaux scholar marks this as the first instance of women’s distinctly articulated 
international human rights, alerts us to a genesis story embedded in Victorian-era anxiety about 
prostitution and the fight against so-called “white slavery”.264 One official history of this thread 
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in IHRL credits the use of the term “slavery” as purposely evocative of the Abolitionist 
movement’s increasing success at halting the global slave trade in Africans.265  
To many feminists of colour, these analogies to specific historic suffering of others as 
metaphor are an indication of the foundational racism inherent in dominant women’s rights 
discourses.266 Perhaps it is no surprise that women’s international human rights shares a pedigree 
as well as inherent value framing with many other official documents of this era.267 It adopts a 
posture of colonial shock at the ‘barbarism’ of ‘other’ cultures, and by analogy, draws 
comparison to the assumed ‘slavery’ of women in prostitution. In this sense, European women’s 
emerging sense of injustice is embedded in what has been referred to elsewhere as an agenda of 
“social cleansing” of “undesirables” at home, and conquest of “the uncivilized” abroad.268 
The title of the early international anti-human trafficking agreement Rehof refers to as 
foundational to women’s international human rights makes no attempt to hide an exclusive 
concern for white, European and North American women. In this sense, women’s rights emerge 
on the international scene with a set of preoccupations that affirms the role of protective 
mechanisms to ensure the rightful place of a particular view of white, middle class European and 
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North American womanhood. These limitations in the early vision of protections as essentially 
paternalistic, Eurocentric and class bound are certainly not limited to women’s rights within the 
international human rights arena;269 nevertheless they foreshadow the ghostly appearance of 
similar concerns in the women’s rights documents we explore below. 
In addition to this trajectory of protections, the Convention of the Political Rights of 
Women, 1953,270 pre-dated the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 
1966),271 marking a forward-thinking commitment to women’s formal civil and political rights. 
In addition, various committees and sub-committees, special rapporteurs and specialized 
agencies, such as the Sub-Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) of the Commission on 
Human Rights, were charged with addressing women’s political equality, civil equality, and 
subsequently, social and economic equality. Between 1952 and 1962, the CSW sponsored a total 
of three international conventions, two of which, The Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women272 and The Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriage,273 signaled a departure from the strict parameters of civil and political 
rights by delving into the sphere of family law as it limited civil and political rights. In 1962, the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) initiated a long-term vision and program with 
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respect to the advancement of women’s rights,274 with the establishment of CEDAW’s closest 
relative and most important antecedent, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (DEDAW),275 being one of its most significant outcomes.  
Notwithstanding critiques of their effectiveness, DEDAW, together with the earlier 
development of political rights, show that a spectrum of rights for women had been enumerated 
prior to CEDAW. In political science terms—and of particular import to the emerging women’s 
movement campaigning around the slogan “the personal is political”—these enumerated rights 
crossed the traditional barrier between public and private concerns going back to the Greeks; 276 a 
bifurcation seen through emerging feminist analysis as a cornerstone of patriarchal social 
relations.277 The Convention on Eliminating all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
building on DEDAW, arguably takes human rights farthest into the private sphere of all the 
treaties, finding in Ms. A.T. v Hungary that: “[w]omen’s human rights to life and to physical and 
mental integrity cannot be superseded by other rights, including the right to property and the 
right to privacy”.278 In GC 28, the Committee articulates this as a warning to states: “Article 2 
also imposes a due diligence obligation on States parties to prevent discrimination by private 
actors. In some cases, a private actor’s acts or omission of acts may be attributed to the State 
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under international law”.279 This “due diligence principle” has become the cornerstone and 
rallying cry for a number of global women’s rights organizations seeking legal sanction for 
failures of state protection in cases of domestic violence.280 While its legal enforceability, 
explored further below, remains tenuous at best, this principle in international human rights law 
emboldens and gives focus to women’s rights activists who continue to experience state 
complacency or even complicity in the forms of violence that women experience in the privacy 
of their intimate relationships.281  
In a further elaboration of this principle, the Committee provides a compendium of its 
meaning and legal authority in its 2017 update to the obligations of States parties with respect to 
what it now refers to as gender-based violence.282 Here the Committee asserts that the obligation 
of due diligence “underpins the treaty as a whole”, and that “failures or omissions constitute 
human rights violations”.283 CEDAW thus extends the range of states’ obligations with respect to 
protection of women’s rights into both the private sphere and over non-state actors. In 
international human rights law terms, CEDAW’s elaboration of women’s rights has pushed 
beyond the so-called “first generation”, strictly civil and political rights, to incorporate “second 
generation” social, economic and cultural rights, finding the former curtailed within family 
arrangements and general cultural norms.   
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Women’s rights, and CEDAW in particular, have tended to “suffer from the brunt of 
international skepticism toward ‘second generation rights’”.284 While canonical commentators 
hold that the schism and the resultant hierarchy between civil and political rights on the one 
hand, and economic, social cultural rights on the other, has been overcome in IHRL generally,285 
CEDAW, as a treaty comprised of a blend of both types of rights, continues to experience 
resistance from commentators and states for simultaneously extending too far into proscriptive 
admonishments that infringe on state’s right to social policy self-determination;286 for not 
adhering to the proper scope of IHRL qua law;287 and for being a program so broad it is “not 
realistic”.288 
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2.2.1 A mandate to broaden the provision and protection of women’s 
human rights 
Prior to CEDAW, the UN’s approach to women’s rights had been informed by classically 
liberal legal preoccupations with respect to the de jure or black letter aspects of law, “to raise the 
status of women, irrespective of nationality, race, language or religion, to equality with men in 
all fields of human enterprise, and to eliminate all discrimination against women in the 
provisions of statutory law, in legal maxims or rules, or in interpretation of customary law”.289 
The famous United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 75(v), which had declared 
that the then Commission on Human Rights had “no power to take any action with regard to any 
complaints concerning human rights”, was accompanied by a parallel resolution that declared the 
Commission on the Status of Women likewise “had no power to take action in regard to any 
complaints concerning the status of women”.290 International conventions created before 
CEDAW had focused on these categories of rights and concerns, and were now judged by their 
critics to have a “restricted scope” along with the “lack of […] provision for international 
review”.291 Thus, both the mainstream human rights protections offered through the ICCPR and 
the separate instruments on women’s rights were, by the 1970s, seen to “have remained 
extremely limited in their ability to affect the condition of women”.292 For example, although the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) did adjudicate women’s rights matters under ICCPR, those 
advocating for CEDAW judged the Committee to have placed exclusive emphasis on “legal, 
                                                 
 
289 Report of the Commission on the Status of Women, E/281/Rev1 (1947) at 12. 
290 Communications Concerning Human Rights Resolution 75 (V) & 76 (V) Resolutions Adopted by the Economic 
and Social Council, 2 During its 5th Session from 19 July to 16 1947 (5 August 1947: ECOSOC). 
291 Laura Reanda, “Human Rights and Women’s Rights: The United Nations Approach” (1981) 3:2 Hum Rights Q 
11 at 19. 
292 Ibid. 
71 
rather than de facto situations”, revealing their grounding in a foundational feminist critique of 
law as abstracted from the lived experience of the women who seek its benefit.293   
In 1979, the existing paradigms of minority rights, civil and political rights as well as the 
“social development” orientation of the CSW, were beginning to be acknowledged as inadequate 
to the violations women were experiencing globally. To the framers of CEDAW, it left an 
enormous gap that women around the world were daily falling through.294 Despite formal 
recognition of women as a protected group within the family of existing instruments, there was 
no practical mechanism that was equipped to screen for their particular rights violations. 
Subsequent developments in the family of treaties failed to address the gaps in understanding 
regarding women’s rights. The limitations of the available instruments gave rise to CEDAW; it is 
a period well summarized in practical terms by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her paper introducing 
intersectionality to the UN in 2000: 
[W]hile women’s enjoyment of human rights were formally 
guaranteed, these protections were compromised to the extent that 
women’s experiences could be said to be different from the 
experiences of men. Thus, when women were detained, tortured, 
and otherwise denied civil and political rights in the same fashion 
as men, these abuses were clearly seen as violations of human 
rights. Yet when women were raped in custody, beaten in private, 
or denied access to decision-making by tradition, their differences 
from men rendered such abuses peripheral to core human rights 
guarantees.295 
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In addition, committees, such as the HRC were, in 1979, still made up exclusively of men 
(a fact that remained the case in 2000)296 who were judged by their contemporaries advancing 
the women’s human rights agenda to have neither knowledge of nor expertise in women’s rights, 
nor any links to national women’s rights groups who could challenge the rosy views of domestic 
legal rights invoked by States parties.297  
2.3 Women’s human rights? 
The engagement with the UN system of rights protections was itself a contested terrain of 
activism. Both those from outside the UN mechanisms and from NGOs, as well as those within, 
expressed their ambivalence in briefs, fliers, memos and discussion papers, as well as in the draft 
notes for the treaty itself.298 Although faith in the existing UN mechanisms was not particularly 
strong, the scholars and activists engaged in the elaboration of the treaty still preferred the 
framing of women’s rights as the human rights of women “to emphasize the globality and 
indivisibility of all human rights, and their full applicability to women as human beings”.299 They 
nevertheless concurrently feared “relegation to structures endowed with less power and resources 
than the general human rights structures”..300  
Despite the uncertain normative and institutional terrain, they saw it as a risk worth 
taking, since it appeared to them that the overall project of human rights promised belonging in 
“one of the few moral visions subscribed to internationally”, although they understood the 
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fragility of its consensus, concluding that “its scope is not agreed on universally”[…].301  
Because of its normative anchor in the best game in town, it was seen as strategically expedient: 
“Human Rights is a widely accepted goal and thus provides a useful framework for seeking 
redress of gender abuse”.302 The CEDAW was to expressly recognize the limitations of the civil 
and political rights of traditional concern to IHRL. The CEDAW’s proponents pushed these legal 
boundaries in the resulting convention. This normative struggle also took place in the context of 
many institutional obstacles, which early members of the Committee keenly recall.303  
The genesis of CEDAW occurred at a time of “superpower confrontations and battles 
between ideologies”304 and amid hesitation about economic, social and cultural rights, codified in 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),305 for what 
they owed to socialist ideals. The project of drafting CEDAW set out to answer the criticism that 
the “root causes” of discrimination against women had been neglected in previous instruments. 
The existing gender protections within the UN machinery had failed to highlight, respond to or 
adequately acknowledge either the fact or the scope of the ongoing violations of women’s 
specific human rights in either their deliberations or conclusions.306  
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This orientation, identifying multiple “roots” and manifestations of gender 
discrimination, plowed the ground for the subsequent intersectional challenge. The CEDAW’s 
articulation of discrimination, as embedded in overall social conditions and institutional 
responses, casts discrimination, in important part, as the result of a social process as well as 
visible through a single event, allowing for the complex structural viewpoint on discrimination 
that intersectionality promises.307 
2.4 CEDAW: an instrument in, but not solely of, the UN 
The Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women was 
adopted and proclaimed on December 18, 1979 by the General Assembly by Resolution 
34/180(1979). Open for signature in 1980, it came into force in 1981. At the time of this writing, 
189 States are parties to it, while 109 have signed its 1999 Optional Protocol.308 This latter 
fortification of the treaty was seen to address its relative weaknesses in the firmament of human 
rights treaties, and brings it in line with other human rights mechanisms, by allowing those 
individuals or groups of individuals residing in states that have signed and ratified it to bring 
forward claims once domestic remedies have been exhausted. Beyond the adjudication of 
individual cases, it additionally grants the Committee the power to conduct inquiries into 
situations of grave or systematic violations of women’s human rights.309  
As with all United Nations bodies excepting the Security Council, enforcement of its 
terms is restricted to the moral suasion inherent in being part of an international community, and 
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the relative power that inheres therein. For example, for states requesting entry to the 
international community as part of seeking other benefits, “[h]uman rights have come to be seen 
as central to the assessment of states of underdevelopment” and “an essential prerequisite in the 
facilitation of societal, legal economic and political progress”.310 Being a signatory to CEDAW 
is a hallmark of progress for those states (formerly) considered to be “backward”, and 
compliance with its terms a form of measurement as to their progress away from their “pre-
modern” past.  
The convention’s closest advocates heralded it outside the UN system as premier among 
treaty bodies for its consideration of civil society views and engagement of NGOs.311 At the time 
of drafting, this newest treaty was expressly crafted from “comments from governments, 
specialized agencies and NGOs on a text which would be prepared by a working group set up by 
the CSW”.312 In the end, multiple working groups were struck to create the treaty over the course 
of its development and the travaux reflect the involvement of many NGOs in the drafting 
process: the All-African Women’s Conference; the International Council of Social Democratic 
Women; the International Federation of University Women;313 and the World YWCA.314 From 
early in its evolution, CEDAW involved specialized agencies and NGOs in publicity activities to 
advance receptivity, awareness and adoption of women’s rights among States parties.315 It has 
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also had an active and specialized NGO monitoring group with links to women’s grassroots 
communities around the world.316 
Sally Engle Merry, the CEDAW scholar and legal anthropologist, holds that among treaty 
bodies CEDAW remains outstanding for its collaborative approach.317 The UN’s official history 
of its advancement of women’s rights traces this extraordinary partnership with advocates 
outside the UN institutions back to the early CSW days, making it explicit that the international 
grassroots movement for women’s rights helped shape the UN’s frameworks for advancing 
women’s rights.318 The previously identified need for a new mechanism for enforcement of 
women’s rights resulted in a broadening and codifying of earlier statements on marriage and 
family rights because, “discrimination arising from customary law, from traditional institutions 
and practices, or from other forms of oppression not specifically defined in the covenant 
[ICCPR] tend to be neglected”.319  This focus on redress is plainly represented in the treaty’s 
final text for Article 2(f), which requires of signatories that they undertake: “To take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women[.]”320  
Thus, present at the conception of CEDAW was the identification of the roles of 
“custom”, “culture” and “traditional practice” as at once responsible for the invisibility 
(appearing as natural or given) of women’s human rights violations and as an engine of their 
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reproduction (justification of violations based on cultural defences).321   The CEDAW broadened 
and solidified a framework of setting women apart as a group in the UN protections. It followed, 
rather than led the particularization of delineating rights for identity groups (ICERD led the way 
in 1966 by specifically codifying protections on the grounds of race). It did so, however, in a 
new and contentious way: while some rights were specified in earlier frameworks, CEDAW was 
to have the force of a treaty, and as such, it was to have powers of obligation to reach into states’ 
“cultures” where discrimination against women was embedded, causing concern among states 
for their cultural integrity.322  This spotlighting of culture became a flashpoint for the debate over 
the meaning of an intersectional approach to women’s experiences of discrimination, with 
CEDAW’s tone on culture appearing to limit its flexibility to adopt an intersectional posture in 
adjudication.323  
The CEDAW has remained every bit as contentious as it was at its initiation.324 At the 
time of writing, 58 countries have registered reservations or made declarations to CEDAW.325 
The definition of a reservation is taken from the Vienna Treaty of 1969: ‘“reservation’ means a 
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the Treaty in their application to that State.” 326 
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Most reservations to the CEDAW are related to Articles 2 and 16, 327 which the 
Committee deems central to the object and purpose of the convention, and which pertain to 
discrimination that takes place in the family, or as an outcome or purpose of culture, tradition 
and custom. Many states make reservations so sweeping as to effectively nullify state 
accountability; others are unilaterally asserted on religious grounds with no canonical (religious 
or legal) justification offered. International legal opinion holds such reservations, subjecting an 
entire treaty to religious or domestic law, are “incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty”, and thus, nullify the objecting states’ adherence.328 Moreover, such objections, couched 
in terms of “competing” rights to freedom of religion or belief (FORB), fundamentally 
misconstrue the nature of those rights in international human rights law. “Afterall”, as scholar 
Nazela Ghanea-Hercock and Special Rapporteur Heiner Bielefeldt have both pointed out, 
“FORB, as a human right, ‘does not protect religions per se (e.g., traditions, values, identities, 
and truth claims) but aims at the empowerment of human beings, as individuals and in 
community with others. This empowerment component is something that freedom of religion or 
belief has in common with all other human rights.’”329 
Despite the clarity in international legal protections for FORB as applicable to individual 
rights holders, and the duty bearers as the states, many human rights scholars and the community 
of practitioners continue to characterize states’ evocation of this set of rights as a “clash” of 
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rights, rather than as an incorrect reading of those rights.330The incongruity of states’ objections 
on these grounds, compounded with their incompatibility with the object and purpose of the 
treaty itself, thus is often not effectively disputed, and most frequently it does not result in clear 
sanction. 
States’ claims that a cultural or religious practice requires a reservation to CEDAW are 
often also disputed by the women active for women’s rights within that state’s boundaries, either 
from the dominant culture or from within another, minority culture. The feminist-egalitarian 
interpretations of Islam reflected in the shadow reports of Morocco to CEDAW, for example, are 
but one version of the complexity of potentially intersectional claims opened by the reservation 
system.331 I attend to the work done by “culture” in this context briefly below.  
2.4.1 CEDAW’s competing discourses 
CEDAW’s drafting and ultimate ratification were the culmination of advocacy by women 
within and beyond the UN; its genesis and normative grounding is both embedded in and 
arguably limited by what it owes to the “women in development” discourse that emerged in the 
late 1960s and 1970s.332  This “developmental discourse” is grounded in an implicit acceptance 
of the unequal relations of international political economy,333 while the variants concerned with 
gender relations posit a social development role for women who, rather than appearing as rights 
bearers, are viewed as “indicators” of a community’s capacity to advance toward a more 
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“developed” state. This legacy is evident in the Convention’s preamble, which declares, 
“discrimination against women … hampers the growth and prosperity of society”.334 This 
discourse has remained dominant both within international NGOs and within the UN, where 
women’s “advancement” on a whole raft of “indicators” joins other measurements to track 
states’ progress.335 This grounds women’s equality as a legitimate endeavour not on its own 
merits, but on the basis of some other, more expedient principle based in shared benefit, 
obfuscating the fundamental and potentially unpalatable power shifts—locally and globally—
required for its attainment. This recalls Puar’s cultural studies normative critique of western 
attempts to expand “the statistical fold that produces appropriate digits and facts toward the 
population’s optimization of life and the ascendancy of whiteness”.336 It is a form of 
“sisterhood”, as Orford succinctly asserted two decades ago, “aimed at producing new female 
subjects of development without unsettling the priorities of globalization”.337 As Sundhya Pahuja 
has pointed out, “[i]nterventions directed at bringing about ‘development’ are assessed primarily 
by reference to the intentions of the ‘developer’, rather than the effect of those actions on the 
‘developing’”.338  
A striking, and a yet more compromised, example of this is the international concern with 
the situation of women in Afghanistan. Since the NATO invasion of that country in 2001, there 
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has been approximately 1.5 billion dollars invested in activities that were intended to benefit 
women.339 Instead, a 2015 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
concluded that the aid “commitments have not translated into concrete improvements in the lives 
of the majority of women, who remain marginalised, discriminated against and at high risk of 
being subjected to violence”.340  The Special Rapporteur’s report is itself an example of the 
contradictory hybrid of critique and complicity the international approach to women’s rights can 
elicit.  
The CEDAW is at once legally radical and normatively conservative: through its 
contextual reading of women’s rights it articulates an expanded definition of human rights that 
integrates civil and political rights with a structural understanding of economic, social and 
cultural rights; it does so however within the context of an unchallenged framework of the 
human rights machinery itself, leaving unexamined the unequal terms of global engagement 
which is in-and-of itself the source of a great deal of the discrimination the globe’s women 
experience.341These mutually contradictory frames condition much of the UN human rights 
discourse, and have not gone un-noticed by those most embedded in their operation.342At the 
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time of CEDAW’s drafting, the “developmentalist” discourse sat alongside the influence of the 
new post-colonial states, which prior to CEDAW influenced the first new human rights standards 
developed after the UDHR, especially through CERD (1965), reflecting the concerns of the 
formerly colonized.343 A similar influence is “also clear” in the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, of 1960, which acknowledged “the evils of 
colonialism and the importance of the right to self-determination”, and the strong “condemnation 
of Apartheid in General Assembly Resolution 1761 of 1962”.344  
The drafters of CEDAW followed a “lull” in this spate of new post-colonial instruments 
(that is, developed during the independence era of formerly colonial states),345 in 1979, during 
which period, the “human rights discourse developed as a counterpoint to the developmentalist 
discourse”.346  The CEDAW’s preamble reflects this history as well, stating: “the eradication of 
apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, 
foreign occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of states is essential to 
the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women”.347  
The Convention sits still in some discomfort on the cusp of these differential approaches, 
with the “women in development” origins holding an ontological tension with the rights-based 
institutional framework that informs its status as a stand-alone human rights treaty with an 
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enumerated set of protections. The CEDAW’s framers were influenced by emerging theories of 
women’s subordination, grounded in critiques of the ontological frameworks of all cultures, on 
the basis that they shared some dominant and dominating forms of gender assignment.348 In the 
scholarship emerging outside the UN machinery, but influential on it, this was summarized in the 
term “patriarchy”, which newly expanded its conceptual reach to go beyond strict 
anthropological application. The long-observed universal organization of human cultures into 
kinship and reproductive units was now being reexamined with the insight that there was a 
differential outcome for men and women vis-à-vis equality: “men have certain rights in their 
female kin, and women do not have the same rights either to themselves or to their male kin”.349  
The compulsory assignment of heterosexuality and of the subordination of women 
through cultural kinship and marriage systems was gathered under the concept of patriarchal 
power. To paraphrase the American legal feminist Catherine MacKinnon, while great differences 
obtain over history and across cultures, from the perspective of women’s role vis-à-vis equality 
with their male compatriots, “bottom is bottom”.350 This pithy reductionism, however, reveals an 
essentialized “woman” that is now considered problematic in complex international and 
multicultural contexts where, in fact, shifting power and social locations alter profoundly what 
constitutes “bottom”, and patriarchal culture can become easily conflated with culture per se.  
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Holmaat and Naber have argued that the explicit language of cultural feminist scholarship 
was slower to enter the public international relations texts;351 however, its influence can be felt in 
the norms and frameworks of understanding of the treaty open for signature in 1981. By 2004, 
CEDAW was interpreting the treaty in explicit terms against this cultural feminist broad 
definition of universal patriarchy:  
Despite variations across cultures and over time, gender relations 
throughout the world entail asymmetry of power between men and 
women as a pervasive trait. [Gender] helps us understand the 
social construction of gender identities and the unequal structure of 
power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.352 
 
A central insight of the intersectional approach will be that the “bifurcation of race and 
gender leads to the mistaken conclusion that the goals of multiculturalism and feminism are 
antithetical”, setting them on an ideological collision path.353 Class, racialization, ability, sexual 
orientation, etc., alter the position of women vis-à-vis men and other women. Yet, CEDAW qua 
document was devised at a time when “[c]ultural feminists developed the modern construct 
‘woman’ by privileging sex differences over any other basis of oppression and asserting the 
existence of universal gender subordination across time and space”.354  
This form of gender essentialism, despite its intended internationalism, builds 
commonality of gender identity at the expense of context that might differently shape a woman’s 
experience and agency. As we have seen, the marker on conceptualizing identity has since 
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moved far from CEDAW’s unproblematized “woman”, with the most radical critiques of 
essentialism challenging the category of  “woman” as an “ontological joke”,355 not at all useful 
due to its historical, cultural and “performative” variations and specificities, 356 and more 
recently, its fundamental biological instability.357 This latter development has particularly 
troubled the Committee charged with overseeing the treaty’s interpretation, as we shall see 
ahead. By 2003, Radhika Coomeraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women 
(SRVAW), addressed the matter of women’s multiple affiliations in international human rights 
protection with the following, more practical, disclaimer: 
Identity is not an essential immutable, permanent status, it has 
many constituent elements. Future experiences often transform the 
nature and direction of personal identity. Identity is often 
composite, made up of multiple selves, often contesting, 
contradicting, and transforming the other. Identity therefore 
reconstitutes itself, reacting to and negotiating ideology and lived 
experience.358  
 
Coomaraswamy is articulating how an operating theory of gender allows the richness of lived 
experience, and particularly of not only violations, but also of resistance, to be seen, understood 
and supported by the instruments charged with the role of protecting women from harms; and, 
specific to international human rights contexts, how this contributes to remedy. It is also the 
central challenge of the intersectional turn. 
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2.4.2 The CEDAW Committee 
Articles 17-30 of the Convention govern the Committee’s mandate and the administration 
of the Committee. In a formula similar to all nine core human rights treaties of the United 
Nations,359 the implementation of CEDAW by States parties is overseen by a committee of 23 
“experts” of “high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Treaty”,360 put 
forward by their governments, but elected by the Committee through secret ballot. They receive 
reports on a schedule of every four years, and engage the States parties in what is termed 
“constructive dialogue” for the implementation at the national level of the Committee’s program 
for implementation.361 Despite the lack of concrete enforcement capabilities, the Committee’s 
utterances are referred to as jurisprudence, with debate as to their status as binding or “soft law”. 
Nonetheless, its General Comments are considered direct interpretations of the treaty’s legal 
meaning; its Concluding Remarks on country reports, no less so, although it must rely on a 
system of “good faith” implementation on the parts of states.362  
Similar to the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), the CEDAW Committee has gone out of its way to establish itself as the custodian of a 
“living document”.363 It has therefore adopted its definitional scope in Article 1 of “all forms of 
discrimination”, and its mandate under Article 21 of the convention to “make suggestions and 
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general recommendations based on the examination of reports and information”364 to identify 
new and emerging forms or patterns of discrimination, whether named or not in the original 
document.365 For instance, the Committee has read a core protection against violence from state 
and non-state actors back into the articles of the treaty, despite the original document’s silence on 
the matter.366   
At the time of CEDAW’s establishment, treaty committees were becoming increasingly 
self-critical about the sources of their information on the status of a country’s compliance with 
its respective obligations: it was the CERD that first went on record as requesting that 
“corrective information from sources other than states” be sought in the review processes, which 
had not yet fully integrated the alternative reports from civil society organizations into their 
deliberations.367 The relationships with women’s INGOs that characterized CEDAW’s framing, 
continue unabated, with official histories recording, in dizzying detail,368 world conferences, 
special meetings and special discussion sessions on women’s international human rights that 
have mapped the rise of the treaty as a core part of the human rights firmament. 369 These 
activities have given rise to, established and tautologically confirmed women’s international 
human rights’ norms, topics and legal status.  
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For Annalise Riles, these relationships are exemplary of a discernable international 
human rights’ aesthetic, such that relations between the UN and women’s advocates in civil 
society have become part of a ubiquitous production of networks and documents, each 
comprising artifacts on par with one another, and worthy of study unto themselves, as 
ethnographies of international human rights law.370 While Riles’ work is informative of the 
extent to which the UN systems for engaging women’s rights have become their own hermetic 
world, her work is a deep study of its own, and takes us in an ethnographic direction, not 
immediately pertinent to this legal study of the grounds for intersectionality. 
2.4.3 Limiting the normative scope: Reservations to CEDAW 
Clearly, CEDAW has attracted a “large number of reservations and reservations of a very 
general type”.371 In her previous Working Paper on Reservations to Human rights Treaties, 
Francoise Hampton observed that “[c]ertain treaties are more affected than others [by 
reservations], the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of discrimination Against Women 
being a notable example”.372 In Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention, CEDAW adopts the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding the “impermissibility principle”, stating 
that any reservation that is incompatible with the “object and purpose” of the convention shall 
not be permitted.373 Likewise, “[a]general reservation subjecting a treaty as a whole to a religious 
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law or to domestic law is likely to be found incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty”.374 
While the legal debates with respect to reservations is not the principal subject of this 
paper,375 the reservation regime is worth noting because of its close relationship to potentially 
intersectional interpretations of women’s rights and the overall efficacy of the instrument. On the 
one hand, the broad social change required by states in order to be in strict adherence to the 
treaty may excuse qualifications in the name of “progressive realization” of its requirements, an 
accepted form of IHRL compliance;376 on the other hand, generally weak enforcement 
mechanisms, combined with the number and extent of reservations to CEDAW, have occasioned 
much reflection on the reservation regime generally, and its implications for CEDAW in 
particular.377 The development of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW of 1999 (December 22, 
                                                 
 
374 note 328, para 56. 
375 Rhona K M Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (OUP Oxford, 2012) at 86–88. 
376 UN Women Asia Pacific, “Why does the CEDAW Convention allow Reservations from States Parties?”, online: 
CEDAW FAQs <http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/focus-areas/cedaw-human-rights/faq>. Explained thus: “It has 
been recognized that some rights may take more time to be realized than others. Some economic, social and cultural 
rights, for example, may require more time to be realized, because they require a greater investment of resources, or 
more substantial structural changes. Some countries at the time of ratification may have in place laws, traditions, and 
religious or cultural practices that may discriminate against women – time may be required to remove discriminatory 
provisions within the law, or change discriminatory behaviour. Where a State cannot be realistically expected to 
achieve a right immediately, its obligation is understood to be ‘progressive’, and can be satisfied by genuine efforts 
that produce incremental progress towards realization of the right.” 
377 LA Hoq, “The Women’s Convention and its Optional Protocol : Empowering Women to Claim Their 
Internationally Protected Rights” (2001) 32:3 Hum Rights Law Rev 677; Riddle, supra note 370; Konstantin 
Korkelia, “New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights” (2000) 13:2 EJIL 437; Hanna Beate Schopp-Schilling, “Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments?” in Ineta 
Ziemele, ed, Reserv Hum Rights Treaties Vienna Conv Regime Confl Harmony Reconcil, Deutsches Institut fur 
Menschensrechte/The Raoul Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library (Danvers MA: Springer) 3; Deutsches 
Institut Fur Menschenrechte, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, 
Harmony or Reconciliation, Ineta Ziemele, ed., The Raoul Wallenberg Institute human rights library (Springer, 
2013). 
90 
2000),378 allowing communications on behalf of individuals and groups, was hoped to have 
improved state accountability379 by providing an additional check and balance on reservations 
through jurisprudence on the meaning of state obligations for individual claimants in situations 
of reservations. 380 The matter, Hanson opines, is “legally complex”.381 Since March 2006, there 
is also the State-driven Universal Periodic Review, monitoring the “universality, 
interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights” to add to the arsenal of 
accountability of states to their human rights obligations.382  
Konstantin Korkelia describes opinion on the reservations regimes for human rights 
treaties as swinging between the belief that consent by the state remains the fundamental 
principle in international law, and that therefore legal consequences of inadmissibility should be 
“taken by the reserving state alone”; and, on the other hand, that supervisory organs should “be 
competent to decide on the admissibility of reservations and to determine consequences of 
inadmissible reservations”.383 Jennifer Riddle summarizes this in the pithy formulation of 
“integrity” (of the treaty’s norms) versus “universality” (of coverage). She traces the climate of 
                                                 
 
378 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 2131 
UNTS 83 (Entry into force 22 December 2000 [Optinal Protocol], 1999); Elizabeth Evat, “Finding a Voice for 
Women’s Rights : the Early Days of CEDAW” (2002) 34:3 George Wash Int Law Rev 515; Cees Flinterman, 
“United Nations Human Rights Reform: Some Reflections of a CEDAW-Member” (2003) 21 Neth Q Hum Rts 621. 
Unlike ICERD and the ICCPR, the Women's Convention originally made no provision for an individual complaints 
procedure, thus limiting access by women and opportunities for CEDAW to develop jurisprudence. 
379 Hoq, supra note 377. 
380 Riddle, supra note 370 at 605; note 326; “Choosing a Forum - How To Complain About Human Rights Treaty 
Violations”, online: Bafesky.com <http://www.bayefsky.com/complain/44_forum.php>. A state party may have 
made reservations to one or more of the treaties which would affect the viability of the complaint. The complainant 
should therefore review any reservations entered by the state, and any commentary by the treaty body on the 
reservation.” 
381 note 328, para 60. 
382 “Universal Periodic Review”, online: OHCHR UPR UPR 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/UPRMain.aspx>; Cees Flinterman, “Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action: 20 Years Late” (2013) 31 Neth Q Hum Rts 129. 
383 Korkelia, supra note 377 at 437, 476. 
91 
reservations for IHRL as having “moved from a unanimity rule to a reservations regime that 
places universal acceptance of multilateral treaties above preserving the integrity of each 
individual document’s provisions”.384 The disassembled meaning of universality in this context 
is an obvious question to raise. While there is now general agreement that “the human rights 
treaty bodies have the competence to determine if a reservation is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty”,385 it is widely acknowledged that there are problems establishing 
invalidity in a climate of “constructive engagement”. 386  CEDAW itself maintains that: 
Although the Convention does not prohibit the entering of 
reservations, those which challenge the central principles of the 
Convention are contrary to the provisions of the Convention and to 
general international law. As such they may be challenged by other 
States parties.387 
 
As with other treaty bodies, CEDAW currently has limited responses open to it: its 
report-receiving function (under Article 18) allows the Committee to interrogate the meaning and 
suggest time limits to reservations as part of monitoring States parties’ progress toward 
compliance with “a view to narrowing its content and/or withdrawing it”.388 To date, few 
reservations to Article 2 have been withdrawn or modified by any State party and reservations to 
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Article 16 are rarely withdrawn.389 Ultimately, the monitoring bodies represent “the interests of 
all states when they exercise their functions”.390  Official weight, however, is granted to other 
States parties, whose objections to incompatible reservations need to be registered. Nevertheless, 
according to the ICJ Genocide Convention decision, such objections can stand side-by-side with 
a state’s continued status as a signatory to the treaty, only “if the reservation is compatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention”.391   
In and of themselves, the existing state objections are of little use and reveal no helpful 
pattern that would empower the CEDAW committee.392 In practice, a reserving state can be a 
party while considering itself exempt from the central tenets of the treaty, weakening the 
normative force of the treaty as a tool for practical protection and accountability.393 Although the 
reservations to CEDAW have been characterized as “haphazard and subjective”,394 there is, in 
fact, a pattern: it is most frequently to those articles aimed at discrimination that takes place 
within the family, or as an outcome or purpose of culture, tradition and custom.395 One powerful 
tool a treaty body has against reservations is the accepted non-derogability of certain rights. The 
law around women’s rights internationally is inching toward an assumed status of international 
customary law, particularly when the matter of VAW within state boundaries is at issue.396 Non-
derogability in international human rights law applies generally to the following conditions: 
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No State party shall, even in time of emergency threatening the life 
of the nation, derogate from the Covenant's guarantees of the right 
to life ; freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and from medical or scientific 
experimentation without free consent; freedom from slavery or 
involuntary servitude; the right not to be imprisoned for 
contractual debt; the right not to be convicted or sentenced to a 
heavier penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal legislation; the 
right to recognition as a person before the law; and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. These rights are not derogable 
under any conditions even for the asserted purpose of preserving 
the life of the nation.397  
 
There have been suggestions that VAW be cast as a matter of the integrity of the person, 
to test the possibility of this as one indisputable international standard in the protection of 
women’s rights.398 This has been referred to variously as the incoherent act of reading coverage 
by analogy to other, formally recognized, IHRL norms;399 as “not yet” the status of international 
customary law”,400 and more recently, in more progressivist language as part of “a growing call 
to redefine customary international law in gender sensitive terms, [that] could eventually bring 
violence against women within jus cogens.”401  
The Committee itself addresses VAW’s non-derogability status obliquely in paragraph 11 
of GC 28 by stating that: “[t]he obligations of States Parties do not cease in periods of armed 
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conflict or in states of emergency resulting from political events or natural disasters”, and that 
they are required to attend to “the particular needs of women in times of armed conflict and 
states of emergency”, gesturing to the context of VAW in such circumstances.402 These previous 
and various statements about the nature and role of violence against women in both the evidence 
and construction of violations that fit the bill of non-derogability and, ultimately, of a protection 
guaranteed by customary international law, are gathered in the most recent update on the 
obligations of states with respect to violence against women in GR 35 on gender-based violence 
against women, updating GR 19.403 In this context, the Committee states baldly that: 
For over 25 years, the practice of States parties has endorsed the 
Committee’s interpretation. The opinio juris and State practice 
suggest that the prohibition of gender-based violence against 
women has evolved into a principle of customary international 
law.404 
 
In GR 19, the Committee delineates “gender-based violence” as comprising the 
nullification of the following universal rights and freedoms: 
a. The right to life; 
b. The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; 
c. The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of 
international or internal armed conflict; 
d. The right to liberty and security of person; 
e. The right to equal protection under the law; 
f. The right to equality in the family;  
g. The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health; 
h. The right to just and favourable conditions of work.405 
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In GR 35, the Committee extends this observation through a compendium of decisions to 
date which together, underscore this evolving area of non-derogability in customary international 
law, by redefining torture in “gender sensitive” terms: 
The Committee endorses the view of other human rights treaty 
bodies and special procedures mandate-holders that in making the 
determination of when acts of gender-based violence against 
women amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, a gender sensitive approach is required to understand the 
level of pain and suffering experienced by women, and that the 
purpose and intent requirement of torture are satisfied when acts or 
omissions are gender specific or perpetrated against a person on 
the basis of sex.406 
 
In paragraph 25 of this GR, CEDAW makes a declaratory statement about the status of at 
least some forms of gender-based violence as jus cogens: 
In addition, both international humanitarian law and human rights 
law have recognised the direct obligations of non-State actors, 
including as parties to an armed conflict, in specific circumstances. 
These include the prohibition of torture, which is part of customary 
international law and has become a peremptory norm (jus 
cogens).407 
 
Most attempts from outside the Committee to delineate a minimum international standard 
of “non-derogability” with respect to protection from VAW remain unconvincing. Many weaken 
the treaty’s normative force by instrumentally extracting acts of violence from their crucial 
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context as part of a continuum of inequality that underscores and reproduces it,408 a complexity 
the Committee has been at pains to maintain, pointing out “the close connection between 
discrimination against women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”.409 In GR 35, the Committee once again makes this point: 
The Committee considers that gender-based violence against 
women is one of the fundamental social, political and economic 
means by which the subordinate position of women with respect to 
men and their stereotyped roles are perpetuated. Throughout its 
work, the Committee has made clear that this violence is a critical 
obstacle to achieving substantive equality between women and 
men as well as to women’s enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Convention.410 
At heart, CEDAW is a treaty about non-discrimination, and holds this context central to 
its consideration of violations. To lay the groundwork for a later discussion of CEDAW’s 
relationship to the elements of intersectionality, a committee-based definition of discrimination is 
necessary. 
2.4.4 CEDAW: Equality and non-discrimination 
As with ICERD, non-discrimination is the broad rubric under which CEDAW’s articles 
are gathered. It has been noted that there is “little overall convergence or congruence”411 among 
the treaty regimes as to the meaning and consequence in the use of “non-discrimination”.  
Instruments range from naming non-discrimination within a sequence of rights of which non-
discrimination is but one, to the ICCPR, which contains a self-standing prohibition of 
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discrimination.412 Some contain only an ancillary right to non-discrimination; others contain an 
explicit guarantee for equality between women and men (ICCPR and ICESCR),413 and still 
others, as we have seen, refer to sex as one of the prohibited grounds. The list of prohibited 
grounds itself differs from treaty to treaty.414 The CEDAW and ICERD are set apart for their 
overarching focuses on non-discrimination, and for their self-contained definitions of 
discrimination. It has also been noted that legal scholars have often held that non-discrimination 
and equality are equivalent concepts, “two sides of the same coin”, or “negative and positive 
forms of the same principle”.415 The CEDAW treaty body in fact holds them to be “different but 
equally important”416 terms that set out the positive, remedial and preventative obligations on 
States parties. As such, “a right to equality (in the enjoyment of human rights) is broader than 
non-discrimination in that the latter prohibits discrimination only on certain grounds”.417 
Discrimination is defined in Article 1 of CEDAW in nearly identical terms to ICERD’s 
with respect to racism. CERD states that discrimination is defined as:  
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose 
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of life.418 
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In CEDAW, discrimination is: 
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field.419 
 
The Treaty names prohibition of and protection against distinction for the purposes of 
diminishing equality as its core value and purpose, which is then elaborated in its subsequent 
articles. In the view of the Committee, a joint reading of Articles 1 to 5 and 24 “form the general 
interpretative framework for all the convention’s substantive articles”, and “indicates that three 
obligations are central to States parties’ efforts to eliminate discrimination against women.”420 
Article 1 is thus referred to as the “chapeau” article, meaning that it “caps”, guides and 
fundamentally shapes all other articles within its terms. 
The Committee’s GC 25 names the related states’ obligations as: 
Firstly, States parties’ obligation is to ensure that there is no direct 
or indirect discrimination against women in their laws and that 
women are protected against discrimination—committed by public 
authorities, the judiciary, organizations, enterprises or private 
individuals—in the public as well as the private spheres by 
competent tribunals as well as sanctions and other remedies. 
Secondly, States parties’ obligation is to improve the de facto 
position of women through concrete and effective policies and 
programmes. Thirdly, States parties’ obligation is to address 
prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-based 
stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by 
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individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and 
institutions.421  
 
Furthermore, and most importantly to establishing a definition of equality, these 
obligations should be implemented in an integrated fashion and extend beyond a purely formal 
legal obligation of equal treatment of women with men. Read through the lens of Article 4.1, 
providing for temporary special measures, CEDAW “goes beyond the concept of discrimination 
used in many national and international legal standards and norms”.422  It is quoted here in full: 
Adoption by States parties of temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not 
be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, 
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be 
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and 
treatment have been achieved.423 
 
Leaving aside the determination of what constitutes temporary in this regard, for our 
purposes what is important is that equality in CEDAW’s terms does not imply identical 
treatment, or sameness in treatment; if a distinction in treatment can be justified on the grounds 
that it will contribute to substantive (de facto rather than de jure) equality, then it will not be 
considered discrimination.424 Read through the elaboration of Article 4, CEDAW proposes a 
definition of non-discrimination that moves from formal non-discrimination to positive equality. 
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It requires positive action on the part of the state; it creates duties and obligations that go beyond 
those of restraint to those of active change; from the prohibition of breach to the requirement of 
both redress and moreover, “provision of general conditions in order to guarantee the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and the girl child, designed to ensure for 
them a life of dignity and non-discrimination.”425 The Committee elaborates this mandate as 
follows: 
The Convention targets discriminatory dimensions of past and 
current societal and cultural contexts which impede women’s 
enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. It 
aims at the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women, including the elimination of the causes and consequences 
of their de facto or substantive inequality. 426 
 
As Vandenhole describes it, both ICERD and CEDAW hold that “[d]iscriminatory intent 
is not a necessary element of discrimination”;427 both refer to “effect or purpose” with equal 
weight.428 The Committee’s elaboration of the treaty’s intent with respect to discrimination 
therefore, while clarifying the conceptual and manifest differences between direct and indirect 
discrimination, makes no particular distinction between the obligations of states where intended 
or unintended discrimination occurs. As we have seen, in the view of the Committee, “cultural” 
and “societal contexts” that are discriminatory are, in fact, a “target” of the convention. Thus, 
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their intent is not, in the Committee’s view, particularly relevant. It is their impact on substantive 
equality that matters. Notwithstanding, the important question as to the relationship between 
religion and culture (CESCR GC 21 embeds “religion or belief systems” in the inter alia 
definition),429 underscoring the point at hand regarding interpretations of equality, the 
Committee’s response in 2008 to the argument made by Saudi Arabia that complementarity of 
rights is equivalent to equality in “Islamic culture”, is: 
The Committee is concerned with the State party’s distinctive 
understanding of the principle of equality, which implies similar 
rights of women and men as well as complementarities and 
harmony between women and men, rather than equal rights of 
women and men.430 
 
In 1994, CEDAW had already made this point in relation to all states: 
States parties should resolutely discourage any notions of 
inequality of women and men which are affirmed by laws, or by 
religious or private law or by custom, and progress to the stage 
where reservations, particularly to article 16, will be withdrawn.431 
 
Noting the inherent “progressivism” discourse, we can nonetheless see the view of 
discrimination as more holistic than the traditional “same as” notion of equality critiqued as 
endemic to western liberalism.432 Vandenhole specifies that in the case of indirect discrimination, 
“treating unequals equally leads to unequal results which can have the effect of fostering 
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inequality”.433 In the European Commission Human Rights context, Thlimmenos v Greece makes 
a similar point, finding that the state “failed to treat differently persons whose situations differed 
greatly”.434 In essence, indirect discrimination “deals with institutional and structural biases”, 
and the proof of its existence is determined by comparison between groups, whereas the proof of 
direct discrimination is determined by comparison between individuals.435   
In the Committee’s view, the prohibition on discrimination is against “both direct and 
indirect” forms,436 and the elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equality are “two 
different but equally important goals in the quest for women’s empowerment”.437 In this sense, 
we can see the “discriminatory dimensions” of “cultural contexts” referred to in GC 25 as 
comparable to indirect discrimination, with the disparate effect of cultural arrangements having a 
discriminatory impact on women as a group and as individuals. While it is discrimination that is 
the target of the treaty, the terms “condemn”, “without delay”, “eliminating” and “abolish” with 
respect to culture, custom and practices appear to leave little room for a gradualist approach to 
change or, importantly, for finding liberation from within culture. Thus, while the foregoing 
evidences the conceptual breadth for a fully structural approach to discrimination and equality 
within the terms of CEDAW qua text, it is here, in relation to its discourse on culture, that much 
of the trouble with CEDAW for an intersectional approach to discrimination begins.  
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The CEDAW’s primary consideration is the abolition of discrimination against women in 
all its forms. Although there was a UNESCO member present during its drafting, and the treaty 
names the right for women to take part in the “cultural life of their countries”438 on an equal basis 
with men, it does not take up the meaning and potential weight of culture in international law.439  
However, like all treaties, CEDAW does not exist in isolation and, particularly in light of the 
numerous reservations on the basis of culture, it benefits from a brief examination in relation to 
other considerations of culture and its protection, since ultimately, CEDAW’s interpretation must 
take place within the full family of protections.440 As long-time CERD committee member 
Patrick Thornberry believes CERD practice has demonstrated, it is a nuanced and full reading of 
non-discrimination as a right within culture, as well as a limitation to the claims of culture 
against other rights that will open up the debate as to the “reach of human rights prescriptions 
into cultural space”.441 In the aftermath of colonial atrocities, any license to “eliminate” any 
aspect of culture matters a great deal. 
2.5 A note about culture and human rights practice 
Culture is a notoriously “spacious” concept in human rights, as Patrick Thornberry has 
noted, and “finding a discrete substance for the right” to culture is a “complex undertaking”.442 It 
is, in any case, not the primary interest here.443 However, it is worth noting at a minimum, as 
Thornberry has, that bundled into the notion are a number of specific and discernible rights that 
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might well be named concretely, rather than tackled as an amorphous right.444 Culture as an 
umbrella concept is particularly unhelpful in the context of reservations to CEDAW, where, 
frequently, from the states’ side “culture is claimed as a justification for practices unlikely to be 
consistent with human rights”.445 This appears to be the position of the Committee. Its sole 
evocation of culture is as a prohibited ground when used as an excuse for the denial of the rights 
of women. 
A number of States enter reservations to particular articles on the 
ground that national law, tradition, religion or culture are not 
congruent with Convention principles, and purport to justify the 
reservation on that basis.446 
 
The use of the word “purport” alerts us to a skepticism that, on the one hand, may appear 
to close down the debate about “cultural differences” in women’s human rights from the 
Committee’s perspective, anticipating CESCR, that “no one may invoke cultural diversity to 
infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope”.447 This is 
more pointedly reiterated in the General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women of 1993, which declares: “States should condemn violence against women and 
should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with 
respect to its elimination”.448 On the other hand, the short shrift in CEDAW qua treaty that 
culture receives begs consideration by the Committee of culture beyond its evocation for the 
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purposes of limiting the human rights of women, especially in light of the Vienna Declaration of 
the World Conference on Human Rights regarding the indivisibility of culture from all other 
rights,449 and particularly in light of its 2010 exhortation to intersectionality as part of States 
parties obligations, explored in a following section. 
Defining culture is in and of itself no small task. CESCR’s GC 21 admits it to be 
“multifaceted”, but broadly outlined culture 
encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written 
literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or 
belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of 
production or technology, natural and man-made environments, 
food, clothing and shelter and the arts, customs and traditions 
through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities 
express their humanity and the meaning they give to their 
existence, and build their world view representing their encounter 
with external forces affecting their lives. Culture shapes and 
mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and 
political life of individuals, groups of individuals and 
communities.450    
 
This definition invites consideration of the woman who faces gender discrimination from 
within a culture of which she generally wishes to remain a part. In this sense, culture leads 
swiftly to the thorny matter of group and individual protections. Minimally, we could ascribe the 
concept of collective rights to individuals enjoying rights collectively as part of a culture or 
minority, where the individual may still be a rights bearer but the rights are oriented toward 
collective notions of social organization.451 Group rights per se obtain where the group as entity 
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corporately holds the right, and can hold its right against the individual members of the group. 
Even with the so-called “‘saving clauses’ designed to support more individualistic conceptions of 
rights and particular categories of persons”,452 women’s negotiations at the intersection of these 
rights and affiliations are complex and painful. Culture in this sense must be examined more 
critically to “understand the link between culture and relations of power and domination” that so 
frequently pits a woman as a bearer of individual rights against the claimed requirements of 
culture, particularly in cases of violence.453 
The CEDAW’s conception of rights is firmly individual. However, “cultural rights are an 
integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent”.454 Often, 
when speaking of culture, CEDAW is exclusively evoking, as in the following extract from GC 
19, “stereotyped roles [that] perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion, 
such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female 
circumcision”;455 practices that are, to be sure, real and discriminatory, but about which some 
perspective and context are required to avoid descent into racist stereotypes. Such commentary 
has “reinforced the notion that metropolitan centres of the West contain no tradition or culture 
harmful to women, and that the violence which does exist is idiosyncratic and individualized 
rather than culturally condoned”.456 European forms of violent discrimination against women 
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seldom receive the same international attention,457 and the preoccupation with the lurid and with 
“alien and bizarre” forms of gender persecution458 among human rights advocates echoes 
colonial arrogance,459 and CEDAW can ill-afford to underscore it.  
The reasons for CEDAW’s preoccupation with such manifestations of discrimination are 
at once straightforward and importantly complex.  
2.5.1  Culture as discrimination 
The CEDAW is concerned with discrimination, lifting women out of legal obscurity as 
adjuncts to husbands and family into personhood and thus individual rights protection.  
Therefore, in referring to culture, it is by necessity referring to those aspects of group norms that 
rankle or violate its mandated individual protections. Importantly, this is often in the context of 
responding to states’ unilateral evocations of culture as a defense to non-compliance. While this 
is surely different from protecting an individual woman’s right to cultural expression, or her right 
to be protected as a member of a group, it is not unrelated. Both the state and CEDAW are 
invoking a vision of culture that is at once partial and totalizing. Bearing in mind the UNESCO 
concept of culture that is not “a series of isolated manifestations or hermetic compartments”,460 
“but […] a living process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a 
future”,461 we can support CEDAW’s vision of culture as changeable, against states’ evocations 
of fixed homogeneity. But, culture is also “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual 
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and emotional features of a society or group, [which] encompasses, in addition to art and 
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”,462 which 
CEDAW neglects in its singular focus on discrimination expressed through or as culture.   
Changeable does not necessarily equate with must be changed; and where it does, 
culture’s relation to the similarly spacious concept, “self-determination”, is relevant; that is, it 
matters how culture is altered and by whom. In the seesaw between the polarities of cultural 
relativism and universality that have so exorcised the human rights community, most successful 
détentes between the camps are brokered on some version of the concept of culturally self-
defined human rights that appeals to universal values. Christof Heyns calls it “the struggle 
approach”, locating the compelling power and central meaning of core human rights values and 
goals in the non-institutional manifestations of all cultures’ struggles against indignity and 
oppression;463 Thornberry speaks of “universality, not uniformity” and of “’importation’, rather 
than ‘exportation’ of human rights”;464 and Merry speaks of “the right to difference” as 
potentially being “a positive, transcultural basis for human rights”.465 Sally Seyla Benhabib flips 
the problem, and speaks of the fear that universalism is ethnocentric as a “widespread anxiety” 
that rests on “false generalizations about the west” and “ignores elements of non-western 
cultures that may be perfectly compatible with and may even be the root of the west’s own 
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‘discovery’ of universalism”.466 Ultimately, we see the question arise as to the “extent to which 
the Convention’s discourse of equality can be married with the discourse of cultural diversity”.467 
The answer to this in the case of the CEDAW, in part, is determined by the treaty’s normative 
framework, which, in its more heavy-handed moments, conflates its central insights into the 
inner workings of patriarchy with the operations of culture per se.   
Paralleling the broad parameters of the oppositional positioning of culture and gender 
rights, CEDAW, while not alone in this matter, has been singled out by some commentators as 
exemplary of the “opposition of international law to local culture”.468 The notoriously high 
numbers of reservations that have accompanied ratifications of the Convention—frequently on 
the basis of cultural difference—mark it as the “first among the human rights treaties” in this 
regard,469 prompting questions as to its efficacy as an international instrument at all.470At the 
heart of this debate is the Treaty’s Article 2(f), which calls for States parties to “take all 
appropriate measures, including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, 
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women”.471  
Exploring CEDAW’s approach to culture is necessary to determine if the intersectional 
turn instructs and allows CEDAW’s normative framework to stretch sufficiently to embrace the 
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possibility of culture as not just infringement and harm, but as access to other, intersecting rights, 
or even as sources of grounded social justice struggle. Studies such as that of Rikki Holmaat and 
Jonneke Naber,472 have queried the Treaty Committee’s choice to focus on violations as a result 
of culture and custom, and have suggested new avenues to broaden acceptance of women’s 
rights by focusing on framing infringements differently, under language contained in other 
articles. Specifically, they suggest that focus on Article 5 regarding gender stereotypes, speaks to 
many of the same concerns with culture without evoking the colonial legacies of the specific 
language of custom and culture.473 Their work, however, was published contemporaneously with 
the important and express development of the Committee’s own reorientation to take stock of 
such critiques and provide new guidance to its deliberations in GC 28 on intersectionality. The 
examinations that follow engage with this new terrain. 
2.6 The rise of intersectionality 
The CERD GC 25474 and CEDAW GC 28475, while written a decade apart, both arose out 
of the legacy of contestation regarding the universality, coverage and meaning of the treaties’ 
protections for those who experienced multiple grounds of discrimination simultaneously. Both 
documents were intended to provide jurisprudential heft to the deliberations and exchanges 
among and between various UN institutions, NGOs, and women activists from the Global South 
                                                 
 
472 Holtmaat & Naber, supra note 113. 
473 Ibid at 28–33; Simone Cusack, “The CEDAW as a Legal Framework for Transnational Discourses on Gender 
Stereotyping” in Women’s Hum Rights CEDAW Int Reg Natl Law (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 124. 
474 CERD, General recommendation XXV on gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination, 56th Session Doc. 
A/55/18, annex V at 152 (2000) (2000). 
475 note 141. 
111 
at public forums and through the academy, by deploying the language of intersectionality.476 We 
will now turn to the question of to what degree this “intersectional turn”—in CEDAW in 
particular—addresses the normative restrictions in the treaty proper, to prepare the ground for a 
later consideration of to what extent and in which ways has it guided the adaptation of the 
Committee’s rulings. We will do so first by examining the ways in which intersectionality came 
into the treaty’s considerations through assembling a view of its antecedents. 
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3 Transmissions to Impacts: Intersectionality at CEDAW, 
Antecedents and Applications 
 
The acceptance of an intersectional vocabulary at the international 
level opens up a space for feminist engagement. It offers the future 
possibility for feminist dialogue within the law—as opposed to one 
that merely focuses on the law. Such an approach keeps with 
intersectionality’s counterhegemonic impetus by offering an 
epistemological guide to engage law’s political, symbolic and 
structural limits and how structural conditions inform them.477  
Clearly, contemporary social theory needs ways to explain how 
ideas, practices and institutions circulate and how they come to 
ground. It is in these processes of movement, incorporation and 
resistance that culturally embedded concepts become visible.478  
Ensuring that all women will be served by the expanded scope of 
gender based human rights protection requires attention to the 
various ways that gender intersects with a range of other identities 
and the way the intersection contributes to the unique vulnerability 
of different groups of women.479 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I made the argument that CEDAW’s normative scope for 
examining women’s experiences of discrimination was simultaneously spacious and constrained 
by the framers’ reliance on fixed perspectives on the properties of culture, contained in Article 2.  
I examined the origins, limits and possibilities represented by the framing of CEDAW as part of 
the IHRL family of protections—assessing where it has advanced the capacity of law to make 
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visible the violations of women’s rights, and where that project of visibility has extended 
colonial prejudices and approbation. In contrast to my assessment, prominent commentators on 
IHRL480 and CEDAW in particular,481 have seen CEDAW’s Article 2 in precisely the opposite 
light, as providing “a firm textual basis requiring the state to appreciate and account for all the 
identities, experiences and factors that contribute to gender discrimination and inequality.”482 In 
order to weigh these different perspectives on the treaty qua text and the developing 
intersectionality story at CEDAW, we will now turn to the antecedents of intersectionality per se 
in the lifecycle of the treaty.  
This chapter will explore the extent to which intersectionality coheres around any 
definitional, institutional and practical understanding that can illuminate its potential 
contributions to human rights law. I will point to the evidence that receptivity to intersectionality 
emerges out of UN deliberations about its institutional failures in the face of contemporary 
genocidal conflicts that mobilized sexual violence against racialized women as their primary 
means. Through these explorations, I will begin to discern the exact nature of the concept we are 
tracing, its operations and its promises, including its transmissions into a legally discernable 
concept. In this sense, I engage intersectionality in the work of “norm clarification and 
elaboration” common to IHRL projects that engage in standard setting.483  
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The story of intersectionality in this chapter is assembled from the threads and fragments 
of intersectionality’s many avenues into IHRL. In one important respect, there is the self-
conscious adoption of the language and positioning of intersectionality. This can be found mostly 
in UN statements, press releases and documents, as well as meeting notes. Then there is the 
related scholarship and discourse, which observes this particular intersectional turn, and through 
which we find textual, theoretical and legal interpretations of its significance.484 Additionally, 
other IHRL explorations of intersectionality outside the UN provide analogy and clarity to the 
discussion of intersectionality’s legal contours and meaning.485 I will discern the origins and 
weight of each source in context in order to build a picture of intersectionality’s origins and 
impacts in the UN context. Tracing the legal development of intersectionality from these 
fragments and into a framework that guides IHRL deliberations at CEDAW takes us back to the 
limitations and possibilities of framing, discussed above, and requires us to find clarity in the 
multitude of phrases, building block concepts and other precursor indicators of intersectionality’s 
acceptance in IHRL. Tracing this trajectory also requires a telescoping in and out of simple 
representation to critical distance, querying the project of governance that intersectionality is 
thereby made party to. In Henne’s words, “[u]sing intersectionality to frame an international 
legal agenda is therefore not about refining variables and correlations between them, but about 
embracing how feminist debate might inform an intersectional sensibility within law.”486 
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Intersectionality, as we have seen in Chapter 1, has played an important intellectual and 
activist role in many fields of study. As a legal concept, and especially as international human 
rights law, it has a distinct pedigree that requires attention to context, precedent and fact-specific 
usages. There are, nevertheless, aspects of intersectionality’s arrival on the IHRL scene that 
remain entangled with its life as a concept outside the legal realm, embedded in the intellectual 
genealogies explored in Chapter I. In this chapter, I will attempt to relate and distinguish these 
uses, highlighting intersectionality’s arrival qua travelling idea, and legal concept; this twin 
materialization is the focus of my work in this section.  
3.2 Intersectionality: mapping how the idea travels 
In contrast to the foregoing thesis about the limitations of CEDAW as embedded in a 
single axis understanding of women’s oppression, with a legacy of colonial views of culture, 
Meghan Campbell advances the argument that CEDAW is, by virtue of its framing qua text, a 
naturally occurring proto-intersectional guide to rights protection.487 Whereas I, and other 
critics,488 have seen CEDAW’s single ground of “women” as an essentializing force in the 
treaty’s norms, Campbell contends that it is precisely because the treaty advances a single 
ground for discrimination that a full spectrum of women’s identities can be covered by its 
protections.  She asserts that: 
Rather than limiting itself to traditional status based grounds, if 
women experience discrimination in relation to an identity, 
experience or cross-cutting problem that interacts with and is 
rooted in their sex and/or gender they are protected under 
CEDAW.489 
                                                 
 
487 Campbell, supra note 247. 
488 Bond, supra note 239; Holtmaat & Naber, supra note 113. 
489 Campbell, supra note 247 at 481. 
116 
 
Acknowledging the critiques of CEDAW’s essentializing impetus, Campbell, following 
Andrew Byrne, argues that its broad definition of discrimination allows it to address those forms 
“not explicitly mentioned in the treaty”.490 They, like Fredman, argue that it is the 
capaciousness491 of CEDAW’s definition of discrimination and corollary concept of equality that 
allows it to support intersectionality as an approach to the Committee’s deliberations.492 
According to Campbell, CEDAW is simply “doing” intersectionality by virtue of an unrestrictive 
grounding for the basis of claim; thus, CEDAW qua Committee is applying intersectional 
thinking, without a fully articulated reason for that practice. Campbell asserts that “[w]hile the 
Committee is in fact addressing women’s intersectional discrimination, the legal basis for this 
remains unclear”.493 Thus, Campbell identifies the thinking work of lawyers and scholars as that 
of discerning, clarifying and shoring up the legal basis for CEDAW’s intersectional instincts. 
Both Fredman and Campbell offer an important if technical read of the jurisprudential 
portent of CEDAW, moving the debate about the possibility of its practical application into 
current practice contexts with sound evidence; but they are relatively unconcerned with the ways 
in which the idea of intersectionality has travelled or landed qua idea, institutional concept or 
vector of power. Their work is particularly illuminating and instructive on the legal points that 
have made CEDAW the place in law where the intersectionality action is, specifically in the face 
of national legal systems that appear to be unable to make the leap from single grounds 
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conceptions of rights infringements.494 We will make use of their analysis as we explore the legal 
definitions and practical potential of intersectionality below, and in the chapters that follow.  
Yet, even within a strictly legalistic or jurisprudential reading of the text of the treaty, a 
consistent application of the critical international legal method I have adopted from Orford 
demands a contextualization of ideas in relation to their progenitors’ intended meaning and the 
changes they undergo in their movement in context over time. As Anne Orford takes stock of 
responses to her work on the UN’s international governance project through the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P),495 she provides observations on international legal method that are instructive in 
this context: 
If we want to understand the work that a particular legal argument 
is doing, we have to grasp both aspects of law’s operation—the 
way it relates to a particular, identifiable social context, and the 
way in which it gestures beyond that context to a conversation that 
may persist—sometimes in a neat linear progression, sometimes in 
wild leaps and bounds—across centuries.496  
 
Following Orford’s method of tracing the historic shift to R2P doctrine in international 
legal governance projects497—a move she painstakingly traces as one that gathered previous 
practices into an articulation and justification, rather than one that followed a conceptual 
direction—the following two chapters will trace the integration of “pre-existing but dispersed 
practices”498 of intersectionality into “a coherent account”499 of its adoption in the consideration 
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and adjudication of women’s IHRL. Mine is a much smaller canvass than Orford’s. Hers is a 
project to trace the  
vital connection between practical innovation, theoretical 
elaboration, and social transformation, both in relation to the 
political instrumentalization of theory in practice and in the search 
for a critical practice of international law in its different 
articulations.500 
 
In her work on R2P, Orford uses this approach to study a subset of statecraft, namely, 
international legal authority carried out through the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Thus, 
while she is crafting a “history” of the R2P, she maintains this wide lens focus on the context of 
the doctrine and the work it is performing, specifically with respect to international law’s 
genealogy in empire.501 In the present conceptualization, IHRL is merely a subset of this larger 
project of international authority and governance, a matter that we have explored in the previous 
chapter. It is worth noting, however, that alongside humanitarian intervention, which specifically 
denotes jurisdiction derived from international authority to intervene in the affairs of another 
state, and can thus be seen to extend the project of international authority directly while offering 
its own (humanitarian) justification for doing so, IHRL likewise contributes to the softer side of 
international authority, loaning it legitimacy as it expresses law’s most noble aspirations. In 
Orford’s sense, these are not contradictory aims, but part and parcel of a deliberately constructed 
vision with roots in time and place, based on the valorization of “free trade, liberalized 
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economies, informal empire and benevolent humanitarianism”, justifying “new forms of 
international action” based on an idea of a “universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose”.502 
In the legal shift to intersectionality at the UN, CEDAW in particular, and the context of 
the broader projects of the UN, the framers of CEDAW and the influential feminist ideas of the 
time all play their parts. In keeping with Orford’s method, I am attentive to the location of 
intersectionality within this genealogy of empire, while tracing the aspiration she notes as 
perhaps unique to law as a discipline: a “passionate quest …for the possibility of positive change 
or—put simply—a ‘better world’”.503 Thus, I find with Merry that, 
[w]hile we focus on the circulation of ideas designed to improve 
the human condition, it is important to remember that they include 
the modes of establishing and maintaining control of 
populations.504 
 
Her work and the work of others work remind us that while “the UN … champions 
human rights as a way to counteract violence against individuals”, it also “reflects older 
traditions of colonialism and patriarchy that valorize unequal treatments of race, gender, class, 
and culture” […].505 As we seek clarity in and expansion of the capacity for law to provide 
visibility, reflection and protection for those most marginalized by the power relations of the 
world through the elaboration of an intersectional approach, we must attend to the operations of 
old narratives made new as they underlay and limit our best aspirations. This is not an act of 
cleverness, designed to undermine the project of protection and empowerment, but an act of 
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clarity and vigilance in the face of law’s nostalgia and self-regard for its own project of 
intervention in the world’s great problems.506 It is Halley et al’s “ethic of responsibility”, 
entreating us to “confront, rather than blindspot” that “enchanted engagement” can lead you to 
“help your friends”, while hurting “some group of even-less-well-off players”.507 In this sense, I 
am following Orford’s method as laid out in the introduction in a different context, by seeking to 
trace the practices of intersectionality as international authority’s consciousness of itself 508 
through attentiveness to the use of the term intersectionality, its meanings, uses and proxies, and 
its emergence in time and place.  
3.3 Emerging grounds: Multiple, compound or intersectional 
discrimination? 
The initial stage of intersectionality’s appearance in the UN’s discussion of women’s 
human rights must be traced in part to Beijing in 1995. In that year, The Beijing Declaration and 
the Platform for Action: Fourth World Conference on Women 509 was launched. For most 
commentators, Beijing is an “immense”510 part of this story; many link its ratification by the 
General Assembly to the commencement of an intersectional approach at the United Nations,511 
and tie this to the adoption of “Gender Mainstreaming,”512 a UN-promoted approach to public 
policy development that “involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of 
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gender equality are central to all activities”.513 It is a related and supportive but separate concept 
and agenda, advanced in the human rights realm through both the Vienna Conference and 
Beijing, which has forced the consideration of gender as an intersection to all areas of UN 
concern.514 It is a concept and practice not without its critics,515 but many more agree that it 
prepared the ground for intersectionality.516 Beginning intersectionality’s story here secures it, by 
association, as a fixed part of a coherent international human rights regime,517 owing to The 
Beijing Declaration’s endorsement by the General Assembly Resolution on December 22, 
1995,518 since, in the simplest legal sense, “a claim is an international human right if the General 
Assembly says it is”.519 Agreeing that The Beijing Declaration “constitutes one of the earliest 
translations of the idea of intersectionality … into UN language”,520 Collins and Bilge 
nevertheless tie its inception internationally to the World Conference Against Racism, thus 
maintaining its link to the activist agenda.521  
The General Assembly, through Article 13 of the Charter, is seen as the most “credible 
arbiter” of agreement and concurrence among those in the international community on what 
constitutes new human rights law.522  In the present reading, I propose The Beijing Declaration 
as a proto-intersectional framework. That is, while advancing the agenda of accounting for 
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multiply discriminated women, the Declaration did not use the word “intersectional” once.523 
Article 32 of the Declaration stated that governments must, for instance: 
Intensify efforts to ensure equal enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all women and girls who face multiple 
barriers to their empowerment and advancement because of such 
factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture, religion, or 
disability, or because they are indigenous people.524 
 
The declaration therefore stands out for many as the “most important”525 building block 
for an intersectional approach to IHRL, and for “including the core elements of an intersectional 
approach”,526 but is not the official launch of the concept as gathered under the terminology we 
are tracking. In the declaration, the listing of multiple characteristics, which constitute grounds 
for protection, signals the intention to complicate the single axis of gender discrimination that 
CEDAW was known for protecting, but it requires further analysis to determine if the terms 
variously used—such as multiple, compound, cumulative, combined, additive, overlapping, and 
complex discrimination527 and intersectionality are synonymous.  
In many documents, such as The Beijing Declaration, but also in many other 
jurisprudential uses,528 various UN entities appear to use the terms synonymously. In her study of 
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the potential for intersectionality to be adopted in the decision making of the EU and its member 
states, Sandra Fredman signaled a similar conflation of terminology when she found that the 
terms were used “interchangeably although they might have subtly different meanings”.529 
Fredman makes the following distinctions in that context, which provide general analytic clarity 
to the use of terms within anti-discrimination and human rights’ contexts where forms of 
discrimination are contemplated as more complex than those conceived on a single axis. 
Fredman distinguishes three main categories of “multiple” discrimination, only the third 
of which meets the definition of “intersectional”: the first is “sequential multiple discrimination”, 
which occurs when a person experiences discrimination on separate occasions, based on different 
grounds or for different aspect of herself, as discrete and sequential events. The second is 
“additive multiple” discrimination and this occurs when one person experiences two separate 
grounds of discrimination at the same time. This discrimination is “additive’, and therefore is 
properly so-characterized because each ground of discrimination can be separately proved. It is 
clear in these cases that two separate grounds have been breached. Intersectionality, Fredman 
holds, is of a different order: it is not simply additive, but is the synergistic melding of grounds 
into a qualitatively new form of discrimination, and thus properly worthy of the metaphor that 
names it. Fredman characterizes this as “of a different order in that discrimination does not 
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simply consist in the addition of two sources of discrimination; the result is qualitatively 
different”, calling it “synergistic.”530 
Here Fredman follows Crenshaw’s early analytic distinction, positing a mutually 
constitutive form of discrimination which is at once a product of multiple vulnerabilities, but not 
simply additive,531 and singles this out as the authentic intersectional approach. She explicitly 
does so with the aim of creating a frame of reference for adjudication. Fredman’s work does not 
refer to Crenshaw’s “provisional protocol to be followed to better identify the occasions in which 
such interactive discrimination may have occurred,”532 proffered in her 2000 paper for discussion 
at the UN. In this work, which we explore extensively below, Crenshaw develops an approach to 
“anticipate the various ways that race and gender vulnerabilities may intersect”.533 Here 
Crenshaw makes the distinction between “under-inclusion” and “over-inclusion” of violations 
within the grounds of discrimination when they are based in the binary of race and gender, and 
distinguishes from these the intersectional approach. She delineates over inclusion as typical of 
the mainstream feminist approach to gender discrimination, where “a problem or condition that 
is particularly or disproportionately visited on a subset of women is simply claimed as a women's 
problem. It is over-included to extent that the aspects of the circumstance that render it an 
intersectional problem are absorbed into a gender framework without any attempt to 
acknowledge the role that racism or some other form of discrimination may have played in 
contributing to the circumstance”.534 Its mirror approach, under-inclusion, strips the gender 
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dynamics of the discriminatory act and renders the gendered dimension “invisible as a matter of 
race or ethnicity”.535  
It is unclear to what extent Fredman’s categories of “multiple” and “additive multiple” 
discrimination can remain legitimate approaches to discrimination, given her acceptance and 
promotion of an intersectional analysis, since, in her own estimation, an authentically 
intersectional approach refuses to disaggregate aspects of identity and harm. Therefore, as 
Yuval-Davis posited in 2006, “whether to interpret the intersectionality of social divisions as an 
additive or as a constitutive process is still central” 536 to the debates surrounding at least legal 
approaches to women’s experiences of discrimination. At the heart of this distinction is the 
insight that for law to be more responsive to the harms intersectionality can assist in 
adjudicating, it must formulate its “test” such that “concrete experiences of oppression, for 
example, as ‘a Black person’”, can be recognized as “always constructed and intermeshed in 
other social divisions (for example, gender, social class, disability status, sexuality, age, 
nationality, immigration status, geography, etc.)”.537  We will return to these authors’ work 
below. 
Building on Fredman, we can see that the multiple barriers approach in The Beijing 
Declaration most closely approximates the additive multiple discrimination that she 
distinguishes above. As an antecedent, there is no doubt Beijing has a pivotal role in the 
development of intersectionality as law. The declaration was influenced by the unique role 
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among human rights treaties played by the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), which 
is the intermediary between women’s civil society groups, women’s movements globally and the 
UN women’s rights machinery. Beijing was pivotal in no small part because of the activist 
struggles launched from international women’s organizations to bring a critical race analysis to 
the deliberations of the UN women’s gatherings, thereby providing the clarity, grassroots 
legitimacy and analytic tools that readied the institutions for the turning point to come.538  
Five years after Beijing, the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), in 
collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), convened an expert group meeting 
on the theme of gender and racial discrimination, hosted by the Government of Croatia. The 
Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimination took place in Zagreb from November 21-
24. 2000.539 Yuval-Davis traces the official emergence of intersectionality by name to the 
contemporaneous emergence of the framework in CERD’s GC 25, and the sequence of the 
preparatory documents to the meeting as part of the preparatory process to the UN World 
Conference Against Racism in Durban the following year.540  
Yuval-Davis notes that Crenshaw’s work “occupied centre stage”,541 and Crenshaw was 
asked to introduce the notion in a special session on the subject leading up to the Durban 
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conference. The tone of Yuval-Davis’ positioning of this moment signals the unresolved 
intellectual debates surrounding the intersectional story, and specifically the dominance of 
American feminist critical race scholars in general, and Crenshaw in particular, in the various 
retellings. Yuval-Davis continues: “these issues have been debated by European (especially,but 
not only, British) feminist scholars since the end of the 1970s but, apparently, without noticeable 
effect on policymakers”.542   
As we have explored more thoroughly in Chapter 1, to the scholars of intersectionality as 
activist and intellectual history, as well as scholarly production, these questions remain hotly 
debated: is intersectionality primarily a story of American critical race feminism, specifically the 
brainchild of Kimberlé Crenshaw, who is credited with coining the term?543; the initiative of 
black British women and women of colour?;544does it begin the moment Sojourner Truth uttered 
the words “Ain’t I a woman”,545 in her famous speech about black women former slaves being 
left out of the American white women’s suffrage movement?;546 or when bell hooks used the 
phrase attributed to Sojourner Truth in 1981, to develop her intellectual and political analysis 
that white-dominated feminism creates a topsy-turvy analytic reality where “the word men in 
fact only refers to white men, the word Negroes refers only to black men, and the word women 
refers only to white women”?547   
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In a story about origins, these intellectual and activist histories may matter a great deal. 
As a policy outcome, the various retellings of its genesis may be in fact more important than its 
intellectual antecedents. As an idea, whose time had come—or more accurately had been 
suppressed and had reemerged across the centuries548— intersectionality as an approach to the 
visibility of multi-discriminated women has many antecedents and foremothers, all of them 
based in critiques of dominant women’s rights paradigms by black women and women of colour. 
In other words, as Grace Kyungwon Hong, paraphrased in Henne, has pointed out, “black 
feminism (among other women of colour feminisms) recognises that ‘the racial project of 
Western civilization was always a gendered and sexualized project’ and thereby has a rich 
tradition of analysing the ‘intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class within the context of 
global colonial capitalism’”.549 
In the context of the jurisprudential turn to intersectionality at the UN, there is little to 
suggest that Crenshaw’s work did not form the original foundation and shape the later 
interpretive contours, no matter how far they came to stray from their origins. Even those who 
disagree on other important matters of origins agree that her background paper, introduced at 
Zagreb, “made a major contribution to intersectionality’s dispersal in global venues”.550  
Mirroring the appearance/disappearance/reappearance of intersectionality, travelling back in time 
to Sojourner Truth, the official story of the Zagreb moment is captured in the recollections of 
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those in attendance,551 but the paper itself is missing from all UN catalogues,552 including those 
in paper files at CEDAW,553 electronically or otherwise, in both UN libraries in New York and 
Geneva. Indeed, the only way to obtain the paper in English at the time of writing is to receive it 
directly from Crenshaw herself.554 (This may change in 2018 when Crenshaw is due to publish a 
collection of her work that will include a version of the paper.)555 
Crenshaw’s paper was delivered at a pivotal conference in Zagreb, meant in part, to both 
reckon with the genocidal events of the former Yugoslavia and those of Rwanda. Thus, in terms 
of both timing and content, the paper links the story of intersectionality’s recent reappearance at 
the international level to some of the most heinous projects of racialized sexual violence in the 
20th century.  
3.4 What intersectionality owes to the UN failures in Rwanda and 
Bosnia Herzegovina  
The institutional groundswell responsible for the receptivity of the concept of 
intersectionality at the UN can be traced backwards from the meeting in Zagreb, a moment 
crucially linked to the mass genocidal failures of Rwanda and Bosnia Herzegovina. An Aide 
Memoire of the meeting, at which Crenshaw’s paper was introduced, suggests that ethnic and 
racialized forms of sexual violence formed the context that gave rise to the discussion.556 
Crenshaw’s paper, prepared to guide this discussion, appears to underscore that this context was 
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top of mind, and formed an impetus to clarify the concepts that, had they been in circulation 
earlier, might have made such horror visible to UN observers. Specifically, her work attends to 
the inability of observers to see the complex role played by racialized gender and gendered 
racism: 
the tragic events of genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia were 
occasioned by ethnically motivated rape and female mutilation. …  
Although the assault against the community represented by these 
abuses has been decried as ethnic genocide, this outrage does not 
signal any solicitude for victims of this abuse, many of whom are 
now ostracized as tainted and unredeemably [sic] degraded 
women.557 
  
The paper prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women, titled Review of Reports, Studies And Other Documentation For The 
Preparatory Committee And The World Conference,558 also points to this context. She starts by 
setting out the main problem that intersectionality is proposed to assist with, referring back to the 
language of multiple discrimination:  
Gender-based discrimination intersects with discriminations based 
on other forms of “otherness”, such as race, ethnicity, religion and 
economic status, thus forcing the majority of the world’s women 
into situations of double or triple marginalization.559 
 
Intersectionality is proposed to assist in making visible the forms of discrimination that increase 
“women’s vulnerability to violence and abuse”.560 
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Coomaraswamy credits “interlinked and mutually reinforcing trends”, which include 
“recommendations of United Nations conferences and summits”,561 as preparing the way for 
intersectionality as an approach to women’s human rights. Thus, although she paints a picture of 
the impetus for an intersectional turn as coming from many sources, she, like other observers 
noted above, specifically singles out the 4th World Conference and the resulting Beijing Platform 
as crucial building blocks to this turning tide.562  
In Articles 12 and 13, which we explore further below, she further gestures to the context 
of ethnic cleansing and war as the raison d’etre of intersectionality, and the authority of the 
General Assembly as the anchor for its legitimacy, thereby solidifying attention on “[t]he 
combined effects of racial and gender discrimination on the advancement of women and their 
achievement of equality”.563   
To Coomaraswamy, the General Assembly’s Special Session on Beijing +5 secured 
intersectionality’s place in the UN firmament through its demand “that Governments take 
measures to address racism and racially motivated violence against women and girls and … 
address all forms of violence against women and girls, including that which is race or ethnic-
based”.564 The intersectional turn, she announces, “has provided the opportunity for recognition 
of the multiple discrimination experienced by women”; specifically, it has allowed legal changes 
ensuring that “the statutes of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals, as well as that of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) implicitly recognize the impact of the intersection of gender and racial 
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discrimination.”565 She continues this genealogy of the concept as a legal one by setting the 
context in the following way: “Historically, gender and other forms of discrimination, including 
racial discrimination, have been considered in parallel.”566 However, demand has increased for a 
“more comprehensive analysis of the dynamics of discrimination against women”,567 with 
particular mention of the Rwandan and Yugoslav contexts: 
Notably, the International Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] has 
concluded that rape and sexual assault committed with the specific 
intent of destroying, in whole or in part, a particular group 
constitutes acts of genocide. In February 2001, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], holding that 
rape and enslavement constituted crimes against humanity, 
convicted three Bosnian Serbs for the systematic rape and 
enslavement of Muslim women during the Bosnian war.568 
   
In Coomaraswamy’s reading, it was racialized sexual assault and sexualized racial assault 
that gave the earlier demand from international women’s groups at the Beijing Conference for an 
intersectional approach at the UN a new persuasiveness and interest, and intersectionality in turn 
provided the framework for the innovations to the harms considered in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). In her speech introducing the background to intersectionality, Special Rapporteur 
Coomaraswamy again points to these links: 
In today’s world where most of the wars are ethnic in dimension, 
the intersection of gender and race during armed conflict often has 
horrific consequences. In Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and East 
Timor, the international community witnessed atrocious crimes of 
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sexual violence that has shocked the system into taking effective 
action against the perpetrators by setting up international tribunals 
of justice. These tribunals and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court make it clear that sexual violence during wartime is 
a war crime and a crime against humanity.569 
 
In her paper, she specifies that the “the failure of national Governments and the 
international community to analyse adequately all experiences of intersectional discrimination” 
that ensures “discrimination faced by marginalized women [is]rendered invisible” to the very 
mechanisms that should be in place to address it.570 
Coomaraswamy’s paper also expressly links two events (the Gender and Racial 
Discrimination Expert Group Meeting of November 2000 in Zagreb, Croatia and the World 
Conference on Racial Discrimination and Other Forms of Intolerance, 2001 in Durban, South 
Africa), which together mark a decided turn toward an “intersectional” approach to multi-
discriminated women within the United Nations system of agencies. To Collins and Bilge, the 
“importance of Durban for intersectionality’s global reach cannot be overstated”.571 Through it, 
they state, “intersectionality gained a global platform for dissemination and development”.572 
Coomaraswamy’s document ascribes an expressly intersectional interpretation of the legal 
protections women are entitled to under the auspices of the Commission on Human Rights and 
through the operations of CERD, CEDAW, and related mandates and agencies.573  Of particular 
note, it appears to launch an official adoption of the language of “intersectionality” at the UN 
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with the public speech by its author that introduced it setting out “intersectionality” by name as 
an emerging lingua franca of international human rights’ approach to women’s protections, 
where once there had been separate approaches.574 At paragraph 22 she concludes her summary 
of the transmissions of intersectionality, and as I quoted at the start of this chapter, characterizes 
the intersectional approach as an expected IHRL framework, resulting in “the expanded scope of 
gender based human rights protection”.575 
The document directly links to the work of Crenshaw, even if it also displays a certain 
bafflement by its central metaphor:576  
The “traffic intersection metaphor”, created by Professor Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, gives what is considered to be an effective model for 
the understanding of intersectional or multiple discrimination. ‘In 
this metaphor, race, gender, class and other forms of discrimination 
or subordination are the roads that structure the social, economic or 
political terrain. It is through these thoroughfares that dynamics of 
disempowerment travel. These thoroughfares are sometimes 
framed as distinctive and mutually exclusive avenues of power.’ 
But these thoroughfares often overlap and cross each other, 
creating complex intersections at which two, three or four of these 
avenues meet. Marginalized groups of women are located at these 
intersections by virtue of their specific identities and must 
negotiate the “traffic” that flows through these intersections to 
avoid injury and to obtain resources for the normal activities of 
life. This can be dangerous when the traffic flows simultaneously 
from many directions. Injuries are sometimes created when the 
impact from one direction throws victims into the path of 
oncoming traffic, while on other occasions, injuries occur from 
simultaneous collisions. These are the contexts in which 
intersectional injuries occur - when multiple disadvantages or 
collisions interact to create a distinct and compound dimension of 
disempowerment.577 
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As Yuval-Davis noted, “the analytic attempts to explain intersectionality in the reports 
that came out of this meeting are confusing”.578 Nevertheless, it does appear that the “distinct 
and compound” dimension of “disempowerment” is a move away from Beijing’s “multiple 
discrimination”, and a step into a new conceptualization. 
On the face of it, the work of the SRVAW played a crucial and consistent role within the 
institutions of the United Nations to link the failures of Rwanda to other examples of 
international failures to protect multi-discriminated and vulnerable women. In her review of the 
work of that office, Special Rapportuer Yakin Ertürk repositions, from the margins to the centre, 
the suppressed narrative of intersectional violence against women in war:  
Although sexual brutality, enslavement, forced prostitution and 
forced pregnancy have marked armed conflicts across the globe, 
these crimes have long remained invisible in international criminal 
and humanitarian law.  
[…]The wartime slavery of “comfort women”, and the conflicts in 
Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as accounts of scores 
of other conflicts around the world, conclusively demonstrate that 
sexual violence is not an outcome of war, but that women’s bodies 
are an important site of war, which makes sexual violence an 
integral part of wartime strategy.579 
 
Following this, the Special Rapporteur expressly links this to needed legal reform of the 
ways in which such crimes could be seen and ultimately prevented. In a surprisingly frank and 
                                                 
 
578 Yuval-Davis, supra note 43 at 196. 
579 Yakin Ertürk, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its 
Causes and Consequences, 15 years of the United Nations SR on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences (1994-2009): a critical review (A/HRC/11/6/Add.5, 2009), para 42. 
136 
critical assessment of the work over 15 years of the SRVAW’s office, the following summarizes 
some of these efforts: 
the SRVAW made recommendations to remedy the lack of 
capacity of the Office of the Prosecutor and the Sexual Assault 
Team to actively prosecute sexual violence perpetrated during the 
conflict in Rwanda. In addition to the focus on prosecutions of 
sexual violence in their mission reports, both SRVAWs also 
addressed the status of women in post-conflict and peace 
processes, notably in relation to the status of survivors of violence, 
women in detention, the operations of the United Nations agencies, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the reconciliation processes.580 
 
Given the office of the SRVAW’s link with the introduction of intersectionality in 
Croatia through the then office holder Coomaraswamy, as noted above, we find Ertürk provides 
further weight to the association of violations in war and the readiness for an approach to 
women’s rights violations as intersectional. She enumerates the visibility afforded the 
intersectional experiences of women in the context of war: 
… the mandate holders have continued to… [bring] out the 
exacerbated impact of armed conflict when combined with 
patriarchy, ethnic and racial marginalization, poor status of 
women, and the absence of gender equality in legislation and State 
processes.581  
 
Ertürk does not shy away from explicitly naming the UN’s role in perpetuating it, and 
ignoring the reports from the mandate holders that sexual violence was endemic to 
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“peacekeeping”.582 It is clear from the internal documents, in addition to the public ones, such as 
the memoires of Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire,583 that while the devastation in Rwanda was 
pronounced by members of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
during the 1994 Genocide to be “one of the most abhorrent events of the 20th century”,584 it also 
was experienced as a moral and institutional failure on the part of the UN.585 Then Secretary 
General Kofi Annan called for an independent inquiry into the events of the Rwandan genocide 
and the complete failure of the international community as part of the institution’s reckoning, 
declaring that the institutional healing and capacity for future prevention were of equal import to 
the accountability to the Rwandan people: 
These are wounds which need to be healed, for the sake of the 
people of Rwanda, for the United Nations and also for all those … 
who are at risk of becoming victims of genocide in the future.586 
  
At the institutional level, the fallout from the Rwanda genocide and the subsequent legal 
prosecutions587 may have been the driver for the integration of gender and race in the recognition 
and prediction of harms. Underscoring this, the Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights in its press kit for the 2001 Durban World Conference Against Racism, at which the 
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concept of intersectionality was formally introduced, issued the following as part of its official 
statement as sponsoring host of the conference (although its assessment of the successes of the 
prosecution of sexual violence as a crime of war differs notably from that of the SRVAW): 
Ethnic or race-based violence against women is considered the 
most recognizable example of intersectional discrimination. 
Incidents of rape in Bosnia, Kosovo, Burundi and Rwanda 
represent race-based targeting of women for an explicitly gender-
based violation. Additionally, ethnic conflict produces a large 
number of female refugees who then become vulnerable to sexual 
violence and gender-related issues. Rape against women picked 
because of their ethnic or religious origin has now been recognized 
as a weapon of war by both International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and prosecuted accordingly.588 
 
Overall, this “new” lens on the intersectional harms and deliberate targeting of racialized 
or ethnically profiled women during war, may have loaned previously resistant institutional 
frameworks the legitimacy to consider the intersections of race and gender as worthy of 
detection, prevention, remedy and study. Since the time of the independent inquiry, the use of 
sexual violence against women as a routine tactic of war has been “mainstreamed”, and the 
requirement to understand and combat it has resulted in specific measures to address it, including 
the establishment of a new Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for 
Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC).589 Crenshaw, in her Zagreb paper, makes it plain that 
the intersectional agenda is linked to the bald examples of “intersectional oppression” that are the 
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“most recognizable”—those that have taken place in the genocidal contexts we have been 
discussing: 
The most recognizable examples of intersectional oppression are 
often the most tragic: ethnic or race based violence against women. 
This violence might be usefully framed as intentional intersectional 
subordination in that the racism and sexism manifested in these 
rapes reflects the race or ethnic-based targeting of women for an 
explicitly gender-based violation. Recent tragedies in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and Kosovo sadly illustrate that the long history 
of ethnically based violence against women has not been relegated 
to the distant past. While these are the most recent and widespread 
examples of intersectional violence, this particular vulnerability 
has played out not only in armed conflict, but also in other contexts 
as well.590 
     
Interestingly, these forms of intersectional violations are also the most easily reduced by 
the law to single axis discrimination, even in the face of express guidance to consider the mutual 
constituency of the harm. The rape of women and the prosecution of the rape of women as a 
form of genocide and a crime against humanity formed an important aspect of the legal process, 
both in its attempts to address rape in a pioneering way, and in its failures to do so, briefly 
considered here specifically in Rwanda.591 Express strategies to prosecute mass rapes as 
intersectional harms have been critiqued for their legal erasure of women as subjects of the 
violence, and agents in their own narratives of harm and remedy. The dominant frameworks of 
criminal prosecution required an overarching adherence to ethnic identity as the targeted 
category; this meant in some cases, the rape of women who were not identified as part of the 
“targeted group”, required the violation to be defined in terms of, for instance their husbands’ 
                                                 
 
590 Crenshaw, supra note 67 at 9. 
591 Wood, supra note 587. 
140 
(acknowledged to be targeted) ethnicity; her rape becomes a (property) crime against him.592 It is 
a legal strategy that practitioners might regard as inventive, creative and even ingenious, as it 
works to move around law’s narrow conceptions to find another avenue for remedy. It is, 
however, ironically, the opposite of an intersectional approach. As Yuval-Davis’s forewarning 
helps us see, such attempts to adhere to the grounds of discrimination, force an essentialization 
of identity. In this way, the effort of an intersectional analysis breaks apart into its constituent 
elements as specific forms of additive oppression. This approach,  
inevitably conflates narratives of identity politics with descriptions 
of positionality as well as constructing identities within the terms 
of specific political projects. Such narratives often reflect 
hegemonic discourses of identity politics that render invisible 
experiences of the more marginal members of that specific social 
category and construct an homogenized ‘right way’ to be its 
member.593   
 
Moreover, it can also serve to reinforce the original harms. As Ertürk underscores 
violence against women in armed conflict has been couched in 
terms of ‘protection’ and ‘honour’. Article 27 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War treats violence against women as a crime of honour rather 
than as a crime of violence. By using the honour paradigm, linked 
as it is to concepts of chastity, purity and virginity, stereotypical 
concepts of femininity have been formally enshrined in 
humanitarian law. Thus, criminal sexual assault, in both national 
and international law, is linked to the morality of the victim. When 
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rape is perceived as a crime against honour or morality, shame 
commonly ensues for the victim594 
 
It appears that the UN’s adoption of intersectionality outside CEDAW is, in some 
important respects, cut from the narrow prosecutorial cloth of war crimes, and consequently 
suffers from the under-inclusion of gender. These structural shortcomings and patriarchal values 
embedded in the very design of the protections, instead often get represented in racist terms as 
shortcomings of the ‘cultures’—“because they are considered tainted and promiscuous”595— of 
the communities in which women seeking redress. In this sense, “legal discussions presume 
rather than interrogate the processes by which conflict is deemed to be ethnic, and violence 
becomes sexual”.596 Within CEDAW, as I explore shortly, the tendency is to disengage gender 
from its mutually constituted formations along race, class and most persistently, along cultural 
axes. Clearly, the intersection metaphor doesn’t immunize those employing it against reverting to 
studying the separate ontological bases of social division, tracing individual identity markers 
rather than the confluence of complex social formations. In this use of the term, rather than 
accounting for the construction of a social process of discrimination, where an individual’s 
experience of it is unintelligible without the context of complex group disadvantage and 
exploitation, “intersectionality” merely restates in new words the experience of personal 
exclusion (or inclusion) during a one-time event of discrimination. This ipso facto characterizes 
discrimination as an aberration from the regular functioning of (assumedly non-discriminatory) 
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social and institutional relations. Without analytic rigour, the radical promise of intersectionality 
as offering structural analysis of the intersectional process of discrimination collapses into the 
mutually exclusive identity-based and narrow grounds of discrimination that it superseded. 
Casual deployments of the term for already entrenched approaches to antidiscrimination law 
reduce what is essentially a radical analysis of social stratification, providing for both recognition 
and redistribution, to one of identity recognition only; what Crenshaw envisioned as a structural 
project becomes individualized.  
This is what Yuval-Davis had forewarned; the UN, she feared, was conflating the 
“positional and discursive,” remaining “on one level of analysis, the experiential, [unable to] 
differentiate between different levels.”597  The result, she contends, “is actually fragmentation 
and multiplication of the wider categorical identities rather than more dynamic, shifting and 
multiplex constructions of intersectionality”.598 How these analytic hazards play out in the 
adoption of the terminology in the human rights treaties at the primary intersection of race and 
gender is explored in the initial incorporation of an intersectional vocabulary at CERD and 
CEDAW set out below. 
3.5 The “intersectionalization” of human rights treaty protections: 
What CEDAW owes to CERD 
In her 2001 paper, Coomaraswamy refers to the adoption of the CERD GC 25,599 which 
had been released that same year, as CERD’s first clear statement on its self-conscious 
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obligations to consider gender within the terms of its norms,600 although it had modified its 
reporting procedures in the previous Session, to incorporate information on the gendered aspects 
of racial discrimination.601 General Recommendation 25 was the first statement of an 
intersectional position at one of the main human rights treaty bodies, although the word, again, 
was not used. Its framing is elegantly brief, or, in light of intervening years, maddeningly thin, 
depending on your perspective. In Article 2, the context of racialized sexual violence is once 
again expressly indicated as the definitional example of discrimination that this new directive to 
interpretation is trying to capture. In directing itself to account for gender, CERD is trying to 
better detect, protect and hold states accountable for: 
… sexual violence committed against women members of 
particular racial or ethnic groups in detention or during armed 
conflict; the coerced sterilization of indigenous women; abuse of 
women workers in the informal sector or domestic workers 
employed abroad by their employers. Racial discrimination may 
have consequences that affect primarily or only women, such as 
pregnancy resulting from racial bias-motivated rape; in some 
societies women victims of such rape may also be ostracized. 
Women may also be further hindered by a lack of access to 
remedies and complaint mechanisms for racial discrimination 
because of gender-related impediments, such as gender bias in the 
legal system and discrimination against women in private spheres 
of life.602 
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In total, the GR is a mere six paragraphs, occasioning Hilary Charlesworth’s scathing 
dismissal of it as “brief and desultory”. 603 Its brevity may be particularly noteworthy to those 
who, like Charlesworth and Coomaraswamy, are familiar with CERD’s long and frustrating 
history of following “some committee members” who “suggested … gender issues did not fall 
within its mandate”.604 However concise and late to the game it may be, it is far from random. 
Modest, not properly catalogued, and still in a changeable format,605 CERD GR 25 nevertheless 
has many of the core elements of an intersectional call to action, showing off the Committee as 
exhorting itself to operate with “a more systematic and consistent approach to evaluating and 
monitoring racial discrimination against women, as well as the … obstacles … women face in 
the full exercise and enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights…”.606 
Its language lacks the convolution of some of the later UN documents, which try to grapple with 
the explicit language of intersectionality, but it nonetheless wrestles with the core distinctions 
that have preoccupied the intersectionalists I have traced through the literature.  
From the foregoing, we can see that CERD sees the intersection of race and gender 
operating at structural as well as individual levels; below we see that CERD perceives 
discrimination as operating in public as well as in private, the latter being a unique insight 
brought into the human rights fold through the advent of CEDAW. From the very abrupt 
beginning of CERD’s GR 25, we see the Committee describing a synergistic, mutually 
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constitutive form of discrimination that is not merely the additive exercise of putting two 
vulnerabilities together. In its opening paragraph, CERD simply posits: 
The Committee notes that racial discrimination does not always 
affect women and men equally or in the same way. There are 
circumstances in which racial discrimination only or primarily 
affects women, or affects women in a different way, or to a 
different degree than men. Such racial discrimination will often 
escape detection if there is no explicit recognition or 
acknowledgement of the different life experiences of women and 
men, in areas of both public and private life.607 
 
Ten years later, this language is lifted almost wholesale into the guidance that CEDAW 
crafts for its own turn to intersectionality. While Charlesworth decries the late and miserly 
arrival of CERD to the gender table, CEDAW waited until 2010 to make plain its commitment to 
incorporating an intersectional analysis, with General Comment 28.608  
In GC 28, the CEDAW Committee sets its jurisprudential guide to the treaty’s 
interpretation back into the context of its chapeau Article 1, and the approach to discrimination 
and equality we explored in Chapter 2. In paragraph 5, the Committee states that: 
…identical or neutral treatment of women and men might 
constitute discrimination against women if such treatment resulted 
in or had the effect of women being denied the exercise of a right 
because there was no recognition of the pre-existing gender-based 
disadvantage and inequality that women face.609 
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Interestingly, however, intersectionality is expressly read back through Article 2, 
referencing the obligations of States parties, and the language discussed earlier of “condemn”, 
“eliminate” and “abolish” customs or practices that discriminate against women, rather than 
through Article 1, governing the interpretation of discrimination itself: 
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of 
the general obligations of States parties contained in article 2. The 
discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably 
linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, 
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual 
orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex 
or gender may affect women belonging to such groups to a 
different degree or in different ways to men. States parties must 
legally recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and 
their compounded negative impact on the women concerned and 
prohibit them.610  
 
Andrew Byrnes maintains that Article 2 has the distinction of being seen by the 
Committee as the “very essence of the Convention”;611 indeed we have identified it above as 
central to the treaty’s object and purpose. However, in arguments about the changed nature of the 
conceptualization of discrimination as a result of an intersectional interpretation, it seems odd not 
to position the interpretation in that definitional Article (1). Rather than expressly expanding the 
definition of discrimination by reading intersectionality as the overarching meaning of the treaty 
and the grounds of discrimination per se, intersectional awareness is now to be seen as part of a 
suite of state obligations, or a form of discrimination to be likewise “eliminated” and 
“abolished”.612 In his excellent exploration of the jurisprudence of Article 2, Byrnes makes the 
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case for the use of the language of “abolish” and “eliminate” as likewise embedded in the terms 
set out against racism in CERD as “a powerful expression of the international community’s 
attitude towards discrimination against women—the language of condemnation is also used in 
the context of racial discrimination,”.613 Thus while the denunciation may be equivalent to that 
articulated against racism, the specific context of culture as its location raises other important 
and cross-cutting rights for an intersectional approach. The difference is a subtle but revealing 
one: reading intersectionality through Article 2, positions “intersectional” as on par with 
“cultural”—part of a list of characteristics, or in Yuval-Davis’ sense, identity markers—and 
these are lumped in with factors that are ipso facto infringements on the rights of women. 
Byrnes, one of most widely agreed upon preeminent scholars of CEDAW as a living document, 
has characterized the intersectional turn at CEDAW within the auspices of Article 2 in the 
following manner: “intersectionality [is the Treaty Committee’s] approach to discrimination 
against particular groups of women—such as ethnic minorities or Indigenous peoples, migrant 
workers, and women with disabilities and other cross-cutting themes.”614 
The posture adopted by the CEDAW intersectional turn is thus, in many ways, in keeping 
with its core contestations with culture as the primary site of the manifestation, reproduction and 
experience of discrimination. In that context, “intersectional” becomes an additional event of 
discrimination based on multiple and specific grounds, identities or vulnerabilities. In contrast, 
we have seen that rather than being merely an additional ground, intersectionality is an approach, 
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a conceptualization and a frame of analysis that operates on many levels to challenge the very 
basis of traditional grounds-based conceptions of discrimination.  
From Crenshaw we learned that an important aspect of the intersectional turn is that is 
requires us to consider the structural and group identity aspects of discrimination, in addition to 
the vulnerabilities that attract the overt discrimination and marginalization of individuals. To 
Crenshaw, these form the “background” systems that sustain and maintain systems of 
subordination in a dynamic and ongoing way. These are distinguished in her background paper 
for the UN as not being simply additive or “multiple” in the ways that continue to appear in the 
various IHRL approaches; nor, importantly, is this form of discrimination like other 
conceptualizations in law, the result of a one-time temporal event, as I have argued above. 
Instead: 
The conjoining of multiple systems of subordination has been 
variously described as compound discrimination, multiple burdens, 
or double or triple discrimination. Intersectionality is a 
conceptualization of the problem that attempts to capture both the 
structural and dynamic consequences of the interaction between 
two or more axis of subordination. It specifically addresses the 
manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other 
discriminatory systems create background inequalities that 
structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities, 
classes, and the like. Moreover, it addresses the way that specific 
acts and policies create burdens that flow along these axes 
constituting the dynamic or active aspects of disempowerment.615 
 
It is this structural aspect of intersectionality that is the most difficult for the law to grasp 
and administer. Ertürk pins this down in a global context that very much includes the peacetime 
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structures of discrimination in Nordic democracies—considered bastions of equality—
specifically “the need to address root causes, including avoidance of gender and cultural 
stereotypes”, as well as adherence to gender-mainstreaming agendas which produce “gender-
neutral State responses to domestic violence, as well as the cultural essentialist responses to 
violence among immigrant communities”.616 Crenshaw, and Yuval-Davis, might counter 
Fredman’s categories of discrimination that retain additive formulations of multiplicity, in all but 
an explanatory or lay language sense. To Crenshaw, the importance of the structural informs all 
considerations of temporal discrimination. For instance, she says, harms from one form of 
discrimination may make a person vulnerable to another form; at other times, two forms of 
discrimination are indistinguishable, and simultaneously occurring: in both instances, “[t]hese 
are the contexts in which intersectional injuries occur—disadvantages or conditions interact with 
preexisting vulnerabilities to create a distinct dimension of disempowerment.”617  
As an example, Crenshaw returns to the war crimes context, and points out the important 
ways in which both what comes before and what comes after such violent outbreaks of atrocity 
are immanent to the operation of intersectional discrimination; indeed there are both structural 
precursors, allowing such violations to occur, as well as continuing conditions which make the 
remedies for intersectional atrocities impossible to achieve. This is especially so without having 
considered this defining feature of intersectionality’s unique analytic contribution: “Propaganda 
against poor and racialized women may not only render them likely targets of sexualized 
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violence, it may also contribute to the tendency of many people to doubt their truthfulness when 
they attempt to seek the protection of authorities.”618 
Here Crenshaw is positing a different approach to intersectional discrimination than that 
which has arisen out of the mass atrocity context, by pointing out that such eruptions of targeted 
violence “draw upon preexisting gender stereotypes” but are also based in “distinctions between 
women”, and on “racial or ethnic stereotypes”.619 In this way, she points out, race or ethnic, as 
well as class and gender stereotypes work to characterize some groups “as sexually 
undisciplined”.620 It is precisely the intersection of these preexisting and powerful social tropes 
that has dire consequences for women: making them “particularly vulnerable to punitive 
measures based largely on who they are”.621 
The direct and deliberate nature of mass atrocity-based intersectional harms against 
women can make them too event-based and sensational, and therefore an inaccurate template, for 
the structural analysis intersectionality requires, unless a much longer view of the background to 
the crisis is engaged. That this eruptive set of pre-mediated violations dominated the introduction 
of the term and its contours is made more evident by Crenshaw’s overt insistence that even 
“[t]argeted acts of intentional discrimination are not limited to sexual violence.”622 In 
Crenshaw’s elaboration for the Croatia meeting, she emphasizes the particular form of 
“structural intersectional subordination”,623 which has been seen in intersectional theory as 
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critical to its potential to assist adjudication to reach past the elaboration of additional 
enumerated and restrictive grounds, and reach into transformative, “counter-hegemonic”, law-
making.624 This requires attention to larger structural issues, such as the uneven global power 
relations that leave, for instance, African migrants at a relative disadvantage to other migrants, 
but also so-called passive or benign forms of intersectional discrimination, which are “not in any 
way targeted toward women or toward any other marginalized people; [but] simply intersect… 
with other structures to create a subordinating effect”.625 Crenshaw cites the “burdens placed on 
women by structural adjustment policies within developing economies”626 as one such example.  
This pivot back to the radical roots of intersectionality’s potential recalls the TWAIL 
critiques explored in Chapter 1; these have called into question the authority of the international 
systems we have in place to arbitrate forms of discrimination that grow out of the very authority 
being claimed to do so;627 authority, as Orford pointed out in the text we explored in Chapter I, 
that found its succor in the “shadow of empire”,628 and still suffers from “the apparent inability 
of the international human rights system to address what many feminists see as the major human 
rights issue facing women in the post-Cold War era: the threat posed to human rights by 
economic globalization”.629 In apparent recognition of these criticisms, CEDAW’s 2017 GR 35, 
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offers the following enhancement to its focus on gender-based violence, linking its concern with 
“culture” in a continuum of harms that culminate in the effects of globalization: 
An erosion of legal and policy frameworks to eliminate gender - 
based discrimination or violence, often justified in the name of 
tradition, culture, religion or fundamentalist ideologies, and 
significant reductions in public spending, often as part of “austerity 
measures” following economic and financial crises, further weaken 
the state responses. In the context of shrinking democratic spaces 
and consequent deterioration of the rule of law, all these factors 
allow for the pervasiveness of gender-based violence against 
women and lead to a culture of impunity.630 
 
In the context of CEDAW, which is, of course, both text and institution, we see the 
struggle with the full range of intersectionality’s role as both “outside” social critique and 
“insider” practical legal guide; it is based on a struggle built into the walls of the treaty document 
and arising out of the nature of the state-populated committee, which mirrors the tensions of its 
founding text, between the more structural approach of the USSR and newly independent nations 
and the more individual protection approaches of liberal western democracies.631 CEDAW 
seesaws, as we have seen in the previous chapter, between its stance as a fully integrated treaty, 
with a view to cohering the binary formations of rights that have characterized the introduction 
of international human rights generally, such as de jure/de facto; civil and political/ social, 
economic and cultural; public/private, and one that falls prey to the old habits of colonial 
formulations of the oppressed “other”. These layered tensions also come alive in the 
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deliberations of the Committee through the individuals who populate it, and bring to it their 
beliefs, influences and adherences.  
Byrne fairly credits CEDAW qua deliberative body with operationalizing an unusually 
expansive definition of equality, in which “both legal and non-legal measures” lead to 
transformation which can “cover all fields of life”, “ensure that all branches and levels of 
government are appropriately engaged in implementation”, with “particular emphasis on the 
groups of women who are most marginalized and who may suffer from various forms of 
intersectional discrimination” are able to “participate actively in the development, 
implementation and monitoring of the policy”, with the end-goal that all women “have access to 
information about their Convention rights and are able to claim them”.632 Far from a strictly 
legalistic approach, CEDAW demands positive equality that imposes forward-thinking public 
policy outcomes among its States parties: 
The Committee has also drawn on analyses of the nature of human 
rights obligations developed under other treaties to explicate the 
meaning and scope of Convention obligations. Of particular 
importance has been the tripartite framework developed initially in 
relation to economic, social, and cultural rights, but now applied to 
civil and political rights as well: the obligations to respect, protect, 
and fulfill/promote the rights guaranteed.633 
 
In the next chapter, I explore, through interviews with a cross-section of current and past 
CEDAW and one CERD member, the ways that the individuals who help to define the 
operations of intersectionality as a technique of IHRL think of the concept, as well as the task of 
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its application. I will do so in the context of a brief review of methodology and jurisprudence, 
with the benefit of the approaches and frameworks I have elaborated so far. As Crenshaw has 
insisted: 
the intersectional problem is not simply that one discreet form of 
discrimination is not fully addressed, but that an entire range of 
human rights violations are obscured by the failure to address fully 
the intersectional vulnerabilities of marginalized women and 
occasionally marginalized men as well.634 
 
Maintaining Orford’s approach, I will take the insights from the present chapter and 
examine the interaction of the Committee’s consciousness of itself next to the decisions it has 
taken on individual communications and countries’ concluding observations (CO). In the final 
chapter, I will examine the forward-looking aspects of intersectionality’s social vision in the 
hands of the treaty body, and scrutinize the space for social agency the Committee members’ 
vision allows for the subjects of the protective frame they administer. The foregoing analysis 
augurs the need to be attentive to the core paradox of intersectionality at CEDAW—that to 
render it fit for praxis, it simultaneously instrumentalizes the concept into a tool of law that 
curtails its insights, thereby impoverishing its social vision where the treaty’s own expansiveness 
could instead be fertile ground. 
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4 Intersectionality and the CEDAW Committee’s 
Consciousness of Itself 
Studying travelling ideas often requires travelling with the people 
who are carrying them.635 
 
It can be more revolutionary to work on the small rules than to issue thumping 
denunciations.636 
 
You know, that CEDAW is not so much an academic debating 
club [laughs]. No, you know it’s important always to emphasize 
members have various backgrounds in CEDAW so the point is 
always to come up with terms that are understandable for all 
members in the committee.637 
 
[L]awyers theorize on the run, in response to particular problems 
or doctrinal dead-ends, and yet in doing so often come back to 
shared themes or conceptual dilemmas.638 
  
4.1 Introduction 
So far, in tracing intersectionality’s promises, transmissions and impacts considering the 
Orford challenge to create a feminist reading of international law that does not simply advance 
imperial ambitions, I have illuminated, in a literature review in Chapter I, the promises of 
intersectionality’s intellectual and activist contributions to feminist law and feminist governance. 
I held out the complex theoretical and praxis roles intersectionality is asked to occupy, and the 
challenges of holding its radical critique in balance with its ambitions to create positive legal and 
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social change through governance engagement. In Chapter 2, I traced the institutional, textual 
and normative grounding of women’s IHR in the CEDAW treaty, revealing an ambiguous legacy 
of rights advancement in the context of fixed notions about culture that owe much to an imperial 
past, making it simultaneously hostile and receptive to intersectionality’s insights. In Chapter 3, I 
explored the antecedents of intersectionality as a quasi-juridical practice while maintaining 
awareness of IHRL as part of the project of international law that, in Orford’s sense, is embraced  
as a vehicle for wide-ranging public projects designed to reorder 
the world, from dividing up Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
century, to ending the scourge of war, managing decolonisation, 
humanising warfare and liberalising trade in the twentieth 
century.639   
 
As an overarching approach, maintained throughout these chapters, I centred out Orford’s 
use of the concept of law’s “consciousness of itself” to explain my approach to the materials and 
texts I was analyzing. Specifically, I invoked it to indicate a methodological approach to 
international legal scholarship that can “develop a legal analysis that is also critical, idiomatically 
recognisable and politically useful”.640 In my introduction, I presented my position that despite 
the differences in scope between Orford’s project of tracking the exercise of authority in 
international law generally through the rise of the concept of Responsibility to Protect, and my 
interest in a critical feminist view of the development of women’s international human rights 
through the rise of the terminology of “intersectionality”, applying Orford’s methodology to my 
topic is consistent with her project of tracing law’s consciousness of itself. Indeed, I traced how 
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Orford’s own methodological journey grew out of her early work in critical feminist 
international law, making my project consistent with the scope and development of her method.  
In this chapter, I take the reader through the dissertation’s most literal deployment of 
Orford’s sense of consciousness of itself. Recalling that this method is principally one of 
embedding critique in the act of tracing origins, with a renewed emphasis on the study of actual 
practices, including discursive practices, rather than the abstract study of disembodied structures.  
Orford, we saw, specifically starts from the practices of law as they appear and operate, but at the 
same time as they reflect upon themselves and become rationalized. As outlined in the 
introduction, this chapter of the dissertation will follow Orford’s distinction of an international 
legal method that examines the history of its own concepts and ideas, based on the authority of 
juridical interpretation.  
In the pages that follow, I present the findings of my research into the operations of the 
CEDAW Committee, probing its responses to place them in the frame of the dissertation’s 
primary concerns with the promises, transmissions and impacts of intersectionality as key 
aspects of women’s human rights protections. As an aspect of law’s consciousness of itself, the 
CEDAW Committee members’ reflections constitute information about the transmission of the 
idea of intersectionality. But importantly, it shows us the key players’ understanding of not just 
the ideas, but their relationship to the structures they work in and the authority they inhabit. The 
Committee’s utterances for this purpose take two forms in this chapter: I analyze the documents 
they author as Committee members, seeing them as transmissions of the idea of intersectionality. 
That is, I review Committee members’ statements, interpretations of the treaty and personal 
reflections in the public domain that bring clarity to the meaning of intersectionality primarily 
because it is they who are in the position to administer it as an aspect of international legal 
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authority. To this already available research, which I have gathered in an Orfordian manner in a 
method outlined above and explored further below, I add my analysis of the transcripts of 
original interviews I conducted with CEDAW members. The interviews fulfill a key aspect of 
the Orfordian project, that is to take the radical obviousness of what is said about an idea from 
the mouths of its main proponents, and probe what this offers to our understanding about the 
extension and meaning of the concept as an embodiment of international authority. In this case, 
of course, the interest is in intersectionality as an approach to women’s international human 
rights protections.  
The practice of this method in this chapter thus combines document analysis with the 
analysis of semi-structured interviews I conducted in person with particular policy experts during 
CEDAW’s fall 2016 session in Geneva, and via video interviews with additional informants no 
longer part of, or situated outside of, CEDAW. Here I followed practices supported by various 
scholars whose work advocates for the role of such interviews in a broader exploration, where 
policy expert interview data complements the primary research methods.641 
In the chapter that follows, I will place the reflections of the particular policy experts on 
the origins and impacts of intersectionality in combination with a review of the decisions they 
have made using the concept (or its proxies). Thus, their personal accounts will be examined in 
this chapter in advance of the next chapter, where I will examine the jurisprudence of individual 
representations adjudicated through Optional Protocol, and Concluding Observations of 
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primarily CEDAW committee members, past and present, in light of insights in this and previous 
chapters.  
My semi-structured key informant or particular policy interviews assist me to determine 
if and how specific aspects of “intersectionality” actually came to be instituted as aspects of 
women’s human rights, and what they mean to the participants who are the proponents and who 
negotiated the texts, as well as how they are implementing these ideas at the UN level. In 
previous chapters, I have explored the academic, broad geopolitical and institutional factors that 
were pushing and impeding the use of recent developments in international human rights’ 
protections for multidiscriminated women. I will explore the context of these emergent norms, 
including what causal links, if any, their proponents believe they hold to political problems the 
UN’s turn to intersectionality might have been seen to address, and how this “back story” of 
intersectionality connects to implementation jurisprudentially.  
4.2 CEDAW interviews as an aspect of legal method 
While Orford discusses her method of gathering materials as being not dissimilar from a 
sociological method,642 it is important to point out that this method is not engaged as part of a 
sociology dissertation, but as part of a legal one. In tracing the account law tells itself about the 
meaning it is making, it is necessary to trace proponents and adherents purposefully. Likewise, 
my work tracing the concept of intersectionality through the UN archives, decisions and memoirs 
of CEDAW members followed a deliberately selective route to the utterances of 
intersectionality’s meaning and traced the work it was simultaneously doing throughout the 
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period of its acceptance. The objective was not to see what a random selection of Committee 
members, or other UN authorities, might think of intersectionality, but rather to trace its 
authoritative pathways and appearances: in short, its decisive transmissions.  
In carrying out my research, I attended the opening of the 65th Session of CEDAW (Oct 
24-Nov 18 2016), from October 24 until October 28.643 My principal reason for attending was to 
observe the working methods of the CEDAW Committee, and to attain access to committee 
members, as the opportunity presented itself, in order to conduct field interviews644 with them 
while they were stationary in Geneva, since prearranging interviews had proven impractical, with 
the exception of one interviewee, whom I was able to prearrange a meeting with through my 
professional connections as a non-profit executive in Canada. While this person was not 
previously known to me, I was able to seek their agreement through my networks.  
Once in Geneva, I attended the organizing meetings of Canadian NGOs that were there to 
present their findings to committee members in advance of Canada’s appearance at the 
Committee on the first day of the proceedings, October 24, 10am to 1pm.645 My access to 
Committee members to ask them about the role of intersectionality in their deliberations was 
facilitated by a purposive snowball technique of building on recommendations of NGO 
colleagues,646 and from each of those interviews, a further recommendation of whom else on the 
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Committee the interviewee would recommend or be able to connect me to.647 If they chose to 
participate, an interview was set up. I developed a protocol that aimed to interview 
representatives on CEDAW who came from a range of geopolitical locations; while CEDAW 
itself is not a globally representative entity per se, there are members from Global South as well 
as Global North countries, so-called high, medium and lower income countries. Within my 
purposeful sample of those who were known to be or were likely to be proponents of 
intersectionality, I tried to ensure global representation.  
As the Committee engaged in constructive dialogue with each country presenting during 
the week, I observed from the NGO seating area. Those most active on the files in the week I 
was there were most likely to be the ones to agree to be interviewed by me. Additionally, each 
interviewee would suggest the next interviewee I approached, offer their introduction so that the 
new recruit would be more likely to agree to meet with me. These recommendations were based, 
presumably, on a combination of the new recruit’s area of expertise, and how that dovetailed 
with my topic, but also with their familiarity and possibly like-mindedness with the person I was 
already speaking with. The exception to this among the in-person interviews was my first 
interviewee, with whom I had a separate connection. This person elected to remain anonymous, 
fearing some controversy in their country of origin for their answers to the kinds of questions I 
would ask. (Additionally, former or non-CEDAW members who had things to add to my 
research were also approached; this is described further below.) The person who remained 
anonymous did not refer me directly to any other interviewee. The rest of the pool of current 
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CEDAW interviewees came from the snowball technique I describe above, based on an initial 
introduction as part of the observing NGO delegation.  
The conditions under which interviews took place were far from private, with members 
coming in and out of the room we used, which was a room set aside for Committee members to 
take breaks and make tea; although it was less than ideal, it was the only room available to us for 
this purpose. Three interviews were exceptions to this pattern; two interviews were conducted by 
video well after the week in Geneva, one with the past Chair, Cees Flinterman, about whom I 
make an especial notation below, and the other with past CERD member, Patrick Thornberry. 
Both are professors emeritus who teach and research in the areas of human rights law. Both have 
reflected on their work on their respective treaty committees in their publications.648 Patrick 
Thornberry was also the advisor of my Masters of International Human Rights Law thesis at 
Oxford, and thus his interview followed from prior familiarity. The other exception was the 
interview with Simon Walker, a manager who oversees OHCHR’s support to some of the UN 
human rights treaty bodies. He was interviewed in person in Geneva in the cafeteria of the Palais 
Wilson. I sought his views to round out the aspects of the research that had a more institutional 
basis, such as the institutional life of intersectionality as a concept in UN human rights discourse, 
and to test his view of the origins I was discovering in the mass human rights violations, as 
explored in previous chapters. All interviewees signed ethics reviewed consent forms (available 
at Appendix 1), indicating what types of questions they might be asked and allowing them to 
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indicate their preferences for how their interviews would be incorporated into my dissertation. I 
found, without exception, the interviewees to be candid, forthright and eager to share the stories 
of their engagement with the complex deliberations of an intersectional approach to women’s 
human rights at the United Nations. 
In my interviews, I asked Committee members what they had read, what the precipitating 
events were that led to their interest in the concept, and what they understand by the keywords 
we have explored as building blocks to an intersectional approach, including the term 
intersectionality itself. Though “intersectionality” was implemented in the jurisprudence by this 
name and others, what did they understand by it? How did they feel about it, and how has this 
influenced their use of the concept? What did each participant think of the various ideas 
advanced in the literature (as opposed to the impetus for the contentions in the literature)? 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the scholar Yurval-Davis traces the official 
emergence of intersectionality by name to the contemporaneous emergence of the framework in 
CERD’s General Comment 25, and, she along with others649 see it origins at the UN in the 
sequence of the preparatory documents to the Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial 
Discrimination that took place in Zagreb in November 2000 as part of the preparatory process to 
the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism.650 In these meetings, as we have explored, the 
American legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, was asked to introduce the notion in a special 
session on the subject leading up to the Durban conference. Her background paper, which I have 
explored extensively in the preceding chapter, thus formed one of the key documents advancing 
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the intersectional turn at the international level.651 In my interviews I have explored committee 
members’ familiarity with Crenshaw’s role and her work on intersectionality, to trace the role of 
the concept as originating or post hoc justification for the advancement of the concept.  
4.3 Intersectionality through the eyes of CEDAW members: 
Originating concept or retrospective attribution? 
I have stated elsewhere that my questions were in the style of semi-structured particular 
policy field interviews, designed to follow the thoughts of the interviewee rather than follow a 
standardized set of “test” questions.652Nevertheless, I began each interview with a version of the 
same framing of the project and an initiating question that went something like this: “Have you 
heard of/do you have a working definition of the quasi-legal concept of intersectionality”? 
My interview results support and augment the line of inquiry based in Orford’s insight 
into the centrality of consciousness of itself as the backward-facing gathering of practices into a 
more or less coherent account of the operations of international law, offering ex post facto 
intellectual clarity. Not one of the informants attributed the origins of intersectionality to the 
work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, or the paper she introduced in Croatia. Two informants seemed 
variously aware of other critical race scholars, referring at times to the work of Angela Davis653 
and Patricia Williams.654  
Interviewer: Have you heard of/do you have a working definition 
of the quasi-legal concept of intersectionality? 
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From Committee member Patricia Schulz, I received a plain-spoken summary of the 
academic or conceptual basis of her understanding of intersectionality:  
No, I have no clue. 
Interviewer: Okay, but from your perspective of the Committee, 
it’s useful and it’s embedded in your work? 
Schulz: Yup.655 
 
And again, from Silvia Pimentel, we see a live laboratory of Orford’s characterization of 
international legal authority as based in the repurposing of existing concepts for the proximate 
justification:  
We didn’t invent intersectionality. We didn’t invent [it]. This term 
was already around … and [in] writing feminist writings so we 
didn’t invent [it].656  
 
Ruth Halperin-Kaddari articulated the Orfordian view of legal method and international 
legal authority as backward facing and precedent based:  
The thing is that from our view on the Committee, many of our 
operations are happening without attributing such, you know, deep 
plannings and intentions.657   
 
She also characterizes it as retrospectively gathered and justified:  
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it’s the historical...the later, broad historical perspective, may 
attribute more to that activity than...than what really took place in 
real time, ok? That’s what I am trying to say, so …658  
 
And she adds that it is only identifiable as part of a retrospective articulation of authority’s 
consciousness of itself:   
And it is […] not to say that this is the wrong analysis but, it may 
actually demand the passage of time allowing to see these broad 
developments and put them together. 659 
 
Cees Flinterman, the Committee member credited with driving the articulation of the 
intersectional approach at CEDAW, likewise downplays the import of any particular conceptual 
framework and, nonetheless, distinguishes an approach to women’s human rights that articulates 
an intersectional approach that approximates what I have developed in previous chapters: 
At the time, it must have been influenced also by academic writing 
at the time. But I don’t recall exactly what at the time. But still I 
like the term intersectional because it’s maybe even clearer, in 
cases of multiple forms of discrimination; there I think the 
confusion can be that there is already gender, there is both gender 
discrimination and racial discrimination whereas intersectional 
discrimination indicates that women belonging to a particular race 
may be differently impacted by gender discrimination than other 
ways, without necessarily that they are also discriminated because 
of their race in a particular situation.660 
 
While I have advanced a reading of these perspectives based in Orford’s international 
critical legal method, on the face of it my informants’ perspectives on the intersectional approach 
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of the Committee could also be seen to support the views of, respectively, Byrnes, Campbell and 
Fredman. As Byrnes puts it, “although the Convention does not explicitly refer to multiple 
discrimination”,661 CEDAW qua committee, exercises a “fluid approach to intersectional 
discrimination”,662 making it “possible to construe existing grounds sufficiently capaciously to 
address the confluence of power relationships which compounds disadvantage”.663   
Where Byrnes, Campbell and Fredman justify intersectionality through fidelity to the text 
of CEDAW, Orford’s method adds the element of gathering the practices and utterances of 
intersectionality to construct a picture of their meaning and purpose. That is, taken in its time and 
context, as well as in light of its travels, the focus on textual embeddedness broadens out to 
provide a fuller picture. The reflections of the Committee members support the view that the 
articulation of intersectionality is based on existing practice, not on conceptual clarity, that is, in 
the way of legal method as articulated by Orford, consolidating precedent and authority into a 
retrospective gathering and systemization of practices already underway. In the words of Patricia 
Schulz: 
 It’s [intersectionality is] a development of the reflections of the 
committee on multiple discrimination.  ... and I sometimes have the 
impression that we use one or the other, without making a 
difference and I’m not really sure that we have to make a 
difference but I’ve, I have read some legal papers sometimes, I 
couldn’t quote any just like that, that make a very, that make a 
difference [between multiple and intersectional discrimination], 
but, what I would think is that the committee has seen repeatedly 
and has addressed more and more repeatedly, the situation of 
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women who are, barred from their rights because of their 
belonging to various groups.664  
 
What she is clarifying here is that the authority of naming an interpretation intersectional 
accords to the Committee’s recasting of the Committee’s previous decisions. Likewise, without 
citing any of the academic authorities I have explored in previous chapters, the Committee 
members operationalize approaches based in intersectional understanding:  
Some say multiple discriminations, but they are categories….the 
intersectional lens produces the categories—if there was not an 
intersectionality on the basis of health, for instance, we wouldn’t 
name disability. The same for older women.665 
 
Outside the Committee, Simon Walker likewise eschews any reliance on academic 
authority, and instead advances a definition that is operationalized in other UN treaty protections: 
 
I’ve always understood the notion to be a compounding effect of 
discrimination. ...I guess also I have a background previously to 
this position I was disability advisor I followed the negotiations for 
the CRPD [Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities] 
that has an article on women, and women with disabilities. So in a 
sense, this is also, you can build on, I don’t think they use the term 
multiple forms of discrimination, but it was very clear, even during 
negotiations that women with disabilities might face double or 
multiple forms of discrimination on the basis of sex, and on the 
basis of disability, and of course possibly on the basis of race... or, 
any other grounds... and that this was a compounding effect.666  
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And finally, in the words of Cees Flinterman, intersectionality gathers previous practices 
and gives them new clarity and articulation: 
Speaking for myself, I did not have a specific definition of my own 
[for]  intersectional discrimination. But I like the term and I do 
think it still is a very clear indication of what we have in mind, and 
that is that gender discrimination may impact women in a different 
manner, dependent on the question of whether they belong to a 
certain class, or group in society, such as race and also caste.667 
 
As an aspect of this retrospective enunciation, we see informants as practitioners 
expressly mixing the terminology that the academic literature has been so careful to parse out. 
Thus, the categories of multiple, compound and intersectional discrimination are being used 
interchangeably, and in Walker’s description, the concept of grounds is still a live concept for 
how discrimination is being conceived of, regardless of Fredman and Campbell’s view that 
“single ground” approach of CEDAW is distinct from the traditional grounds-based limitations 
of most other anti-discrimination frameworks.668  To Schulz, “we are contributing to a, a broader 
view of issues of discrimination by state parties”.669 
 
When pushed, her views become more elaborated: 
Interviewer: So is it, is it, in your view, kind of a broadening of the 
grounds or is it a different ground?  Or is it a bit of both?   
 
Patricia Schulz: I think it’s a bit of both.  … I don’t, I don’t see it 
so far as a completely separate ground I mean, I, I look at 
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discrimination against women and discrimination based on... race 
or ethnicity or, disability status or whatever and…, it helps me 
work that out, work that package together, put the package 
together. […] I think also what’s interesting with the concept of 
intersectionality is that, is that it helped move away from women 
as a group vs. men as a group. I mean, which is the language of the 
convention which is, generally, the language of constitutions that 
say gender equality, between women and men.  All women, all 
men.670 
 
Here Schulz is providing a critique of the single axis criteria I named as being the textual 
basis of the CEDAW Treaty. She continues: 
we know that both groups [men and women] are extraordinarily 
diverse. What makes me nuts, is lumping women with, the poor, 
the young, the old, the migrants, the disabled, the elderly, 
whatever. As if there weren't..., whereas, apart from the group of 
men, women are in every other group.671 
 
But in her wrap up to the question, she returns to precedent as the source of authority for 
a changed meaning in a new context: 
 
… but I really think it was a result and, and... a result of the 
previous work. Or based on the previous work, but it has then 
helped,... the continuing to develop this and our thinking on this.672 
 
4.4 Cees Flinterman: Intersectionality at CEDAW 
In Orford’s account of international law’s consciousness of itself, the Swedish diplomat 
Dag Hammarskjold became a central character in R2P’s consolidation as an international legal 
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framework; his vision and approach shaped the outcomes that Orford traced. In the account of 
intersectionality that I have traced through CEDAW, Cees Flinterman, the Dutch member of 
CEDAW and its Chair from 2003-2010, emerges in a similar role with a smaller canvass and a 
less grandiose stage presence than Hammarskjold, whose vision reshaped the world order aimed 
at the “protection of life” and the “maintenance of order” in the decolonized world.673 In 
contrast, Flinterman is humble and restrained in his ambitions, but his sense of purpose was cited 
by many as the impetus to the articulation and documentation of intersectionality as the official 
approach to women’s international human rights at CEDAW. As explored in the previous 
chapter, Article 18 of GR 28 sets out CEDAW’s express conceptualization of intersectionality as 
part of the Committee’s interpretation of the treaty. In exploring its development with the 
Committee members, it became clear that Flinterman, had been its quiet proponent:  
OK, so I am 99% certain that it was in fact Cees Flinterman who 
started it.674  
And, even more emphatically,  
He was the Chair, and not only a formal chair, but a Chair!675 
 
These interviews also underscored the role a particular individual can play in the 
development of a direction in IHRL, a point Orford felt compelled to defend in the controversy 
that surrounded her choice to feature Dag Hammarskjold in her work on R2P.  In the age of 
bureaucratic processes that may seem inherently anti-individual —“ a governance by faceless 
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experts”— focusing on the role of an individual in the transmission of ideas may seem 
anachronistic.676 In answer to her critics, Orford states that focusing on the individuals who 
shaped the shifts in international law allowed her to determine “which historical figures and 
authors we might properly make reference in order to develop a legal analysis that is also critical, 
idiomatically recognisable and politically useful.”677 In this way Orford was able to determine 
“the ways in which those practices of governing and that form of authority had been 
represented”.678 My conversations with Ruth Halperin-Kaddari illuminated this methodological  
point about the idiomatic nature of international legal authority:  
For instance, the General Recommendation that I led was number 
29, on the economic consequences of family dissolution. It was 
just my own specific ambition, and my own knowledge of this 
field, and understanding that there is a great lack in CEDAW's 
jurisprudence, in this area.679 
 
The Committee members’ emphasis on the leadership and visionary role of Flinterman 
led me to arrange an interview with him, which took place by video conference one year after the 
original interviews in Geneva. With him I explored in more detail his view of the origins and 
impacts of intersectionality at the Committee and through the originating GR 28. His interview 
underscores the accuracy of taking as the methodological starting place that the descriptive 
accounts of intersectionality gather more or less incoherent practises into a more coherent 
account of it ex post facto:    
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In the framework of the general recommendation we saw that it 
would be important to introduce a term—intersectionality—as a 
term for the kind of work of the committee. But I am sure that 
since that time, the committee has also used the term multiple 
discrimination and maybe even other terms.680  
 
Both Foucault, and Orford following him, make a crucial decision about the role of the 
concept as consciousness of itself in the consolidation of bureaucratic practices: in their approach 
to authority’s “consciousness of itself”, it is the interest of power in consolidating concrete 
conditions that shape the advancement of the idea, rather than the (Hegelian)681  notion of the 
idea shaping the conditions for practice and inviting the dialectic of transformation. Orford 
explains that for Foucault the “state did not appear first as an elaborated concept or idea—rather, 
its origin lay in the development of governmental practices and their subsequent transformation 
into concepts such as sovereignty or statehood”.682 Particular people (in Orford’s account of the 
consolidation of the concept of international authority it is UN Secretary-General, Dag 
Hammarskjold; in this account of intersectionality, it is Flinterman) can play a central role in the 
transformation of practices into systematized articulations.683 Although we have fruitfully traced 
both the promise and the transmission of Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, it is not 
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necessarily the case that her concept of intersectionality has opened the way for the practice of 
intersectionality. In transcriptions of my interviews with members of the Committee, we can see 
that the transmission of the idea of intersectionality has a more complex trajectory, both shaping 
practice, and in the genealogy of its legal life, naming and consolidating existing practices, and 
above all conferring authority. In the words of one member,  
the concept was important to consolidate the authority of the 
Committee to name certain forms of discrimination: Because it’s 
named it gives us a threshold and legitimacy. There is a non-
negotiable.684  
Once named, intersectionality additionally extends that authority beyond the original 
frame it works to consolidate:  
And, I think that it has been helpful to discuss certain issues.  For 
instance, issues that meet with a lot of resistance. ... like, sex 
workers or L[esbian]G[ay], L[esbian]B[isexual].685 
And again: 
I mean it doesn’t mean that they always agree with that, but at least 
to help some delegations understand what we mean and why we 
address those issues, also…Because, when you read the text of the 
convention, I mean a state party could think ‘hey, I have never 
ratified anything that protects the rights of sex workers and/or 
LBTs.’686 
 
In these informants’ views, and emerging from below the surface of the answers from all 
the informants I spoke with, was the identification of the need for a definitional “non-
negotiable”, not so much about ensuring that the intersections of race and gender were fully 
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accounted for in states’ obligations to the treaty’s overarching non-discrimination framework, 
but rather that gender identity and sexual orientation were made visible and accounted for. So, 
although committee members classify Article 18 in GR 28 as a consolidation of existing 
practices, it is equally an express and deliberate articulation of a new understanding of gender 
identity; it took the original treaty framers’ implicit social rather than scientific categorization of 
sex and gender, as explored in Chapter 2, and enriched it to account for sexual orientation and 
gender identity through the vehicle of intersectionality. In this way, we can see intersectionality 
as the mechanism for the expansion of the authority of the Committee to hold states accountable: 
…clearer terms such as lesbians or intersex or transgender, and all 
the other references to the LGBT LQGBTI. And most often, again, 
reference to them would raise a question that runs in the line of 
intersectionality gender protection commitments.687  
 
In the treaty, we have protections based on “sex”, which is represented in the final text 
through an implicit understanding of gender as malleable and more expansive than “sex” 
generally connotes; gender becomes the pertinent category not only of protection, but also of 
social change through changed (gender) roles, which are expressly credited as a means to 
achieving women’s gender equality. With the introduction of intersectionality (notwithstanding 
other “intersections” that are also newly expressed, such as religious belief), we have gender 
identity and sexual orientation newly expressed as aspects of previously articulated gender 
protections. As we see further below, to those who opposed it, this line of reasoning represents 
                                                 
 
687 Interview of Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, CEDAW Committee (28 October 2016), supra note 654. 
176 
an expanded authority for the Committee vis-à-vis States parties’ obligations. “Gender”, though 
implicit in the treaty, comes to do new work in the intersectional era. 
4.5 Sexual orientation and gender identity at the intersections of 
International Human Rights Law  
Flinterman’s interview underscored other informants’ view that the approach to 
intersectionality was organic, backward facing—a consolidation of existing legal practise—and 
bore only fragile connection to academic representations of the concept. His interview confirmed 
the legacy of the mass human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda that we 
explored as conducive to the adoption and articulation of intersectionality at the UN generally.  
I was the head of the Netherlands government delegation to the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. In Vienna, 
not far from the war theatre, not far from the concentrations where 
sexual violence was used once again in the context of warfare and I 
am sure that what happened then, in the former Yugoslavia, has 
had tremendous positive impact on the recognition of women’s 
rights to human rights; the recognition of violence against women 
as a general human rights issue, as an issue of discrimination. And 
later developments in this respect, in the context of such countries, 
as well the prosecutions of Bosnia/Herzegovina and the later 
prosecutions also in relation to Serbia, and what has happened in 
Rwanda certainly had an impact, at the back of our minds on also, 
in the formulation and the drafting of General Recommendation 
28. Maybe not in an explicit manner but it was implicit that this 
issue should be addressed and that it should also be addressed from 
a human rights perspective.  
I think that looking back, that was one of the most important 
outcomes of the United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights in 1993.688   
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While confirming this pedigree of intersectional protections at the UN, his interview and 
others’ also indicated that the original meaning and utility of the concept at the time it was 
introduced, in the context of grappling with unbridled and unmanaged genocidal gender-based 
violence, had morphed over time. Intersectionality was now called upon to do new work in a new 
global context. Flinterman’s interview, while confirming the time, place and meaning of 
intersectionality’s introduction as I have traced it in previous chapters, simultaneously 
underscores the central role of the term intersectionality in consolidating the important and 
controversial expansion of the Committee’s interpretation of the protections against the rapidly 
evolving area of lesbian, bisexual and trans rights. All the informants I interviewed pointed out 
to me this specific work done by intersectionality, both implicitly:  
And, ah, no problem to use the intersectionality as Angela Davis 
propose... and others and race, the difficulty was the other 
aspects... yes.689  
 
And explicitly: 
And the biggest part, … which held up the adoption of the General 
Recommendation, was the whole issue, at the time, of gender 
identity and sexual orientation. Those were difficult words at the 
time, in the framework of introducing the term of 
intersectionality.690 
 
In Chapter 1, I began to explore how globalized homophobia and its characterization of a 
globalized agenda of LGBT human rights combine to produce a complicated picture of the 
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instrumental role human rights play in consolidating positions of power domestically and (human 
rights) superiority internationally. This is a dynamic that Flinterman, as CEDAW Committee 
chair was certainly alive to: 
you could say there was a certain politicization of the committee's 
work. In general, you hardly feel that in CEDAW but in here, in 
this particular issue [LGBT rights], there was certainly some, how 
do you say that in English, reverberations of the general 
discussions in the General Assembly.691  
 
What Flinterman is obliquely referring to here, is that the period during which CEDAW’s 
GR 28 was being written, between 2005 and 2010, was one of the most active periods in a 
rapidly expanding range of efforts in various UN settings designed to force the recognition of 
LGBT rights as inherent and explicit in existing IHRL protections.692 As with the express 
development of intersectionality, this period of international LGBT rights development at the 
UN can be traced to fractious exchanges during the Beijing World Conference, singled out as “a 
high point for international activism on women’s human rights and status”.693 Here, sexual 
orientation and gender identity were raised from the floor as rights that should be expressly 
accounted for in the resulting Platform for Action.  
In both the case of intersectionality, and sexual orientation and gender identity, the 
official documents prepared after the event are silent on the matter; the World Conference 
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however, again in both cases, played a pivotal role in galvanizing the groundswell for later 
achievements.694 During the period Flinterman refers to, the Human Rights Committee and other 
fora were expressly grappling with the meaning and impact of recognizing LGBT rights as an 
aspect of international protections. Most pertinent to Flinterman’s statement regarding the 
General Assembly, is that on the December 18, 2008, Argentina presented the General Assembly 
a Joint Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, signed by 66 
states.695 Following this, Diane Otto696 traces the October 26, 2009 report by Martin Scheinin, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, to the General Assembly.697 Her analysis lends itself to 
an underscoring of Flinterman’s perception of the “reverberations” felt at CEDAW during the 
drafting of the Committee’s direction on intersectionality.  
As I explore through these documents below, the turmoil over sexuality and gender 
identity was at a peak of “epic transnational contestation”698 during this period. While both 
events mentioned above followed the Yogyakarta Principles of 2007,699 and the Organization of 
American States Statement of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in 2008,700 the latter two 
did not come with a challenge to the UN General Assembly to use its authority to endorse them. 
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While there are important differences in weight and import between the action of states within 
the General Assembly presenting a statement to be endorsed by other states and a Special 
Rapporteur report being received by the General Assembly, both invoke the GA’s authority and 
both actions exemplify similar operations of gender and gender identity in international human 
rights.  
As I traced in Chapter 2, the General Assembly has primary authority to make binding 
legal advances in IHRL.701 The Joint Statement presented by Argentina on December 18, 2008, 
provoked an immediate Arab League statement, signed by 60 countries, denouncing it.702 Both 
statements—for and against— remain technically “open for signature” before the UN General 
Assembly, a symptom of the posturing and the impasse. This specific confrontation, referenced 
by Flinterman in his interview, is not taken up by Weiss and Bosia’s volume, but it fits the 
pattern of their analysis. That is, while the Argentinian statement called for the decriminalization 
of same sex consensual relationships, and the end to the death penalty for homosexuality, the 
states responding to it decried the “social normalization … of pedophilia”.703 In Weiss and 
Bosia’s analysis, “the pressures of globalization” come to be addressed by the consolidation of 
state authority through the evocation of a “spectral sexuality…where a threatening, perverted 
and/or sick sexualized body or group of bodies are continually incarnated in discourse but never 
fully instantiated in the flesh”.704 Likewise, the modest demands of ceasing criminalization and 
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execution are morphed into fully-fledged western demands for equal marriage, etc., “drawing 
more on imported than domestically sourced language, agendas and strategies”.705 Scheinin’s 
report, though not directly referenced by Flinterman, also falls within the same time period he 
cited as having influence on the development of an intersectionality GR at CEDAW. 
Specifically, Scheinin’s definition of gender in his report on terrorism, included reference to 
intersectionality’s transmissions, namely that  
International human rights law, including the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
requires States to ensure non-discrimination and equality (de jure 
and de facto) on the basis of gender, sex, sexual orientation and 
gender identity, as well as to address instances where gender 
inequality intersects with other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, such as race, colour and religion.706  
 
Citing the authority of CEDAW on this matter in the year before Flinterman was 
successful in having GR 28 completed, further entangles the transmissions of the new gender 
protections in the web of UN documents and processes I have been tracing. Certainly, as he cites 
here, Scheinin is relying on the advances made through the Yogyakarta Principles with respect to 
gender identity and sexual orientation. His intersectional approach to gender takes up a structural 
account of the violations he is concerned about in a specifically global understanding of power 
balances and imbalances: 
Those subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between 
targeting by terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism 
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measures that may fail to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish 
these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights violations 
with impunity. This squeezing effect is present for example, in 
Algeria, where women have been arrested and detained as potential 
terrorists after they report sexual violence and humiliation by 
armed Islamists. In Nepal, the counter-insurgency campaign that 
was defined with reference to terrorism was characterized by 
attacks on meti (effeminate males or transgender persons) by both 
sides, with reports that the Maoists were abducting meti and the 
police were taking advantage of the counter-terrorism environment 
to attack meti as part of a “cleansing” of Nepali society. A recent 
report by Amnesty International exemplifies the extent to which 
women may be targeted by all entities, noting that in Iraq, “crimes 
specifically aimed at women and girls, including rape, have been 
committed by members of Islamist armed groups, militias, Iraqi 
government forces, foreign soldiers within the US-led 
Multinational Force, and staff of foreign private military security 
contractors.707  
  
Otto traces the reception of Scheinin’s report at the GA Third Committee through the lens 
of Puar’s work, linking the global “queering” of “terrorism”, and terrorizing queers, all in the 
service of global security agendas that link the authoritarianism of homophobic and sexualized 
counter terrorism with the terrorists such actions are meant to counter. Otto articulates, a succinct 
Puarian formulation of the GA’s reception of Scheinin’s report, which I quote at length as proxy 
for the events Flinterman discussed in his interview with me: 
The reception to his report can be read as a single story of an 
intractable divide between liberal and illiberal states, between 
civilisation and barbarity, and between freedom and tyranny. 
However, I have argued that the tale can also be read in a number 
of other ways, which make visible new opportunities for queering 
international law, as well as their attendant paradoxes. Another 
reading of the struggle over the meaning of ‘gender’ is made 
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possible by its resonance with the imperial tropes of perversely 
gendered and sexualised colonial peoples used to legitimate the 
‘civilising mission’, which would interpret illiberality alternatively 
as resistance to western hegemony. A different reading of the 
refusal of hostile states to use the identity categories of sexual 
pride and liberation makes visible the spaces left for gender and 
sexual freedoms beyond the domesticating reaches of the law. It 
creates another opportunity to undertake the important work of 
seeing how discursive and performative practices give meaning to 
gender and sexuality in specific social and cultural contexts, and 
resist the emergence of new paralysing dichotomies between the 
west and the rest.708 
   
These same politics and proxy wars through sexuality and gender identity, as Flinterman 
alludes, plagued the CEDAW committee as it attempted to craft General Recommendation 28, 
Article 18 on intersectionality. When I asked the Committee members I interviewed for the 
source of the delay between the 2000 CERD General Recommendation acknowledging the 
gender dimensions of racial discrimination, and the 2010 CEDAW General Recommendation 28 
on intersectionality, the issue of embedding lesbian and trans rights into the definition of gender 
protection as an imperative was invariably cited as the element that slowed the progress of the 
interpretation.  Silvia Pimentel recalls: 
But what is important, I was from the working group, and I told 
Cees Flinterman and he was very open. And I told, Cees please, 
let’s not push too much to the committee to approve this without  
[bangs the table] the insertion of the issue of the rights of the 
LGBT people.709 
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At the same time as the Arab League and the Argentina group of states were battling 
about LGBT rights at the General Assembly, and Martin Scheinin was weathering a storm of 
controversy over his report on the links between human rights abuses of LGBT in the name of 
terror as well as counter-terrorism, the small committee at CEDAW, charged with crafting its 
first direction on intersectionality—10 years after CERD crafted an essentially intersectional 
recommendation without expressly using the word—ground to a halt under the protest of a 
coalition of members allegedly brought together by the member of the Committee from Egypt.  
One of the most compelling opponents of an explicit reference to 
gender identity and sexual orientation, in the context of this 
particular general recommendation, was [the member] from 
Egypt.710  
And: 
It was interesting maybe to note that uh a colleague, I love her a lot 
... she’s from Algeria … she was … she and the colleagues, the 
Muslim colleagues … yes, was the most most confront[ational], no 
doubt, no doubt… But not only them, in the beginning, also, 
colleagues from Europe711… 
 
This account of the slow progress of the adoption of intersectionality for the legitimacy it 
loaned LGBT rights, underscores the microcosmic effects within CEDAW of the battles being 
waged globally and through the General Assembly. In one member’s recollection, Egypt 
becomes Algeria (although there were members from both states at that time on CEDAW, the 
Algerian colleague was not cited by others recalling this incident), and the drama at the General 
Assembly between the Arab league and Argentina is seen to play out in CEDAW’s midst.  
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During this period, a confrontation with Committee members from Muslim majority states plays 
out directly mirroring the more overtly political battles waged in the General Assembly. So much 
so, that the final success of intersectionality as a harbinger of LGBT rights is attributed to the 
absence of the member ascribed responsibility for carrying on this mirrored campaign: 
She was away for some time during that last session that I attended 
and so she was not able then to express her opposition once again 
and to find any sort of coalition against the adoption of the General 
Recommendation or what was also being discussed at the time, to 
have the footnote to the recommendation on the issue, making it 
clear that some members of the committee opposed an explicit 
reference to gender identity and sexual orientation.712  
 
Thus, in exploring the main tool of backward-facing consolidation at CEDAW—the 
General Recommendation 28, in which Article 18 outlines the Committee’s approach to 
intersectionality—a further twist of embedding the controversially new within the consolidation 
of the status quo, emerges. This reflects the paradoxes I traced through the literature on 
intersectionality in Chapter 1—what I referred to as the aporetic nature of feminist engagements 
with the law more generally. At this level, feminist governance is by its very nature a complex 
and often contradictory enterprise, using the instruments of power to extend freedoms.713 In this 
case, intersectionality does the work of extending gender protections to those whose identity as 
women challenges the very core of fixed gender identity, and yet its proponents attribute the 
resistance to this to part of a fixed notion of culture:  
We are seeing entrenched positions as far as gender roles and 
norms are concerned. It [intersectionality] names race, class, 
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ethnicity, gender identity, which is a flashpoint for countries and 
the committee as well. It names it and makes clear an obligation 
for the state. … We see push-back on the basis of culture and 
religion, from states but also within the committee.714 
 
As we have seen, objections to the extension of human rights’ protections of LGBT 
people can be usefully seen as “as a conscious political strategy often unrelated to substantial 
local demands for political rights”,715 and therefore a further example of how the reified and 
timeless notion of “culture” does the dirty work of contested temporal politics in human rights 
discourse, evoking “a ‘spectral’ sexuality” locally, “[e]mbedded in Western imaginaries, but 
exported and adopted alongside economic and technological practices”.716 The interviews 
certainly bore this analysis out: 
There [are] sometimes, also in my opinion, too ambitious 
proposals in the fora of the United Nations, relating to the whole 
issue of gender identity and sexual orientation. Which had this 
somewhat negative effect, as if, some of my colleagues from 
Islamic countries had a feeling that once again they are being told 
by western experts what to do in this respect.717  
 
In this way, as I examined in the previous chapters, homophobia is not so much cultural, 
as something that “brings to mind a range of ‘globalized localisms’ […] that arise in the West 
but grow roots in the rhetoric and policies of powerful actors much farther afield.”718 Resistance 
to the rights of women and LGBT peoples becomes an entrenched expression of resistance to 
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globalism, cosmopolitanism and the remaking of the world in the image of the idealized 
cosmopolitan western individual, while the promotion of these rights by other states (as opposed 
to grass roots activism, which “fosters alternatives to state-centered configurations of sexual 
justice”719) is steeped in hypocrisy inherent to the claim by the West/Global North/First World to 
have achieved them. In the words of one of my informants: 
and then, I find, you see this also with sexual orientation but...how 
much of the motivation behind protecting women’s rights and 
protecting against discrimination based on sexual orientation in the 
global sphere is a cultural way of picking the weakest points, of 
some of these countries to say that they’re superior. […] there is 
this cultural superiority in human rights generally......it’s exactly, 
[a] colonial mindset… the ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ world. And 
also... ‘well we can go and bomb you, and we can commit awful 
atrocities, but we have to grab hold of something to make us feel 
good’. 720 
 
Diane Otto, citing Jasbir Puar’s work, observes this very same phenomenon in the pithy 
assessment that: “sexual liberalism has emerged as a new marker of civilisational superiority.”721 
Both Christine (Cricket) Keating, and Jasbir Puar, comment on the stance of superiority 
vis-à-vis LGBTI rights, and the alliance-building strategies of the states that deploy it; Keating 
specifically developing it under the title of State “homoprotectionsim”,722 while Puar is more 
interested in “homonationalism”.723 They see it not as an opposite to state homophobia we have 
been tracing in the literature, but rather its counterweight, deeply entwined with it, stating that 
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“these two approaches are closely linked and that political authorities rely on a complex interplay 
of both approaches in order to mobilize consent (or at least to minimize dissent).”724  
As we saw in Weiss and Bosia’s work, homophobia is one of the  
typical tools for building an authoritative notion of national 
collective identity, for impeding oppositional or alternative 
collective identities that might or might not relate to sexuality, for 
mobilizing around a variety of contentious issues and empowered 
actors, and as a metric of transnational institutional and ideological 
flows.725 
 
For Puar, it is even more deeply implicated in the national security agendas of the 
dominant western states, such as the United States, (Canada, although not named by her) and 
Europe. In her reading, these state manufacture “queer consent”, a specific form of LGBT racism 
founded on “queer Islamophobia”, by citing the specter of the Muslim terrorist homophobe, and 
positioning themselves as homoprotectionist allies in their full security regalia.726 These dramas 
are not just nationally orchestrated, but are played out to best effect on the world stage. Human 
rights protections are quite clearly the currency in circulation for these “wars”. Keating argues 
that the notion of homoprotectionism plays a similar role—sometimes at the same time as—state 
homophobia, in “consolidating collaborations on which state power rests”.727 It is, like state 
homophobia, instrumental and purposive, serving to “legitimate political authority on both a 
national and transnational scale”.728  
                                                 
 
724 Keating, supra note 174 at 246–247. 
725 Weiss & Bosia, supra note 157 at 3. 
726 Puar, supra note 23. 
727 Keating, supra note 174 at 248. 
728 Ibid. 
189 
Exploring the very dynamics my informant speaks of, Keating observes the 2011 speech 
by Hilary Clinton on International Human Rights Day, in which Clinton positions the US in what 
Keating terms “classic homoprotectionist terms”, positioning “the state as the vehicle for anti-
homophobic social transformation, arguing that ‘progress comes from changes in laws. … Laws 
change, then people will’”. Even while criticizing states that engage in homophobic abuses, 
Keating argues Clinton’s speech “occludes state homophobia as a mode of governance”, 
redirecting responsibility to “the way that the people use ‘religious or cultural values as a reason 
to violate or not to protect the human rights of LGBT citizens.’”729  
It is important to counter-weigh this cynical bartering of the protection of some 
vulnerable groups as pawns for the dehumanization of others in states’ larger struggles for 
power. Clarifying the terms of a structural approach to intersectionality and to its inclusion of 
religion and belief may help widen the view of what is at stake. It bears repeating here that 
despite, or perhaps because of the instrumental manipulation of human rights in wider economies 
of dominance and security, clarity about the interdependence and mutually reinforcing nature of 
all human rights is particularly important. In the face of world-stage posturing embedded in 
security agendas that in their totality undermine human rights for all, “it remains important not to 
turn concrete conflicts between human rights issues into an abstract antagonism on the normative 
level itself.”730 Much of what is laid at the feet of religion, on both sides of the binaries that 
instrumentalize it, is simply not attributable to a human rights reality: “FORB is a right like any 
other. FORB is neither a right of ‘religion’ as such nor an instrument for support of religiously 
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phrased reservations and limitations on women’s [or others’] rights to equality.”731 In the view of 
Beilefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener, as we saw in Chapter I, intersectionality must be expansive 
enough in its grasp of these wider aims of states and global trends to hold the protections of 
FORB and sexuality and sexual identity in its grasp.732 In her own work, Ghanea is at pains to 
underscore that it is “essential to (re)vitalize the synergies between FORB and women’s equality 
in order to advance each of these rights, to be able to address overlapping rights concerns, and to 
adequately acknowledge intersectional claims”.733  
Keating concludes that “[b]oth homophobic and homoprotectionist approaches to 
governance are deeply imbricated in processes of colonialism, neocolonialism, and capitalist 
globalization”, and that there is a “close relation of homophobia with formulations of power 
within and between states that continue to privilege the Global North over the Global South”; in 
short, “[l]ike homophobia, current homoprotectionist discourses and policies are also deeply 
linked to and embedded in inequitable global relations of power.”734 
In a less legalistic or scholarly context, the forgoing struggles being waged in and 
through LGBT rights can be seen plainly in the official UN representations of them: the 
opposition of culture, religion, traditions and rights; the “traditionalist” State homophobia 
juxtaposition of “real” human rights and these “abominations” (spectral sexuality); the global 
economic system of tying human rights’ achievements to the support by rich states of poor 
states: 
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The United Nations and some Western nations are urging African 
governments to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered 
(LGBT) rights. But recent decisions by the US and UK to tie those 
rights to foreign funding has had unintended consequences on the 
continent. 
 
In reaction, homophobia is now on the rise in Africa, and much of 
it is state-generated. Several African leaders have instructed law 
makers to stiffen laws against same-sex acts and same-sex 
marriage. 
… 
Ambassador Fode Seck of Senegal, as leader of the Africa group at 
the council, refuted the notion that gay rights are part of global 
human rights: “We categorically reject all attempts to hijack the 
international human rights system by imposing social concepts or 
norms, in particular certain behaviours, that have no legal grounds 
in the human rights debate. Such an initiative would be perceived 
as a flagrant disrespect for the universality of human rights”. 
… 
According to Navi Pillay, the human rights commissioner, such 
incidents constitute a grave human rights challenge that the council 
has a duty to address. “As always, people are entitled to their 
opinion,” she said. “They are free to disapprove of same-sex 
relationships, for example … [and] they have an absolute right to 
believe and follow in their own lives whatever religious teachings 
they choose. But that is as far as it goes. The balance between 
tradition and culture on the one hand and universal human rights 
on the other must be struck in favour of human rights”.735 
 
This passage illustrates what Weiss and Bosia contend in their volume, that positioning 
the protection of LGBT people as caught in the see-saw of polarities between culture and 
tradition on the one hand, and human rights on the other, continues to stunt the analysis and 
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accurate observation of the true vectors of power and influence; occluding state maneuvering in 
Keating’s sense, and, in Orford’s, the exercise of international authority—both of which travel 
along these well-worn, trope-littered pathways. In the complex history of the present, the self-
representation of the most virulent forms of homophobia marshaled in national contexts (most 
often) have their basis in ideologies imported through western religions, in either the colonial or 
neocolonial contexts, and sometimes both. Neocolonial policies likewise marshal 
homoprotectionist narratives to consolidate both state power and international dominance, and 
what at first seems an opposite position, comes, in Keating’s analysis, as linked:  
A first link between them is that state homophobic rhetoric and 
policy help shape the “traditionalist” politics that are the object of 
state homoprotectionist intervention. Second, although one 
approach or the other might be rhetorically dominant, both 
approaches are often concurrently pursued. Finally, both 
approaches help foster alliances that help to bolster state power.736  
 
Keating points to the internal hypocrisy of the states that operate the agenda of 
homoprotectionism, in much the way one of my informants did above. As he said to me:  
And it’s the mauvais foi,737 of a lot of the arguments behind it … 
it’s so flagrant … Because, quite frankly 20 years ago … actually, 
10 years ago! I mean the US in 2004 was voting against…738 
 
As Keating explains, 
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While homophobic rhetoric and policy are geared toward 
engendering the collaboration of dominant groups, 
homoprotectionism works to garner support from those who hope 
to put the state in the service of reform, obscuring the ways that the 
state helped to generate sexual hierarchies and its own stake 
(sometimes submerged) in their continuation.739 
 
Several members of the CEDAW Committee mentioned their own imbrication in the 
(global) battle between states conducted through these issues, and carried out within the 
discussions at committee level; most identified a layered, overlapping and ambivalent 
relationship with the state’s positioning of itself and their indebtedness to the state for their 
nominations:  
All of us are government approved. My nomination was put 
forward by a ministry.740 
 
This is played out in the tensions the Committee members experience between their role 
as state-approved members of what is at its core an agreement among and between states, and the 
potential of their role to hold states accountable to advance civil society and activist critiques of 
state policy and conduct. Committee members are aware of being part of the contradictory 
statecraft conducted through the instrumentalization of women’s rights and the LGBTI human 
rights debate that we have explored above, and that Halley et al explore as “governance 
feminism”.741 As Sally Merry has noted, “[t]he human rights system challenges states authority 
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over their citizens at the same time as it reinforces states power: both agent of reform and 
culpable if not a direct violator.742 As Silvia Pimentel discussed with me: 
I am here just because the Brazilian NGOs indicate my name to the 
government. … So, what I would like to say is that really I don't 
know if I have, ahem, a wrong perspective because I feel myself as 
NGO, but I believe really that the main force, yes? here in the 
United Nations human rights system, that this what goes forward 
not only in the case of the CEDAW but the other committees on 
human rights...the nine committees um is the force the presence in 
each tied more close of the NGOs…and this is interesting. Because 
we know that… this received direct responses from the states. 
Because there are some states that really are very [uncomfortable] 
by the presence of the NGOs. And we listened the frequently 
[frequently hear that] that we should be very careful with 
alternative sources ... so it’s interesting this how to say, tension 
between … The State parties … And the civil society … but of 
course not all state parties, not all state parties. Some state parties; 
it’s interesting. Interesting. And this reflects of course inside the 
committee sometimes.743 
 
Or, as one member put it, more simply:  
On the Committee, we go into blocks for and against, with those 
who broker the discussion between.744 
 
The interviews with informants confirm that there is little doubt that intersectionality is 
experienced as one of the vectors along which these global dynamics travel. We have seen that 
those who use it reflect on its existence along multiple lines: as conceptual tool, as conduit of 
global debate and contention, as consolidator of existing practice and the advancement or 
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extension of the same in new ways. It is likewise a legitimation in all these contexts and put to all 
these uses, for the articulation of new areas of rights protections and to hold states accountable 
by national actors.  
Intersectionality and GR 28 give me a threshold I can push back 
with my government. We can use our government’s ratification to 
say ‘you must find a place within [Religion] not to exclude’. It 
gives us leverage.745 
 
This mirrors Merry’s findings that national women’s groups find that international human 
rights “provide social movements a kind of global law ‘from below’: a form of cosmopolitan law 
that subalterns can use to challenge their subordinate position”.746 The complex chemistry 
between states, national civil society groups, INGOs, and the CEDAW Committee members that 
is evidenced during the state reporting sessions and during individual communications that I 
have referenced in this chapter, reveals a microcosm of the broader themes explored in the 
literature, including that by Merry, Orford, Weiss and Bosia, as well as Keating. The exchanges I 
am scrutinizing reveal the vectors of global inequality and their discontents, the 
instrumentalization of human rights, the identification of state homophobia and state 
homoprotectionism and all that this entails; in short, the reinterpretation of past obligations of the 
treaty, gathered under new nomenclature and put to new uses in the present. For instance, in my 
interview with her, Ruth Halpern-Kaddari traces some of these byways: 
I clearly remember that the critique brought by NGOs, that country 
which I don’t remember what it was but it was exactly based on 
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[…] that the law, or even the constitution...like it demanded 
bringing separate cases—discrimination based on “A” 
discrimination based on “B”...and did not allow the concept of one 
claim, which is the intersection...747 
 
The question that remains is what light can this complex deployment of 
intersectionality’s life at CEDAW shed on the decisions made by committee members with 
respect to States parties’ obligations? Are there material impacts one can point to that result from 
CEDAW’s adoption of intersectionality? Acknowledging the imperial phantoms, facile 
polarities, global inequities and legal vagueness that travel along with intersectionality in its life 
as international human rights law, what can we expect from its implementation? In the next 
chapter, I turn to the decisions made by the CEDAW Committee in light of intersectionality’s 
implementation as a framing approach to Article 2 of the treaty, which outlines states’ 
obligations.
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5 Intersectionality and Consciousness of Itself in the 
CEDAW Jurisprudence 
 
Take for example the communication I sent under the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. I died in court that day the rapist 
was acquitted. But the knowledge that there was recourse to justice 
outside of Philippine courts brought me back to life. … In 
subsequent years there was a series of exchange[s] between my 
lawyers and representatives of the government of the Philippines. 
…The official stand of the Philippine government was that it was 
not obligated by the views of CEDAW… .748 
 
[I]nternational law has long been a methodologically unique and 
theoretically engaged field of law. It articulates a horizontal, rather 
than vertical, normativity in which there is no universal sovereign. 
Its traditional sources bind it to the reality of inter-state relations, 
yet it is also meant to constrain and configure those relations. 
Dispute resolution in international law inevitably also raises 
questions about the grounds of jurisdiction and the particular 
normativity that is to apply in a given situation.749 
 
National courts continue to struggle on how to properly evaluate 
and take account of the qualitatively different intersectional 
discrimination […]. At the same time, the CEDAW Committee has 
quietly been transcending these challenges and pioneering a 
promising approach to protecting women with multiple and 
intersecting identities against discrimination.750 
 
For us the concept [of intersectionality] is extremely useful 
because it helps understand that... it’s not just an addition of 
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problems and discrimination, I mean, you sort of add this and that 
[otherwise].751 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The extent to which a profound reworking of the limitations of women’s 
international human rights that I have traced in previous chapters has translated into the 
knowledge and practice of the Committee’s decision-making, is a matter for examination 
to which I now turn.  
In order to explore the Committee’s decision-making in light of intersectionality, I 
note its transformation from the various iterations explored in previous chapters—where 
intersectionality appears as discourse in UN documents (Chapter 3), as a metaphor for 
domestic human rights critiques (Chapter 1), as a concept in sociological and activist 
legal analysis (Chapter 1), and as an heuristic device for theoretical examination of the 
dynamics of power (Chapters 1 and 4)—to its role as a legal tool in international 
jurisprudence. To clarify the role intersectionality plays at CEDAW, I will briefly 
recapitulate and augment matters referred to in Chapters 2 and 3, regarding the decision-
making powers of the Committee. The comments, pronouncements and decisions of the 
Committee are both circumscribed by the legal bounds of the treaty system and extend 
legal meaning and authority through their role as authoritative interpretations in 
international human rights law. 
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5.2 Background to treaty body decision-making 
Like other treaties, CEDAW is constructed of a self-limiting proposition: the 
international human rights treaty system is an agreement among states to be held to the 
ratified terms of each treaty by a fraternity of mutual obligation, legally accountable to 
each other only by each other. As we saw in the previous chapter, international law is “a 
form of law conceived to represent, constitute, and govern the modern system of 
territorially based nation-states, [and has] has always been seen both as a function of the 
powers that be and as governing those powers…”.752 In this context, the treaty 
committees play a role as both authority on the interpretation of the treaty and an 
appeaser to states parties, encouraging the fulfillment of the obligations. The ultimate 
legal authority that binds states is one of mutual agreement between the states 
themselves.  
In Chapter 2, I explored the limits to the universality of obligations as evidenced 
by the reservation system, which allows states to reserve those aspects of a treaty that it 
determines do not apply to its context. Despite legal limits on the nature of those 
obligations, recourse by the Committee to enforce those limits are circumscribed to 
dialogue and “constructive engagement”, a notion and approach to international human 
rights enforcement explored further below. In the previous chapter, I explored the role of 
the individual committee members charged with the responsibility to administer this form 
of law, and, within its terms, oversee states’ compliance; I outlined their relationship to 
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state authority and how intergovernmental and global politics affect their decision-
making and independence.  
Nonetheless, the Committee’s pronouncements on the proper interpretation of the 
treaty play a quasi-judicial role, with the mechanism for individual communications in 
particular, creating human rights jurisprudence (if practically non-binding).753 The 
Committee’s interpretation of the treaty is collectively made up of the “language of the 
article in question and the general recommendations [GRs], concluding observations 
[COs] and case law under the Optional Protocol, through which the Committee has 
interpreted and applied the Convention”.754 While traditional legal hierarchy sees the 
individual communications as the authoritative or jurisprudential aspect of treaty 
decision-making, such legalistic valorizations obscure the central role that social context 
and public policy outcomes—or systemic change—play in distinguishing the 
advancement of intersectionality from other approaches to discrimination. Since the 
Committee placed its interpretation of intersectionality at the heart of state obligations as 
set out in Article 2 of the treaty, concluding observations and special inquiry, which lie at 
the heart of the “constructive dialogue” process (explained further below), will therefore 
form a measure of the impact of the treaty’s understanding of intersectionality. Thus, it is 
to a mix of these pronouncements I will turn in determining the place that 
intersectionality now occupies at CEDAW.  
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As I set out in Chapter 2, at the time of this writing, 189 countries have ratified 
CEDAW, while 109 have signed its 1999 Optional Protocol.755 This latter fortification of 
the treaty was seen to address its relative weaknesses in comparison to other human rights 
treaties, and brought it in line with other human rights mechanisms, by allowing those 
individuals or groups of individuals residing in states that have signed, ratified or acceded 
it to bring forward claims once domestic remedies have been exhausted. The seven UN 
member states that have not ratified or acceded to the convention are Iran, Nauru, Palau, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, and the United States (which signed the Convention on 17 July 
1980).756 Beyond the adjudication of individual cases, it additionally grants the 
Committee the power to conduct inquiries into situations of grave or systematic 
violations of women’s human rights.757  
As with all UN bodies excepting the Security Council, enforcement of its terms is 
restricted to the moral suasion inherent in being part of an international community, and 
the relative power that inheres therein.758 Individual representations and the conclusions 
and recommendations the Committee draws from them, are the case law of the treaty, 
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although they are neither the only, nor the primary, means through which States parties 
are held to account for their adherence to the terms of the treaty; rather:  
Countries who have become party to the treaty (States 
parties) are obliged to submit regular reports to the 
Committee on how the rights of the Convention are 
implemented. During its sessions the Committee considers 
each State party report and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of 
concluding observations.759 
 
Put another way, “the primary role of all the committees … is to review the 
reports submitted periodically by State parties in accordance with the treaties’ 
provisions”.760 In this respect, the notion of “constructive dialogue” characterizes the 
Committee’s engagement with States parties: all signatories are obligated to send high 
level state representatives to the international forum overseen by the Committee of 
experts that administers that the treaty to attend “a rigorous, but constructive, dialogue on 
the state of human rights implementation in their countries”.761  
In this process with the Committee of experts, States parties submit a report in 
advance; “[t]he reports must set out the legal, administrative and judicial measures taken 
by the State to give effect to the treaty, and should also mention any factors or difficulties 
encountered in implementing the rights.”762 The Committee examines the report and 
structures its questions based on this report in relation to the past COs, which would have 
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entailed recommendations for implementation towards “progressive realization” of 
compliance with the treaty, testing for advances on past concerns. Progressive realization 
is a principle “requiring that there must be a continuous, gradual improvement in the 
realization of … rights by virtue of taking concrete steps to the maximum of their 
available resources”; its grounding as a principle is traced to Article 2 of the ICESAR.763   
The Committee also relies on the “alternative” reports and dialogue with civil 
society organizations (CSOs), where active, from the national context of the reporting 
state. Civil society is defined as “organizations and individuals that voluntarily engage in 
public participation and action around shared interests, purposes or values that are 
compatible with the goals of the United Nations”.764 Often they are human rights 
defenders, NGOs, and individuals. Where there are no active civil society groups, and/or 
where there is repression of the same, alternate processes are put in place, for instance 
accepting reports through INGOs such as Amnesty International, and providing 
anonymity for national activists and NGOs by holding in-camera meetings without 
naming sources, a process I witnessed in my research during the fall 2016 session of 
CEDAW with the reporting process for Belarus. As mentioned in the previous chapter, I 
attended the opening of the 65th Session of CEDAW (October 24–November 18, 2016). 
The Committee’s concluding observations to the Belarus report, explored below, make 
express reference to the dangerous context for human rights defenders and NGOs.765 
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Meghan Campbell’s work has shown that “state report and civil society 
organization submissions to the CEDAW Committee in the periodic reporting process are 
influential in ensuring an issue is included in the concluding observations”.766 Non-
governmental organizations are not parties to the treaty, and so their role is restricted to 
contributing  
to the discussion of lists of issues, lists of issues prior to 
reporting, as well as to the constructive dialogue with the 
State party concerned, and to the adoption of 
recommendations. Their submissions enable committees to 
put the human rights situation in the State party in context. 
These organizations also follow up the national 
implementation of the recommendations of treaty bodies 
and can report on its success or failure.767 
 
Constructive dialogue acknowledges, “the treaty bodies are not judicial bodies 
(even if some of their functions are quasi-judicial), but are created to review the 
implementation of the treaties”.768 In short, the treaty bodies have no ability to compel 
states to implement their recommendations except through a dialogue that can escalate in 
tone and record states’ implementation shortcomings in concluding observations.  
5.3 Method for selecting CEDAW decisions 
In exploring what patterns there are to be traced through the decisions of the 
CEDAW Committee that relate to its adoption of intersectionality, Meghan Campbell’s 
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work is ground breaking. In her 2015 piece referenced elsewhere in this dissertation,769 
Campbell assesses CEDAW’s application of intersectionality through its general 
recommendations, inquiry procedure, individual communications and COs. She 
specifically does so through examining how the Committee deals with the intersection of 
poverty, race and gender. She concludes, “there are a number of inconsistencies in how 
the CEDAW Committee applies intersectional discrimination”.770 She says by way of 
example that “even when the CEDAW Committee expresses concern on women’s 
intersectional discrimination, it does not consistently follow this up with a tailored 
recommendation”.771 In her conclusions, she calls for, among other things, a general 
recommendation on intersectionality, as part of a more focused approach to directing 
states in this way. It is not clear why Campbell does not consider GR 28 to be “on” 
intersectionality; perhaps it is because of its thin theoretical grounding. Nonetheless, 
since she has written her piece, additional GRs, as well as COs and individual 
communications, have entered the record.   
Given my research directly with committee members, and the augmented record 
of interpretation, I will turn my attention to this new terrain with questions similar to 
Campbell’s but tempered by intervening events and information. First, as background, I 
will explore the embellishment of the Committee’s understanding of intersectionality as 
revealed in the new GR 35. I will follow this with a method that uses a search-based 
examination of all COs and individual communications since 2010 that deal with the 
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terms “intersectionality”; “multiple discrimination”; “compound discrimination” and 
“aggravated discrimination”.772  
As we have seen from the literature explored in relation to the specific legal 
connotations of intersectionality, these proxy terms are often used synonymously with it. 
In light of the striking role played by the extension of gender protections to the categories 
of gender identity and sexual orientation in both the augmentation of intersectionality in 
and since GR 28, and in the minds of and dynamics between the CEDAW decision-
makers, my analysis will also track the search terms “sexual minorities”, “sexual 
identity”, “sexual orientation” and related terms, such as “LGBTI”, “lesbian” and 
“bisexual”. It is worth noting that, perhaps because of the novelty of the express inclusion 
of these rights in the protection of women under the concept of intersectionality, sexual 
identity, sexual orientation and sexual minority rights were not identified in the 
Individual Communications of CEDAW that I reviewed; they rather come up in the COs 
of the Committee. This makes sense since the constructive dialogue with States parties is 
much more fluid and dynamic process, fed by the on-the-ground conditions identified by 
activist groups and NGOs, whereas individual communication, like litigation, is a multi-
year process, where sometimes a decade may have passed since the original harm being 
identified was alleged to have taken place. As the recognition of these rights is still 
emerging, the infractions would not have been identified a decade earlier.  
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Where method and substance come together is in examining how these terms, as 
the Committee employs them, bear up to the conceptual, rather than purely semantic 
distinctions I have laid out in previous chapters. Of particular interest will be the 
Committee’s ability to account for structural discrimination and remediation in its 
application of the terms, as I found this a central aspect of intersectionality’s unique 
contribution to anti-discrimination law. In light of this core intersectional marker, I will 
be asking if the Committee is able to offer a focus that moves from the grounds-based 
and comparator-ensnared notion of additive discriminations, and instead recasts 
discriminations as mutually constitutive.  
Following the analyses carried out throughout the other chapters of the 
dissertation, I additionally will be watchful for the ways that the shadow of imperialism 
persists in deliberations and decision-making, making special note of the work culture is 
made to do in the decisions I am analyzing. In this way, I will assess the degree to which 
intersectionality is an answer to Orford’s question guiding this dissertation. 
5.4 CEDAW from 2010 onward 
As we have explored, the international legal method of creating precedent and 
building law from it shares some basic structures with the principles that inhere to 
common law. In the case of IHRL, the committees charged with administering the 
obligations under the treaty build on their prior de facto decisions to create guidance for 
the future interpretation of states obligations under the treaty document. As I cited earlier, 
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this has been characterized as a “broad remedial approach to interpretation”,773 or in 
Orford’s less technical and more critical sense, an integration of “pre-existing but 
dispersed practices”774 into “a coherent account”775 that justify and articulate its authority 
in the present. I will test the employment of the concepts noted above in the individual 
communications that come after GR 28, which introduced intersectionality as an 
approach to Article 2—that is as a core aspect of state obligations. Where the interviews 
of committee members speak directly to the types of decisions I am examining, they too 
will be examined and weighed. At the conceptual level, the most express development of 
the Committee’s reflections on intersectionality since 2010 come in the form of an 
additional General Recommendation, GR 35. I will consider this first, as it articulates the 
Committee’s consciousness of itself in relation to its decision-making and authority, 
casting its own retrospective consideration of how its current decisions under the banner 
of intersectionality consolidate what it has always already done.  
5.5 General Recommendation 35 
Having had the interval since the writing of GR 28 in 2010 to reflect on the role 
of intersectionality in its decision-making, the Committee has issued the following 
summary of its self-assessment of the meaning of intersectionality in its jurisprudential 
deliberations within the context of an overall update on its seminal GR 19, on violence 
against women. The Committee’s conclusion on this matter builds on GR 28 
significantly, stating that their subsequent work, 
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…confirms that discrimination against women is 
inextricably linked to other factors that affect their lives. 
The Committee’s jurisprudence highlights that these may 
include ethnicity/race, indigenous or minority status, 
colour, socioeconomic status and/or caste, language, 
religion or belief, political opinion, national origin, marital 
and/or maternal status, age, urban/rural location, health 
status, disability, property ownership, being lesbian, 
bisexual, transgender or intersex, illiteracy, trafficking of 
women, armed conflict, seeking asylum, being a refugee, 
internal displacement, statelessness, migration, heading 
households, widowhood, living with HIV/AIDS, 
deprivation of liberty, being in prostitution, geographical 
remoteness and stigmatisation of women fighting for their 
rights, including human rights defenders.776   
 
The elaboration of intersectionality in this GR advances and details the 
intersections under consideration considerably since the 2010 guidance of GR 28, 
recalling the questions in Chapter 1 about the ontological and epistemological scope of 
what is captured by an intersectional approach. This formulation of the intersections 
under consideration in the above-sited article risks, in the words of one of the CEDAW 
members, adding “this and that”.777  
As Yuval-Davis cautioned, while it is true “that each social division has a 
different ontological basis, which is irreducible to other social divisions”, it is equally 
important to “acknowledge that, in concrete experiences of oppression, being oppressed 
… is always constructed and intermeshed in other social divisions”.778 She warns against 
a “fragmentation and multiplication of the wider categorical identities rather than 
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[accounting for] more dynamic, shifting and multiplex constructions of 
intersectionality”.779  
Human rights defenders and those caught up in armed conflict surely experience 
discrimination, but for properties that are not inherent to their natality,780 and are 
therefore not experiencing discrimination that is of the same ontological inescapability 
and intersectional categorization as the properties of being racialized, born to a caste, or 
LGBTI. Does this laundry list of personal characteristics proffered in GR 35 rise to 
Yuval-Davis’ challenge above, to account for the “dynamic, shifting and multiplex 
constructions of intersectionality”?781  Does it weaken the concept of human rights as a 
legal protection to expand its contextual reach? Does discrimination ultimately require a 
“ground” to make sense of its impact and portent, such that we can distinguish between 
that which is an aspirational policy outcome and that which is a legal, and therefore 
justiciable concept?   
These matters came up in my discussion with my informants in several ways, but 
most precisely in the interview with Simon Walker: 
I can see the risk with the extending grounds...[but I see it] 
slightly differently…Obviously…the reason is, even if 
someone is suffering discrimination, then whatever the 
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grounds is then it’s … that’s the focus. It’s a differential 
unjustifiable treatment… . 
I could see the problem with the grounds … I mean I don't 
have a problem with including age, for example, disability 
has been added, sexual orientation has been added. There is 
a number … gender identity has been added. I worry 
maybe a bit more when people start adding … things which 
might not be inherent to the person, I know that’s a wobbly 
concept but, I’m trying to think of an example. I mean there 
is a tendency, let’s say, particularly in western societies that 
everything becomes discrimination. You know, 
discrimination against cyclists or something like that. It just 
happened that you decided to take your bike today rather 
than your car, you know, and that I think is weakening the 
concept.782  
 
In the context of CEDAW, which sets a bar of human rights protections and 
achievement through standards of law and policy to which states essentially hold 
themselves and others to account, the hard line between what is a legal concept and what 
is a preventative or ameliorative act of public policy is less related to a discernable 
“ground” than it is to an overall regard for the state of human rights protection, and the 
ability of all to access to the benefits of society. As Walker says, this has “less to do with 
the grounds of discrimination” per se, and rather, with the best way to “avoid violation” 
of the right in the first place.783  
In this way, CEDAW’s formulation in GR 35 begins to set out the social context 
or “background” discrimination we saw Crenshaw draw the UN’s attention to in cases of 
overt gross human rights violations: that is, recasting discrimination as a social process, 
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wherein an individual’s experience is unintelligible without the context of complex 
systemic and group disadvantage and exploitation. The concern with grounds over 
context characterizes discrimination as an aberration from the regular functioning of 
(assumedly non-discriminatory) social and institutional relations, framing it as a singular, 
discernable, legal phenomenon.  
In Chapter 3, I characterized the formulation of intersectionality in GR 28 Article 
18 as risking a neutering of the potency of intersectionality by characterizing it as an 
additional event of discrimination based on multiple and specific grounds, identities or 
vulnerabilities. In contrast, through the academic literature, we have seen that rather than 
being merely an additional ground, intersectionality is understood as an approach, a 
conceptualization and a frame of analysis that operates on many levels to challenge the 
very basis of traditional grounds-based conceptions of discrimination. From Crenshaw 
we learned that an important aspect of the intersectional turn is that it requires us to 
consider the structural and group identity aspects of discrimination, in addition to the 
vulnerabilities that attract the overt discrimination and marginalization of individuals. To 
Crenshaw, these form the background systems that sustain and maintain systems of 
subordination in a dynamic and ongoing way.  
In GR 35, CEDAW sets its sights on these systems. That is, the Committee is 
attempting to capture, in Crenshaw’s words, “both the structural and dynamic 
consequences of the interaction between two or more axis of subordination”, as well as 
“the manner in which racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other discriminatory 
systems create background inequalities that structure the relative positions of women, 
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races, ethnicities, classes, and the like”. 784 As I explore below, CEDAW’s grouping of 
conditions in GR 35 demonstrates a more advanced reckoning with the deeper analyses 
possible through intersectionality employed as an analytic tool by addressing “the way 
that specific acts and policies create burdens that flow along these axes constituting the 
dynamic or active aspects of disempowerment”.785 This is evident throughout the articles 
of the GR, which I explore in some detail below. 
In keeping with the thematic focus of this GR, the Committee reflects on the 
specific integration of intersectionality into its understanding of violence against women 
—or what it now refers to as gender-based violence: 
Accordingly, because women experience varying and 
intersecting forms of discrimination, which have an 
aggravating negative impact, the Committee acknowledges 
that gender-based violence may affect some women to 
different degrees, or in different ways, so appropriate legal 
and policy responses are needed.786 
 
Despite the disconnect I previously traced between CEDAW’s development of 
intersectionality and Crenshaw’s, the framing of intersectionality in this article echoes 
Crenshaw’s early accounts of violence against women from an intersectional perspective 
in the national context, as explored in Chapter 1: “the location of women of colour at the 
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intersection of race and gender makes our actual experience of domestic violence, rape 
and remedial reform qualitatively different from that of white women”.787 
The shift in the language from violence against women to gender-based violence 
in this GR, keeps pace with semantic changes elsewhere in the UN, but additionally, 
CEDAW specifies that this change allows them to focus attention on the structural 
aspects of violence. In paragraph 9, the Committee remedially expands its understanding 
of violence against women with the following: 
The concept of ‘violence against women’ in general 
recommendation No. 19 and other international instruments 
and documents has emphasised that this violence is gender-
based. Accordingly, this document uses the expression 
‘gender-based violence against women’, as a more precise 
term that makes explicit the gendered causes and impacts 
of the violence. This expression further strengthens the 
understanding of this violence as a social—rather than an 
individual—problem, requiring comprehensive responses, 
beyond specific events, individual perpetrators and 
victims/survivors.788  
 
In service to a thicker definition of intersectionality, we see the pattern I have 
traced throughout this dissertation of putting an old concept to new purpose in CEDAW’s 
articulation of its consciousness of itself. We have a clear articulation of violence, and 
therefore of the discrimination it represents, being a social, rather than individual 
problem, requiring comprehensive responses beyond individual events. In the following 
paragraph (10), this positioning of gender as a category that extends the view of structural 
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subordination is further articulated by categorizing gender-based violence as a 
“fundamental social, political and economic means by which the subordinate position of 
women with respect to men … is perpetuated”.789 Moreover, in answer to the question I 
posed about the relation of the “identity” traits CEDAW listed as part of intersectionality 
in the GR above, the following article expressly opens up the relation of women’s 
intersectional identities to structural violence with phrasing that is worth quoting in full: 
Gender-based violence against women is affected and often 
exacerbated by cultural, economic, ideological, 
technological, political, religious, social and environmental 
factors, as evidenced, among others, in the contexts of 
displacement, migration, increased globalization of 
economic activities including global supply chains, 
extractive and offshoring industry, militarisation, foreign 
occupation, armed conflict, violent extremism and 
terrorism. Gender-based violence against women is also 
affected by political, economic and social crises, civil 
unrest, humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, 
destruction or degradation of natural resources. Harmful 
practices and crimes against women human rights 
defenders, politicians, activists or journalists are also forms 
of gender-based violence.790 
 
Here CEDAW appears to face, head on, criticisms of feminist approaches to 
international law that contribute to the obfuscation of global inequalities and the 
structural sources for women’s intersectional subordination. Recalling Orford’s critique 
that “[a] feminist analysis of international law that focuses on gender alone, without 
analysing the exploitation of women in the economic ‘South’, would operate to reinforce 
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the depoliticized notion of difference that founds the privileged position of the imperial 
feminist,791 we can be encouraged by the manner in which these wider economic issues 
are explicitly articulated in GR 35. The mantle of intersectionality, as it is operating in 
the context of GR 35, appears to be facilitating an expansion of the field of the CEDAW 
Committee’s conceptualization of (women’s) international (human rights) law such that it 
is beginning to glimpse “the preservation and maintenance of a deeply unjust global 
order,”792 if not (yet) its own role in it. In GR 33, CEDAW recognizes the role of law in 
the intersectional subordination of women domestically.793  
With these two potential building blocks framed within an elaboration of an 
intersectional approach to women’s human rights—a recognition of an unjust global 
order and the recognition of the role domestic legal frameworks play in maintaining 
women’s oppression—the Committee appears both so close and so far from a recognition 
of its own structural positioning within the intersectional discrimination it seeks to 
unearth. Despite the contested nature of the concept and its uncertain application as I 
have traced so far, at least one of my informants believed that GR 28 paved the way for a 
more fully realized understanding of intersectionality in GRs 33 and 35: 
 
Since I joined, 28 and intersectionality is gaining. GR 33 
also reflects GR 28 article 18. [General Recommendation] 
28 gives us license in the drafting of 35 for non-derogation. 
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… Intersectionality compels you to do that deeper analysis. 
It helps recast the context.794 
 
Citing intersectionality as authority in this way, assisted this racialized committee 
member to articulate concerns that both her state, and her fellow committee members had 
previously dismissed —in particular, the extension of protections to LBT women.  
Turning to the deliberations and decisions of the Committee, we will trace this 
claim through the main activities of their interpretation, that is first through the 
concluding observations; then the individual communications, which most closely 
approximate what is traditionally understood in law to be jurisprudence; and then through 
a particular ground-breaking intersectional inquiry into grave and systemic violations 
which the Committee is authorized to initiate under Optional Protocol Article 8.795   
This latter inquiry brings to bear the confluence of an intersectional approach in 
the service of a critical analysis of neocolonial, systemic and racialized discrimination 
carried out by Canada, a state from the Global North that is generally seen to be a 
champion of gender protections in international law. As such, it goes some distance to 
answer Orford’s call to cease a pattern of savior white feminism implicated in the 
extension of empire,796 replacing it with an international approbation of a colonial state 
denying basic gender protections to an oppressed Indigenous population within its 
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borders. That the inquiry was expressly prompted by the request of domestic activist 
groups further evidences the links I traced earlier between the movement-based origins of 
intersectional critique and its uptake at CEDAW.797  
5.6 Individual communications post-2010 
As explored earlier in this chapter, individual communications are authorized 
under the Optional Protocol of CEDAW. They most closely approximate the 
jurisprudence of domestic systems, in that they allow for fact-specific interpretations of 
the treaty in comparison to claims made against State parties to the treaty by individuals 
claiming discrimination within the treaty’s terms after having exhausted domestic 
remedies. Like domestic case law, these cases take on the name(s) of the claimants, or as 
they are known in international human rights law, their authors. Decisions issued by the 
committees on individual communications are considered authoritative interpretations of 
the treaty’s articles and are most frequently categorized as its “jurisprudence”.  
In a broad-based approach to discerning the frequency of the terms associated 
with intersectional analysis in recent UN discourse explored in previous chapters, I 
conducted a search of the UNHROHC jurisprudence database. This indicated a broad 
deployment of the term “multiple discrimination”, with 37 instances concentrated in the 
individual representation findings of CCPR, CEDAW, CERD and the newly ratified 
CPRD.798 Both cases that were found to be inadmissible—that is, not considered on their 
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merits but rather technically disallowed from being heard or adjudicated by the 
Committee—and those cases for which a full hearing and decision were rendered, were 
included in this count. The states represented in the data range from Canada to Uruguay. 
A similar search for the use of the term intersectionality in the same database turns up a 
mere six references, the chronological first of which is in 2000, at CPRD. In that context, 
it was a word repeated in the decision of non-admissibility but quoted as submitted by the 
claimant, who saw his situation as arising at the “intersection of political opinion, race 
and religion”.799  
The Committee itself provides a survey of its deployment of intersectionality post 
GR 28 throughout GR 35. I will engage with this catalogue as an additional window into 
the committee’s self-understanding of its deployment of intersectionality, recalling that 
sometimes what at first seems a banal observation—intersectionality “might be used as 
its proponents were suggesting it should be used”800—is also a reflection of the 
Committee’s “consciousness of itself”. Put another way, CEDAW’s catalogue of 
intersectionality’s appearances in its previous decisions can reveal its method of 
consolidating and reassembling an intersectional approach over time and retrospectively. 
Taken both at face value and eyed critically, it is a glimpse into the Committee’s 
articulation and justification of its understanding of the concept of intersectionality in 
relation to its authority to determine the scope of gender protection and state obligation in 
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international human rights law. This fits squarely within the Orfordian approach to 
critical international legal method. 
With respect to individual communications, the Committee draws attention to 
Jallow v. Bulgaria, 2012;801 S.V.P. v. Bulgaria, 2012;802 Kell v. Canada, 2012;803 A.S. v. 
Hungary, 2006;804 and R. P. B. v. the Philippines, 2014,805 which I will examine in 
relation to the earlier famous GBV case of Karen Tayag Vertido v. the Philippines, 
2010.806 It also draws attention to M.W. v. Denmark, 2016,807 which I will explore below. 
I will briefly explore the decisions in these cases, before moving on to consider the 
concluding observations and then Special Inquiry, again following and updating those 
singled out by the Committee with more current decisions as well as decisions arising 
from reports I witnessed in 2016 during the 66th Session. As Canada’s inquiry follows 
GR 28, I will concentrate on this from among the two inquiries the Committee has 
conducted. 
5.6.1 Intersectionality as a factor in the individual communications 
decisions of the CEDAW Committee 
Recalling that “jurisprudence” proper—while rightfully a contested notion808—is, 
in the international human rights context, restricted to individual communications, I 
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began my search for authoritative interpretations of intersectionality in CEDAW through 
the jurisprudence database provided by the Office for the High Commission on Human 
Rights. Perhaps due to a cataloguing error,809 the only instance of the term 
intersectionality by name in CEDAW’s jurisprudence as catalogued in the UN’s 
jurisprudence database, cropped up in a 2016 dissenting opinion (a rare occurrence), in 
this case by Patricia Schulz (Switzerland), in M.W. v. Denmark.810 While the opinion is a 
dissent, it is worthy of our attention first because it is the only occurrence of the word 
intersectionality, and second because it articulates a desire to limit the Committee’s 
conceptualization of intersectional discrimination. In the space between the majority 
opinion and the dissent, the indeterminacy of the concept and role of intersectionality at 
CEDAW gets traced. The dissent echoes concerns Schulz shared with me regarding the 
possibility for intersectionality to blur rather than sharpen the Committee’s focus.  
Schulz finds, in a complex custody case involving two different national legal 
systems (Denmark and Austria) that had made contradictory custody decisions, that 
intersectional discrimination was not present, and that having it as a frame of reference, 
far from compelling the Committee to a deeper analysis, as referenced by another 
committee member above, propelled them to widely miss the mark. The majority held 
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that the author (in international human rights, claimants are called authors of the petition) 
“suffered discrimination as a foreign mother”, citing its recollection “that discrimination 
against women on the basis of sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors 
that affect women, such as nationality, and that States parties must legally recognize such 
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the 
women concerned, and prohibit them”.811   
In her dissent, Schulz does not hold back: she states, “not every case of poor 
treatment of a female claimant amounts to discrimination based on sex, or foreign 
nationality or the intersection of both grounds”.812 Schulz appears in this paragraph to 
pivot back to a grounds-based analysis in her interpretation of intersectionality. Her main 
objection to the majority in this case is on the grounds of admissibility or what in 
Common Law would be the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Nonetheless, while she 
believes the case should not have been heard at all by the Committee on legal grounds, 
her comments regarding the occurrence or not of discrimination can be viewed as an 
attempt to provide guidance as to the boundaries of an intersectional interpretation. She 
argues the facts in this case did not support a finding of discrimination, but rather it was a 
“tragic case” with bad (legal) behaviour on all sides. The majority, she argues, 
overstepped, and the fact that they found that “‘the custody of a minor child of tender 
age’ amounts to a case where the ‘general public importance rule’ should apply is 
disconcerting, and does not relate to sex-based discrimination”.813  
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Schulz’s is the first post-2010 clear articulation from the Committee of ‘what 
intersectionality is not’, and for this it is significant. Intersectionality is thus represented 
as a double negative: defined in the negative in terms of what it is not, and in dissent 
against the majority holding of what it is. Schulz appears to be taking a stance against a 
notion of intersectionality as a catalogue of conditions, or as Schulz puts it,  
women and all bad things and mix and there you have it.814  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Schulz is one Committee member who is 
against a “this and that” approach. It seems likely that the Committee will continue to 
grapple with its task of discerning limits to the laundry list of conditions and 
characteristics articulated in GR 35, explored above, as it evolves its working definition 
of intersectionality. 
The cases of two individual communications against the Philippines, Tayag 
Vertido v. the Philippines, 2010, and R. P. B. v. the Philippines, 2011 (2014) can be 
treated together. Both involve gender stereotypes and myths in the treatment of sexual 
assault survivors by the criminal justice system. That these cases are cited in GR 35’s 
catalogue of intersectionality decisions made by the Committee, means that we should 
see the treatment of matters of race, culture religion, etc., named as aspects of the 
Committee’s own definition of intersectionality, appear in the method of case analysis 
and decisions rendered by CEDAW. The R.P.B. case follows Vertido, and the author 
cites Vertido in her communication. The author R.P.B., a Filipino national, was executive 
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director of the Davao City Chamber of Commerce and Industry when the defendant, 
president of the Chamber at the time, sexually assaulted her. The judge who presided 
over the trial in a domestic court questioned the credibility of the victim’s testimony and 
found it implausible, using strong gender stereotypes in the language of her decision. The 
defendant was found not guilty, despite the existence of corroborating evidence and a 
medical report. In its decision, the CEDAW Committee held that the assessment by 
domestic courts of the credibility of the claimant’s testimony was influenced by several 
stereotypes about the “ideal victim” in cases of rape. The Committee found the state 
responsible for failure to fulfill its obligation to take appropriate measure to modify and 
abolish not only existing laws and regulations, but also customs and practices that 
constitute discrimination against women.815  
In R.P. B., the communication argues for a finding with respect to the chapeau 
Article 1 on discrimination, and Articles 2 c, d and f. Article 2, which, we may recall, is 
the article in which GR 28 situated the mandate to interpret state obligations regarding 
anti-discrimination through an intersectional lens. R.P.B commenced her communication 
with the Committee in 2011, after the release of GR 28; the Committee rendered its 
decision in 2014. As such, we would expect to see intersectionality as a complication to 
single-axis considerations of women’s human rights in this decision. I am neither the 
first, nor alone in tracing a tendency of the Committee to interpret Article 2(f) with a 
vague and thin understanding of culture.816 As I explored in Chapter 2, the framing of this 
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article takes us into the territory of the role of custom and tradition in discrimination 
against women, and the Committee’s mandate to demand that the state abolish it. This 
exemplifies, and I argue roots, imperial approaches to women’s human rights law at 
CEDAW. In R.P.B. v. Philippines, the Committee found that the Philippines State 
breached the rights of a mute and hearing-impaired girl to non-discrimination under 
Articles 2 and 5, in the investigation and trial of her alleged rape. The Philippines had, in 
investigating the crime and in the trial, they found, failed to provide a free interpreter and 
had used stereotypes and gender-based myths, disregarding the victim’s specific situation 
as a girl who is disabled. Finding under Article 2, we see the Committee recasting culture 
as a congealing of rape myths within the legal system, rather than a pre-industrial and 
racialized set of vague customs. This foreshadows the application of a more structural 
approach to the meaning of culture as specifically patriarchal in a case I analyze below, 
Jallow v. Bulgaria. 
The holding in R.P.B. shows the potential for the Committee to move from a view 
of culture still crafted in the shadow of imperialism, to one that is augmented by 
intersectionality’s concern with systems, structures and state apparatus. In R.P.B, the 
Committee finds: “First, the court not only rendered judgement against the author using 
gender stereotypes and myths, but also reasoned with manifest prejudice against her as a 
deaf minor victim”.817 Here culture and tradition become the culture of patriarchy 
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specifically, and this view is further complicated by recognition of a clear case of 
intersectional discrimination based on disability.   
Although this decision appears to take us into new territory with respect to 
intersectionality and what it opens in the interpretation of custom and tradition, the 
Philippines is a country that has been the subject of much imperial and globalized 
capitalist intervention; it is, for the purposes of the foregoing analysis, part of the third 
world from a TWAIL perspective, or the Global South from the perspective of the UN. It 
is thus necessary to balance the interest CEDAW takes in the breaches it finds here with 
its approach to states of the Global North. Does the interest in systems and contexts for 
discrimination arise from an intersectional analysis, or is the interest a proxy for its 
imperial predecessor, and restricted to the systems of those states located in the Global 
South? In M.W. v. Denmark, explored above, we had a mixed response, complicated by a 
dissent on procedural grounds. How does this new intersectional tool assist in the 
examination of traditionally strong states, which are part of the Global North?  
In Kell v. Canada, the Committee appears to find its voice with intersectionality. I 
will argue below that the rubric of intersectionality now appears to be openly shaping 
subsequent jurisprudence in such decisions as Jallow v. Bulgaria, decided in 2012, in 
which CEDAW held a European state and one of its nationals responsible for the 
violation of the treaty rights of a migrant woman on the basis of her daughter’s abuse, 
and for the state’s subsequent lack of remedy.818 Both decisions foreground the specific 
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experiences of discrimination against multidiscriminated women, and expand both the 
kinds of gender discrimination states are required to prevent and the kinds of remediation 
imposed. Both involve fact scenarios very familiar to women’s rights advocates in 
several national settings. I will first turn to Kell. 
In Kell vs. Canada, a decision adopted in 2012 in which the Committee found 
against Canada, an Aboriginal woman was deemed discriminated against based on 
gender, in a way that may not have been so for a white woman, when her property rights 
were alienated after leaving an abusive relationship with a non-Aboriginal man. The facts 
of Kell’s case are detailed below. 
 In 1990, William Senych applied for housing without the knowledge of his 
common-law partner, Cecilia Kell, an Aboriginal woman from the Rae-Edzo community 
in the Northwest Territories (NWT). Senych’s application was denied because he was not 
a member of the Rae-Edzo community for which the housing was earmarked. On the 
advice of a Tenant Relations officer at the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority, Kell then 
applied for housing, listing Senych as her spouse. In 1991, the NWT Housing 
Corporation issued an Agreement for Purchase and Sale to Kell and Senych as co-owners 
of the property. Senych subjected Kell to domestic violence, including economic abuse, 
over the subsequent three-year period.  
In 1993, following a request from Senych and without Kell’s knowledge, the 
NWT Housing Corporation (on instruction from the Rae-Edzo Housing Authority) 
removed Kell’s name from the Assignment of Lease, the document that certified co-
ownership. The removal had the effect of making Senych the sole owner of the property. 
Senych was a board member of the Housing Authority at the time of his request. In 1995, 
228 
 228 
Senych changed the locks and denied Kell access to the property. He subsequently sought 
to evict her. While she sought protection in a shelter, Kell filed proceedings against 
Senych in the NWT Supreme Court seeking compensation for assault, battery, sexual 
assault, intimidation, trespass to chattels, loss of use of her home and consequential 
payment of rent and attendant expenses. She also filed a declaration that Senych had 
obtained the property fraudulently, aided and abetted by the NWT Government. Kell was 
assigned a legal aid lawyer, who advised her to comply with the letter of eviction and did 
not challenge the letter’s validity.  
Shortly thereafter, Senych was diagnosed with cancer at which time Kell’s lawyer 
advised her to delay proceedings. Senych later died, following which Kell’s lawyer 
initiated proceedings against his estate, the NWT Housing Corporation and another. A 
replacement legal aid lawyer added a claim for damages for assault and intimidation. In 
1999, Senych’s estate and the Housing Corporation offered Kell a monetary settlement. 
During negotiations, Kell’s case was twice reassigned to new lawyers. Both insisted that 
Kell settle. She refused, however, as her key concern was regaining the property. 
Following her refusal, Kell’s lawyer ceased acting on her behalf. Kell’s case was only re-
assigned to a new lawyer after she appealed to the Legal Services Board. The Supreme 
Court dismissed both proceedings for “want of prosecution”. Costs were imposed against 
Kell and subsequent appeals were unsuccessful. In 2004, Kell filed a third action related 
to her interest in and right to the leasehold title and possession of the property. The 
property had then been sold and the Court dismissed the matter. 
Kell subsequently submitted a communication to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in which she claimed that Canada had 
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violated articles 1, 2(d), 2(e), 14(2)(h), 15(1)-15(4), 16(1)(h) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Kell claimed that Canada 
had allowed its agents—the NWT Housing Corporation and the Rae-Edzo Housing 
Authority—to discriminate against her on the grounds of sex, marital status and cultural 
heritage and had failed to ensure that its agents provide equal treatment to female housing 
applicants. Kell noted Canada’s failure to prevent and remedy the fraudulent removal of 
her name from the Assignment of Lease and the failure to ensure that its agents afford 
women and men equal rights in respect of ownership, acquisition, management, 
administration and enjoyment of property. 
The Committee concluded that Kell’s property rights had been prejudiced due to a 
public authority acting with her partner, and that she had been discriminated against as an 
Aboriginal woman. The Committee also found that Canada had failed to provide Kell 
effective legal protection when she sought to regain her property rights. The Committee 
established that Canada, as party to the Convention and its Optional Protocol, had failed 
to fulfil its obligations under Articles 1, 2 and 16 and that it should provide monetary 
compensation and housing matching what Kell was deprived of. The Committee also 
recommended recruiting and training more Aboriginal women to provide legal assistance, 
as well as review Canada’s legal system to ensure that Aboriginal women victims of 
domestic violence have effective access to justice.819  
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In Kell, the victory is a particularly poignant recasting of a famously different 
decision on similar facts. In the 1981, Lovelace v. Canada820 case, predating both 
CEDAW’s individual complaints mechanism and Canada’s Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the complainant contested both the colonial state’s definition of (her) culture 
and the Indigenous male leadership’s collusion with it in an access to matrimonial 
property case. Importantly, the complexity of identity presented by Lovelace while 
named in the protections under separate articles in the Treaty (ICCPR), was not 
recognized in the holding by the Committee adjudicating (then, Human Rights 
Commission), who found in her favour but on the basis of her Indigenous status alone. In 
Kell, we see the operationalization of GR 28 in a holding against a state traditionally 
immune from international approbation: 
As an Aboriginal person, she experienced racism, and as a 
woman, she experienced sexism. Both of these aspects of 
discrimination contributed to a pattern of behaviour that 
was―at best bullying and at worst abusive. Poverty, 
unemployment, dislocation and homelessness resulting 
from the theft of her home played a role because she could 
not afford a lawyer of her own choosing[.]821 
  
The Committee further underscores that “[a]s the author is an Aboriginal woman 
who is in a vulnerable position, the State party is obliged to ensure the effective 
elimination of intersectional discrimination”.822 Specifically, the Committee references 
                                                 
 
820 Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977 (Communication No. 24/1977: Canada 
30/07/81). 
821 note 804, pt 9.3. 
822 Ibid, para 10.3. 
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GR 28 in its decision, and as justification for its articulation of state obligations and 
reparations in this case: 
In its general recommendation No. 28, the Committee 
states that intersectionality is a basic concept for 
understanding the scope of general obligation of States 
parties contained in article 2 of the Convention. … 
States parties must legally recognize and prohibit such 
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounding 
negative impact on the women concerned.823 
 
In Kell, the Committee found that article 2, paragraphs (d) and (e), of the Convention 
were violated.824 
In Jallow v. Bulgaria, 2012, referred to above, the CEDAW Committee found 
against the state in a case involving Isatou Jallow and her minor daughter without express 
use of the language of intersectionality but with use of its proxy term multiple 
discrimination. Isatou was an immigrant from Gambia, her husband and the father of her 
child, a Bulgarian national. Both mother and daughter were subjected to physical and 
sexual abuse at the hands of her husband. State authorities, including child welfare, who 
granted sole custody to the abuser, and initiated proceedings against the mother, based on 
only unverified assertions from the abuser, were found to have failed to provide 
protection, as required by Bulgaria’s obligations under CEDAW and the Optional 
Protocol. “The State party … failed to take appropriate measures to protect women, 
especially mothers, from domestic violence. The law and the practice of the authorities 
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do not recognize many forms of violence against women, resulting in inequality with 
men[.]”825 
In this case as in the one against the Philippines, we see a holding that reads 
Article 2(f) in relation to the intersectional discrimination congealed in the legal system 
of the State party. The required compensation owed to the author and her daughter 
included specific measures aimed at the rights of migrant women to state protection for 
domestic violence and the right to access to translation and interpretation in the legal 
system, as well as a requirement that the state, 
provide for appropriate and regular training on the 
Convention, its Optional Protocol and its general 
recommendations for judges, prosecutors, the staff of the 
State Agency for Child Protection and law enforcement 
personnel in a gender-sensitive manner, having particular 
regard to multiple discrimination, so as to ensure that 
complaints regarding gender-based violence are received 
and considered adequately.826 
 
In S.V.P. v. Bulgaria,827 S.V.P. is the author of the communication on behalf of 
her daughter regarding alleged discrimination under several articles of CEDAW. The 
daughter was sexually abused by a neighbour as a child. The prosecution of the crime 
was pursued laxly and tardily by authorities, who brought a lesser charge than the one in 
evidence, according to an agreement of facts. In this case, the child’s sexual abuse and 
subsequent mental health, developmental and trauma-related learning disabilities were 
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also cited by the Committee in its holding against the state. Once again, the systemic 
aspect of discrimination is featured in the finding against the state, using 2(f): 
The Committee recalls that article 2, paragraphs (a), (f) and 
(g), establishes the obligation of States parties to provide 
legal protection and to abolish or amend discriminatory 
laws and regulations as part of the policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and that they have an 
obligation to take steps to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women.828 
 
In S.V.P. we see again the pattern of ascribing to culture and tradition a less 
colonial and more structural understanding of the operations of discrimination. Here what 
Crenshaw called the “background conditions” are the concern of the treaty Committee, 
tracing the systemic nature of discrimination and inequality, rather than the one-time 
event, seen as an aberration from the norm. This is one of the fundamental aspects of an 
intersectional approach, and it appears the Committee is finding its way with it. 
5.6.2 Intersectionality as a factor in Concluding Observations 
We are pretty clear on the definition of intersectionality. 
We come at it from the perspective of the country report: 
even when we use intersectionality, sometimes sexuality 
and sexual orientation drops out. But race, ethnicity, 
religion, caste, there isn’t a country where those don’t come 
out. Where it is obvious, it comes out.829 
 
I think that it actually happens routinely without devoting 
any concrete or planned thought. It had become integrated 
into our routine set of questions both … at the very first 
                                                 
 
828 Ibid, para 9.4. 
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part of the dialogue under articles 1 and 2 when, you know, 
the most emerging overarching issues are being laid out.830  
 
Recalling the review earlier in the chapter, countries that have become party to 
CEDAW are obliged to submit regular reports to the Committee on how the rights of the 
Convention are implemented. During its sessions, the Committee considers each state 
party report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the state party in the 
form of concluding observations. While concluding observations do not hold the same 
place as ICs, it is nonetheless “the primary role of all the Committees … to review the 
reports submitted periodically by State parties in accordance with the treaties’ 
provisions”.831  
I asserted above that in the context of intersectionality, viewed here as an 
approach to contextualized law making, the concluding observations may have an even 
more important story to tell about the Committee’s interpretation of the concept. This is 
because it is where the Committee articulates states’ obligations in broad public policy 
prescriptions (and proscriptions), by necessity addressing the background conditions of 
discrimination with an eye to prevention, rather than through technical interpretations of 
breaches only. This, I have argued elsewhere (Chapters 1 and 3), brings us closer to the 
potential operationalization of the radical roots of intersectionality, as articulated in 
Crenshaw and Yuval-Davis. 
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In GR 35, the Committee draws attention to the concluding observations of Papua 
New Guinea, 2010,832 South Africa, 2011,833 Afghanistan, 2013,834 and Jordan, 2017835 as 
exemplary of its adoption of intersectionality. I will examine these concluding 
observations in light of the foregoing analyses. However, because GR 35 was focused on 
an update of GR 19 on gender-based violence, I will expand the concluding observations 
considered here to those that I witnessed the reporting cycle of, and for which there are 
now concluding observations, taking us beyond the violations categorized exclusively 
under gender-based violence. Thus, I will add to my examination, a brief consideration of 
Canada 2016,836 Belarus 2016837 and Bhutan, 2016.838 
In the concluding observations for Afghanistan, we see a return to the language of 
“cultural beliefs”, “deep rooted patriarchal attitudes”,839 and familiar approbation with 
which a neocolonial, deeply contingent and emerging state such as Afghanistan has 
historically been regarded, with CEDAW using women’s international human rights as a 
measure of its general acceptance into the international community. The CEDAW was 
ratified by Afghanistan, without reservations, as part of a spate of human rights 
                                                 
 
832 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Papua 
New Guinea, CEDAW/C/PNG/CO/3 (2010). 
833 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women South 
Africa, CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 (2011). 
834 Concluding Observations on the Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of Afghanistan, 
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ratifications, all listed in the concluding observation, in keeping with the contingent 
nature of Afghanistan’s acceptance into the global community. Yet, the litany of 
violations the Committee goes through indicate the pro forma nature of this ratification 
and point to CEDAW’s role—and consequently women’s international human rights—in 
disciplining a rogue state.  
The CO itself does not analyze the ways in which international interests and 
outside pressures shape the fortunes and manipulations of a state and consequently, how 
the instrumentalization of patriarchy is used as a bulwark against internal challenges and 
external pressures. Should this have been the case, such as the ways state homophobia 
was analyzed in the scholarship of Puar, Weiss & Bosia, intersectionality might have 
emerged as potent tool in the critique of the imperial pedigree of international law.  
Likewise, Bhutan’s concluding observations vacillate between a colonial 
fascination with the state’s spiritual “gross national happiness (GNH)” indicator, 
mentioning it six times in the concluding observations, and repugnance at its toleration of 
polygamy.840 In my informal discussions with NGO representatives during the civil 
society meetings before the state reporting session for Bhutan, women’s rights advocates 
expressed concern with the lack of accountability for the degree of gender-based violence 
in Bhutan and the soft manner in which the state was approached in this regard. Although 
gender-based violence is mentioned as a condition of GNH in the concluding 
observations, 841there is concern among activists that a colonial fascination with the GNH 
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of Bhutan distracts the Committee from the harsher realities, particularly when it is seen 
as a country that avoids some of the pitfalls of embracing neoliberalism in its 
“development” path.842   
The tension between the “women in development” narrative and the rights agenda 
represented by CEDAW that I analyzed in Chapter 2 remains in play in this and the other 
concluding observations for countries of the Global South analyzed by the Committee. 
Recalling that this discourse traces its intellectual history to an often unquestioned 
grounding in the unequal relations of international political economy,843 and posits a 
social development role for women who, rather than appearing as rights bearers, are 
viewed as indicators of a community’s capacity to advance toward a more developed 
state, the Committee gestures to this context of measurement again when it states that 
“the State party has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis of existing 
discriminatory stereotypes in order to assess their impact on the achievement of gender 
equality”.844  
In the concluding observations for South Africa, the Committee continues this 
line of observation with multiple mentions of the importance of the Millennium 
Development Goals. The references to development in South Africa’s case, follow the 
strain within women’s human rights I examined in earlier chapters regarding the 
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contextualization of women’s “advancement” as tethered to the very economic conditions 
that many argue are the source of their disenfranchisement. In keeping with this 
developmentalist narrative, the Committee’s view of intersectionality seems additionally 
obscured by the imperial shadow we have traced through Orford in passages such as the 
following: 
The Committee is thus concerned about the inadequate 
implementation of effective and comprehensive measures 
to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative traditional 
values and practices in South Africa. The Committee also 
expresses serious concern about the persistence of 
entrenched harmful cultural norms and practices, including 
ukuthwala (forced marriages of women and girls to older 
men through abduction), polygamy and the killing of 
“witches”.845 
 
As I explored in Chapter 1, such preoccupation with what Letti Volpp calls 
“bizarre and alien” forms of gender persecution as “traditional”,846 lifts these harms from 
the global context of gender-based violence and consigns them to the local and cultural, 
giving them status as backward spectacle. The Committee’s most frequent mention of 
intersectionality in this CO is in relation to the intersection of gender and HIV status, 
along with the specific impact of gender discrimination on rural women with respect to 
property inheritance and ownership.847 Given the continuing impact of Apartheid and 
globalization on South Africa’s present, an intersectional analysis might be expected to 
take a step further in situating women’s oppression within this context. 
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In the CO for Papua New Guinea, 2010, the Committee finds “the State party has 
not taken sustained systematic action to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative 
traditional values and practices”, even while it acknowledges “the rich culture and 
traditions of the State party and their importance in daily life”.848 In what appears a nod 
to more recent understandings of the dynamic nature of culture, the Committee “invites 
the State party to view culture and tradition as dynamic aspects of the country’s life and 
social fabric and therefore as subject to change”.849  
In Chapter 2, I explored how the language of “abolish” in Article 2(f) of CEDAW 
echoes the presumed right of metropolitan centres to require change in the subjugated. 
Despite the intervention of contemporary and critical perspectives on the textual 
limitation in CEDAW’s formulation of culture, the Committee continues at times to 
conflate culture with discrimination, or patriarchy with culture, giving an at once partial 
and totalizing view of a state’s culture, no less fixed in conception for the gesture to its 
changeability.  
Earlier in the dissertation I explored how such commentary has “reinforced the 
notion that metropolitan centres of the West contain no tradition or culture harmful to 
women, and that the violence which does exist is idiosyncratic and individualized rather 
than culturally condoned”.850 This theme of colonial superiority casts a pall over aspects 
of the Committee’s reasoning, such as the one following the passage I’ve just quoted, 
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where the Committee calls upon the state to “take steps to ensure that traditional 
apologies are abolished” and ensure that “women and girls who are victims of violence 
have access to … shelters and safe houses”.851 While clearly women in Papau New 
Guinea have every right to find safety from violence, the prescriptive nature of the 
solution seems out of keeping with the nod to cultural difference in the passage before. In 
this instance, we see a post-intersectional CEDAW following in the footsteps of the 
founders of international authority studied by Orford: confidently setting out to “remake 
the world” in their (cosmopolitan) image.852  
In what appears to be a blatant confirmation of this assessment of the 
Committee’s reliance on its imperial roots, the 2016 concluding observations for Canada 
start out the customary constructive dialogue by praising a piece of legislation853 that was 
the subject of extensive feminist resistance and activism within Canada (Bill S-7, 
Barbaric Cultures Act; 854 and the related Quebec Charter of Secularism),855 specifically 
on the grounds that it advanced an expressly anti-intersectional analysis and racist 
instrumentalization of feminism. The so-called Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural 
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Practices Act, passed into law in 2015, was advanced in Canada along with a Barbaric 
Cultural Acts tip line, in the name of securing the gains of white feminists against the 
brown—literally barbarian—hordes who would bring unfiltered patriarchy with them 
when they emigrated. Indeed, the language itself was so blatantly colonial and egregious 
that there could be no clearer case of a single axis and racist feminism at work. 
Domestically, the legislation became a focal point for activism,856 comedy,857 and 
may have contributed to the defeat of the previous national government.858 It was brought 
to the international community as an example of the state not fulfilling its international 
obligations,859 by taking a non-intersectional approach to rights, by stirring up anti-
immigrant sentiment and by legislating these values in ways that criminalized, isolated 
and targeted vulnerable populations of women. Openly imperial, analytically 
compromised or simply ignorant of the national details and tone deaf—and quite possibly 
all of the above—CEDAW failed to apply its intersectional lens to this context where 
perhaps the state’s bias confirmed and echoed its own legacy.  
On other matters, the concluding observations for Canada advance an 
intersectional approach, specifically on Indigenous issues and core human rights’ 
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protections, such as solitary confinement, more properly protected in the pre-CEDAW 
treaties, such the ICCPR. And, contrary to Campbell’s finding of inconsistent follow up 
from individual communications in the concluding observations,860 in Canada’s 2016 
concluding observations, the Committee expressly asks for accountability with respect to 
its findings in Kell: 
The Committee urges the State party: (a) To fully 
implement the Committee’s views concerning 
communication No. 19/2008 regarding reparation and 
compensation for the author of the communication and 
inform the Committee without delay of all measures taken 
and planned as a consequence of its recommendations[.]861 
 
The Committee likewise follows up on its earlier recommendations in its inquiry, 
which we will explore below, in these concluding observations, with the following 
unequivocal statement: “The Committee recommends that the State party fully 
implement, without delay, all recommendations issued by the Committee in its report on 
its inquiry.”862 
Additionally, the Committee takes account of the role Canada plays in the 
perpetuation of international inequality through its trade and other economic dealings by 
requiring attention to the gendered impact of its global extractive industry and other trade 
activities. These intersectional aspects of the concluding observations for Canada may 
have more to do with the intersectional formulations of the NGOs and INGOs submitting 
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shadow reports to the Committee than with the coherence of CEDAW’s own 
interpretation of intersectionality.863  
Although all UN human rights treaty bodies rely on shadow reports, CEDAW, as 
I explored in Chapters 2 and 3, has a long and slightly more nuanced tradition of working 
with women’s rights NGOs due to its background as a body slightly outside the 
traditional UN structure, and for its reliance instead on the Commission on the Status of 
Women. While in the case of Canada the representation of women’s rights NGOs may be 
more robust than most, the role of women’s rights groups based in the Global South is no 
less important or influential.  
As I explored in Chapters 2 and 3, women’s groups from the Global South were 
present at the drafting stage of CEDAW, just as they were during the Beijing debates. As 
I demonstrated in Chapter 3, it was their voices that gave rise to the demand for an 
intersectional approach in the first place. Despite—or perhaps more accurately because 
of—the Committee’s reliance on the shadow reports of the national and international 
NGOs, there is evidence of an emergent and inconsistent intersectional approach in the 
Committee’s deliberations. 
Unlike Canada, Belarus can be seen as appearing before the Committee as more 
of a supplicant nation, ambivalently engaging with the international treaty system as a 
means to attaining access to the economic benefits of globalization,864 because, as we saw 
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in Chapter 2, ratification of human rights’ instruments is “seen as an essential prerequisite 
to the facilitation of societal, legal, economic and political progress”.865 Within this 
context, the intersectional approach of CEDAW under Article 2 of the Treaty, which is 
the textual location of states’ obligations, takes on the added dimension of explicit and 
expanded gender protections. The attention the Committee draws to the rights of lesbian, 
bisexual and trangender women is striking,866 as are of course, the corollary violations.  
As previously mentioned, the persecution of human rights defenders meant that 
during the country report before the Committee, NGO representatives had to have their 
identity obscured, and required the protection of and screening by large INGOs to put 
forward their experiences to committee members on the floor of the session. While the 
criminalization of lesbians, the apprehension of the children of human rights defenders on 
trumped-up grounds,867 and a variety of state suppression and repression, including 
executions, are indeed grounds for a strongly worded set of concluding observations, 
there are contextual issues to state homophobia in the global perspective that a nuanced 
committee approach to intersectional oppression committed by a variety of states might 
surface. For instance, in the case of terrorism and religious extremism, the context of 
globalization is often mentioned.868  
Where state homophobia comes before the Committee to examine, it might 
contextualize the approbation to consider the role human rights obligations play in the 
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state’s admission to the international community, and the corollary manufacture of a 
common enemy that appeals to homophobia and repression exemplify. It may be too 
much to wish for an acknowledgement of Puar’s sweeping yet even-handed mapping of 
homophobia and its variants in the global security agenda, neoliberal promotion of 
human rights, establishment of militarized hyper masculinity and the deployment of 
sexualized racial violence against men and women under the guise of both state 
homoprotectivism and state homophobia. Yet the Committee seems able at times to get 
part way there, as the reviews of Jordan and Canada, explored below, indicate. 
In Jordan, the Committee again finds focus on the women and development 
discourse, concluding: “The Committee calls for the realization of substantive gender 
equality, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, throughout the process of 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”869 
Nonetheless, the Committee balances this with a sustained intersectional 
contextualization of the factors preventing Jordan from implementing the Treaty 
adequately: 
The Committee acknowledges the impact of the combined 
economic, demographic and security challenges facing 
Jordan as a consequence of the continuing conflicts in the 
region, in particular the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
which has resulted in: (a) A mass influx of refugees from 
the Syrian Arab Republic, estimated at 1.4 million persons; 
(b) A social and economic cost to Jordanian society, 
reflected in a sharp increase in poverty and unemployment 
and overstretched national health and education systems, 
basic services and infrastructure; (c) A deteriorating 
                                                 
 
869 note 836, para 59. 
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security situation. The Committee notes with concern that 
the support from the international community has been 
insufficient to alleviate the burden on the State party and 
the host community and calls upon donors to meet the 
humanitarian needs identified by the United Nations. The 
Committee is concerned about the persistent rise of 
fundamentalism in the country, which has a negative 
impact on women’s rights.870 
 
It is a remarkable passage that gives hope for a new perspective on the full import 
and meaning of intersectionality in the Committee’s deliberations. Given the multitude of 
individual, state, geopolitical and bureaucratic determinants I have surfaced in the 
forgoing chapters that effect decision making at the Committee, it would be overly 
deterministic to conclude that this was solely the result of a further development of the 
Committee’s understanding of intersectionality as laid out in the more robust GC 35.  
5.6.3 Inquiry into Canada’s Treatment of Indigenous Women: CEDAW 
/C/O P.8/CAN/1 
 
... so being at the same time a woman, who is indigenous 
and has a disability means that your life is going to be 
extremely miserable because of the combination of the 
three elements. So you’re always a woman, but the two 
others are going to really add to the problems, the legal 
problems, you'll be faced with. And, and, I mean the legal, 
the practical problems in your daily life.871 
 
                                                 
 
870 Ibid, para C (7). 
871 Interview of Patricia Schulz, CEDAW Committee (26 October 2016), supra note 655. 
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Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the Committee has 
authority to investigate “grave or systematic violations by a state party”.872  Since 
acquiring the additional authority, CEDAW has exercised it on three occasions, first in 
relation to Mexico,873 subsequently on the Philippines,874 and most recently on Canada.875 
The inquiry under consideration here, namely that of Canada, finds a country of the 
Global North, and a traditional darling of feminist international law, keeping company 
with States parties it normally sits in judgement of. In this sense, at a normative and 
structural level, CEDAW/C/P.8/CAN/1 evidences a shift in protagonists, as Orford 
characterized the position of the imperial feminist in international law, discussed in 
Chapter 2. This could signal a holistic intersectional approach that goes beyond the 
individual violations that characterize the “this and that” approach of listing sequential 
harms as further enumerated grounds. The format of the inquiry procedure lends itself to 
an intersectional approach, since the mechanism expressly deals with systemic matters, 
which, to be properly investigated, require a deeper contextual approach. In the Canada 
report, the CEDAW Committee delivers on the intersectional promise. In a tersely 
worded 58-page report, it holds the State to account, recalling that, 
under articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) of the Convention, States 
parties have an obligation to take appropriate measures to 
modify or abolish not only existing laws and regulations, 
                                                 
 
872 note 144, para 8 Optional Protocol 1999. 
873 Report on Mexico Produced by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and Reply from the Government of Mexico, 
CEDA W/ C/2005/OP 8/MEXICO (2005). 
874 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Summary of the inquiry concerning the 
Philippines under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, CEDAW /C/OP8/PHL/ 1 (2014). 
875 note 796. 
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but also customs, practices and stereotypes that constitute 
discrimination against women. The Committee also notes 
that the intersectional discrimination suffered by Aboriginal 
women in the State party results in the gender stereotyping 
they face. It considers that gender stereotyping is persistent 
in the society of, and institutionalized within the 
administration of, the State party, including within law 
enforcement agencies. This stereotyping includes portrayals 
of aboriginal women as prostitutes, transients or runaways 
and of having high-risk lifestyles, and an indifferent 
attitude towards reports of missing aboriginal women. The 
Committee considers that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
State party has made an effort to provide gender-sensitive 
training for the police, the State party has failed to take 
sufficient and appropriate measures to address gender 
stereotyping, including institutionalized stereotyping, in 
breach of its obligations under articles 2 (f) and 5 (a).876 
 
Here 2(f), the source of so much difficulty for a committee wrestling with its 
treaty’s imperial legacy, is marshaled to the intersectional purpose that GR 28, 
augmented by GR 35, demands. The strong language of abolishment, so implicated in the 
colonial projects of international law, but importantly also referencing genocide in 
Canada as well as in other states, is here focused with more precision on the culture of 
racist and sexist stereotypes that define and condition intersectional discrimination. In 
this full consideration of the state’s role in the murder and disappearance of thousands of 
Indigenous women, we can recall the words of Kimberlé Crenshaw when addressing the 
UN back in 2000. Here she laid out as to how harms from one form of discrimination 
may make a person vulnerable to another form; at other times, two forms of 
discrimination are indistinguishable, and simultaneously occurring: in both instances, 
                                                 
 
876 Ibid, para 205. 
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“[t]hese are the contexts in which intersectional injuries occur—disadvantages or 
conditions interact with preexisting vulnerabilities to create a distinct dimension of 
disempowerment”.877 
 
In CEDAW’s inquiry into the state’s complicity in the grave and systematic 
intersectional discrimination against Indigenous women in Canada, the continuing 
conditions that make the remedies for intersectional atrocities impossible to achieve are 
brought into visibility. Crenshaw’s earlier quoted encapsulation of intersectionality’s 
unique analytic contribution is worth quoting again here, because it fits the Committee’s 
insights accurately:  
Propaganda against poor and racialized women may not 
only render them likely targets of sexualized violence, it 
may also contribute to the tendency of many people to 
doubt their truthfulness when they attempt to seek the 
protection of authorities.878 
 
We saw earlier that Crenshaw is positing a different approach to intersectional 
discrimination than that which has arisen out of the mass atrocity context, by pointing out 
that such eruptions of targeted violence “draw upon preexisting gender stereotypes” but 
are also based in “distinctions between women”, and on “racial or ethnic stereotypes”.879 
In this way, she points out, race or ethnic, as well as class, and gender stereotypes work 
                                                 
 
877 Crenshaw, supra note 67 at 9. 
878 Ibid at 10. 
879 Ibid. 
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to characterize some groups “as sexually undisciplined”.880 It is precisely the intersection 
of these pre-existing and powerful social tropes that has dire consequences for women:  
making them “particularly vulnerable to punitive measures based largely on who they 
are”.881  It is this reality of intersectional discrimination that the CEDAW inquiry into the 
situation of Indigenous women in Canada draws out.   
5.7 Assessing the Record 
 
[T]he law is not the text, no, it’s the interpretation...And no 
people more than us at the CEDAW Committee can 
interpret with the same authoritative way.882 
 
Overall, when assessing CEDAW’s decision-making record, the concluding 
observations in particular reveal that states from the Global South or “non-western” 
states, as we saw in the case of Papua New Guinea, tend to be subject to greater criticism 
from the Committee regarding “the persistence of harmful norms, practices and 
traditions, as well as patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes”.883 Meanwhile, 
advanced liberal democracies, such as Canada, are subject to an inconsistent standard of 
accountability, at once holding the state to account for neo-colonial violations of 
Indigenous women’s rights, and shoring up a view of the colonized and barbaric 
immigrant woman that belies a reliance on imperial authority vested in its status as an 
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international law authority. As explored above, recent legal and public policy debate in 
Canada, in both the common law and civil law contexts, has mobilized an essentialist 
notion of women’s rights to limit religious and cultural rights (Bill S-7, Barbaric Cultures 
Act; 884 Quebec Charter of Secularism),885 simultaneously abstracting women as rights 
bearers from their race, culture and/or religion, and dissolving the harms they experience 
into vague, colonial notions of culture—ones CEDAW does not only fail to condemn, but 
goes out of its way to endorse. Openly deploying the term “barbaric” in public debate, in 
law and in policy, has normalized aggressive colonial language, thought by many 
academics in a post-Edward Said886 world to be impossible to deploy without irony,887 
and it has done so expressly in the name of protecting women’s rights. Canada is not 
alone in this trend, and CEDAW appears unprepared to challenge it, intersectional 
framework or not.  
As record numbers of peoples are on the move, many have identified safe 
migration as a top global priority. The CEDAW Committee appears inconsistently able to 
adhere to its own advancements in shaping a view of women and their rights that reflects 
this global reality. At once a hope but not an immunization against the vestiges of 
colonialism that continue to haunt and determine the protections offered by international 
                                                 
 
884 Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil Marriage Act and the 
Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, introduced 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2014, 
(at 3rd reading, 16 December 2014) [Barbaric Cultures Act]., supra note 855. 
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law, CEDAW’s engagement with intersectionality requires a rigour not yet in evidence. 
This rigour needs only to be based in analytic clarity, not academic purity. Recirculating 
problematic discourses of “cultural” behaviour oversimplifies important complexities in 
women’s experiences of violence. Practically, victims and survivors of gender-based 
violence are actively discouraged from coming forward if disclosing that they have 
experienced, for instance, forced marriage or trafficking, will mean criminal sanctions or 
deportation for their own families.  
Yet, while CEDAW has recently advanced cogent critiques of the effects of law 
on women in the global context,888 it remains confident in the structures of legal sanction 
to effect gender equity and regularly advances recommendations reliant on them. When 
condemning violent and discriminatory practices against women, the recommendation 
might better focus on the particular social location, contextual specificity and lived 
experiences of the affected women. Broad stroke, culture-based assertions obscure the 
nuances and intersecting vulnerabilities of women experiencing multiple sources of 
marginalization, such as poverty, homelessness, racism, and discrimination on the basis 
of indigeneity, religion, country of origin, newcomer status, mental health, and 
disability—in short, the very contextual essence of an intersectional approach. Returning 
the role of international law in the maintenance rather than the dismantling of women’s 
global inequality, the mirror intersectionality can turn on law to reflect its oppressive 
                                                 
 
888 note 794; General recommendation on article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their 
dissolution), CEDAW/C/GC/29 (2013) at 16. 
253 
 253 
shortcomings is an aspect of its analytic rigour not yet fully embraced in CEDAW’s 
contributing observations. 
In other decisions, such as the individual communications and the inquiry 
procedure—the area of committee decision-making that rises to the level of 
jurisprudence—CEDAW appears more capable of a nuanced engagement with the 
criteria of an intersectional analysis. Here, background systems, the dynamics of historic 
oppressions, stereotypes, contextual power dynamics and a consideration of targeted 
remedy appear more readily in the Committee’s deliberations. It is perhaps a prosaic, 
rather than grand theoretical moment that grants this clarity: the individual 
communications are just that—individual—which, while counter-intuitive as a bolster to 
a critique of individualistic liberal approaches to anti-discrimination law, also offer fact-
specific instances against which to develop considered analyses.  
The inquiry process is by definition, attentive to systemic and structural grounds 
of discrimination, and is charged with getting to the specifics of how discrimination plays 
out through systems. In the contributing observations, a general approach to national 
contexts runs the risk of imprecision, caricature, and in the case of Canada analyzed 
above, tone deafness to the persistence of imperial views of women and their rights in the 
international legal context. Although the CEDAW Committee’s adoption of 
intersectionality fails the test of analytic precision or consistent application, there is little 
question that its committee members, such as Silvia Pimentel, quoted at the outset of this 
section, see the authority of their role as interpreters of women’s international human 
rights bolstered, redefined and advanced by the development of intersectionality as a 
concept, a discourse, an heuristic device and, ultimately, as a legal tool.  
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6 Thinking While Acting: Conclusion 
“Feminists seek to rule for emancipatory purposes, and the tools they find in 
governance are among their best guesses as to how to move toward an 
emancipatory future. Understanding how it is working seems crucial to deciding 
how it should proceed going forward.”889 
 
At the outset of this dissertation, I repeated a gauntlet thrown down by Anne 
Orford, asking “[w]hat might a feminist reading [of international law] that attempts to 
avoid reproducing the unarticulated assumptions of imperialism look like?”890 I proposed 
that intersectionality, as an approach to women’s international human rights law, might 
be a partial answer to this challenge. Taking up her invitation at both the substantive and 
methodological levels, I adapted her method of critically assessing law’s appearances and 
stories about itself, used in her account of R2P, and applied it to an account of 
intersectionality in women’s international human rights. 
I began with a curated approach to the literature on intersectionality, entering 
scholarly conversations that spotlight the promise of its intervention and advance a 
complex view of its dual roles as critic of and technician in law. Striving to recapture the 
heuristic, ontological and epistemological critiques that intersectionality can offer to 
inform an approach to law grounded in social activism, I used this exploration of the 
literature to sharpen the focus on intersectionality’s most potent promise: to offer us a 
structural analysis of the intersectional process of discrimination. Moving from 
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intersectionality’s promise to its initial transmission to international human rights law, I 
spent time exploring the textual ground into which it was being introduced. To do this, in 
Chapter 2, I explored the nature of CEDAW as treaty. Here, by tracing the possible 
unarticulated implications and imbrications of imperialism in women’s international 
human rights law to situate the intersectional turn, I compared the academic literature 
ascribing meaning and portent to the concept both as epistemological challenge and as 
legal tool, using it to trace the limitations of CEDAW qua text. In Chapter 2 I also 
provided an account of the treaty’s legal capaciousness to discover and explain why its 
promise finds a home there. In doing so, I noted the thin understanding of culture rooted 
in the text and the interpretations of the text that continue to obstruct intersectionality’s 
full reach. 
Beginning in Chapter 3, I traced the unfurling of intersectionality as it advanced 
in relation to UN interpretations of women’s human rights. In this chapter I also began to 
uncover the geopolitical realpolitik that gave rise to the introduction of intersectionality 
in the context of genocide and international criminal prosecutions. In chapter 4, I 
provided insights from CEDAW Committee members as to the retrospective nature of its 
justification for the expansion of state obligations considered under the category of sex 
and gender—specifically, the highly politicized introduction of LGBTI rights. From this 
record, there is little doubt that intersectionality holds the hope and promise of pushing 
against the limitations it was born of and into, at the same time as the thin application of 
its potential to account for the same geopolitical forces it was born of leaves it, at times, 
complicit in the very structural oppressions it was released on the world to right.  
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As an approach to international human rights law, intersectionality seeks to 
complicate the imperial image of the European woman as the essentialized model for 
receiving the protections of human rights law. The entry of the term into the discourse of 
international human rights bears the imprint of the radical critiques that produced it; it 
also still bears the mark of its role in the unjust international order it plays a part in 
maintaining.   
An uneven grasp of intersectionality among the individuals of the CEDAW 
Committee, and the inconsistent record of its employment in the various decisions, does 
not tell a neat, teleological story of progress. The Committee’s engagement with 
intersectionality as metaphor, sociological concept, heuristic device and legal tool 
remains as contingent, iterative and imperfect as the field(s) of theory from which it 
derives, and the economically and politically volatile and violent world it attempts to 
address. Moreover, the Committee context mixes progressive analysis from individual 
members with compromises with both state and fellow committee members, within an 
overarching assumption of authority granted through the international legal system. In 
this mix, intersectionality plays many roles.  
Intersectionality in all its guises, is forged of both sincere and determined effort to 
reveal and ameliorate the experiences of the most marginalized and runs the real risk of 
fixing those experiences in a caricature of abject over-determinacy, where defiant, 
disruptive and contradictory experiences of identity among the intended beneficiaries of 
the human rights regime are flattened into a thin representation that intersectionality 
promised to enrich.  
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This dissertation tells a new story about the arrival and integration of 
intersectionality as a form of anti-discrimination theory and praxis in the international 
human rights context. It also reveals an older story about the risks inherent in any 
engagement with the project of governance. Throughout this work, I aspired to take the 
advice to “think anew about engaging with power”891 and to probe the apparently 
mysterious ways in which the ideas we advance to improve the world can be traced to 
some of its worst moments of failure. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Research Ethics Letter/Study Interviewee Agreement 
Oct 25, 2016 
Geneva/ Canada 
Dear  
I am writing this letter to ask if you would be available to speak with me. I am 
conducting research on the origins of intersectionality in transnational human rights law, 
and its applicability to Canadian claimants. I have been working with Professors {_,_,_} 
at Osgoode Hall Law School.  
I will be in Geneva and able to interview you during the CEDAW session 
beginning {Date}. I only ask you to name the time and place and I will be there. 
My study is called: Women’s Intersectional Transnational Human Rights: Origins 
and Impacts. 
My understanding is that you have had experience with the roll out, deliberations 
and applications of intersectionality at CEDAW, as part of the CEDAW Committee. I 
anticipate taking no more than forty-five minutes of your time. 
I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research. 
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I do anticipate that your participation will contribute to scholarship and practice, 
which advances and legitimates the goals of an intersectional approach to human rights 
both internationally and within Canada. Your specific observations and experiences will 
thus inform ongoing development of theory and jurisprudence.  
I anticipate our discussion would revolve around the following issues and themes:  
1. What do you know about the text of CEDAW General 
Recommendation 28 and how it was negotiated? 
2. Does the Committee use this GR’s definition of “intersectionality” in 
its deliberations? 
3. What was the influence of the development of CERD’s statement on 
intersectionality, General Comment 25, on CEDAW’s work in this 
area? 
4. What, if any, influence do you think the context of sexual violence in 
conflict, such as the prosecutions in Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda 
had on the development of CEDAWs intersectionality statement? 
5. Do you feel the statement guides the Committee’s work? 
6. What pressures are brought to bear with respect to the “culture”, 
“religion” or race of the claimants/individual representations that come 
to CEDAW?  
 
Our meeting would be more like a consultation or a conversation than a formal 
interview.  In discussing the issues noted above, I will not have a formal list of questions 
but rather let the discussion unfold. It should go without saying that, if you agree to meet 
with me, you are under no obligation to answer any question I might ask. 
I may bring a recorder. If I do, the recording is only to assist my note taking. My 
intention is to use the notes from our discussion in connection with my dissertation in the 
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PhD Program at Osgoode. Dissertations are published, but not widely circulated. As well, 
I might later wish to publish an academic article that relies upon our discussion. 
I would be pleased to speak with you either on a not-for-attribution basis or, if 
you prefer, to attribute comments that you make or ideas that we have discussed. If I do 
wish to quote you by name or in any way that could be attributed to you, I undertake to 
provide you with a copy of the intended quotation based on my notes. You will have the 
opportunity to revise any comments associated with your name. The notes (and 
recordings) from our discussion will be kept in my safekeeping for a period of at least 
two years. I will treat them as confidential to the limit allowed by law. Neither the topics 
we will discuss, nor any writing I do afterwards, is intended to produce a "report card" on 
any person or organization. 
Needless to say, you are under no obligation to meet with me and you may call 
the session to a close at any time.  
You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so 
decide.  If you decide to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, it 
will not affect your relationship with me, York University, or any other group associated 
with this project. Should you wish to withdraw after the study, you will have the option to 
also withdraw your data up until the analysis is complete. 
If you agree to meet, I look forward to hearing from you. I will be in touch with 
you within the next ten days to see if a convenient time for this meeting can be arranged. 
Do not hesitate to be in touch with me if you have any questions or concerns. I can be 
reached at  ____________________________. 
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York University has a policy on research ethics. You will find this at 
http://www.yorku.ca/research/support/ethics/humans.html 
If you have questions about the research in general or about your role in the study, 
please feel free to contact XX, either by telephone at _____________ or by e-mail 
___________________. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human 
Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board and 
conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines.  If 
you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a participant in the 
study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 
{contact information}. 
At the interview I will ask you to initial my copy of this letter to ensure that you 
have given me your informed consent. 
When we meet, I will ask you to indicate the following.  By all means, you can do 
so now in response to this letter if that is most convenient. 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
 
I ___________________consent to participate in Women’s Intersectional 
Transnational Human Rights: Origins and Impacts conducted by Amanda Dale I have 
understood the nature of this project and wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my 
legal rights by signing this form.  My signature below indicates my consent. 
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Signature     Date        
 
Participant 
 
 
Signature    Date   October 25, 2016     
Principal Investigator 
 
I consent to have this discussion ______________________  
With Attribution ______________________________  
Without Attribution ____________________________ 
 
 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Amanda Dale, BA, MA, MSt, PhD (Cand)   
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